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TOWARD A CRIMINAL LAW FOR CYBERSPACE: A
NEW MODEL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT?
SUSAN W. BRENNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article argues that one consequence of the increasing
proliferation of computer technology and the attendant migration of
human activities, including illegal activities, into cyberspace is that
the efficacy of our traditional approach to enforcing the criminal
law is eroding.' As Section II explains, it is already apparent that
the traditional model is not an effective means of dealing with
cybercrime, i.e., crime the commission of which entails the use of
computer technology.
* NCR Distinguished Professor of Law & Technology, University of Dayton
School of Law, Dayton, Ohio. Website: http://www.cybercrimes.net.
The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions to this article made by
two individuals: the first is John Lightfoot, Special Assistant to the Deputy
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Counterterrorism Division. The
fdcus on incorporating assumption of risk into cybercrime law arose from a
conversation the author had with Mr. Lightfoot in which he cogently argued for
the use of such a principle.
The second person who contributed to the article is Doug Dailey, Program
Manager for the Rural Law Enforcement Training Center. Dr. Dailey was kind
enough to read several drafts of the article and offer substantive suggestions which
were invaluable given his extensive expertise in the area of criminal justice. His
comments markedly improved the quality of the article and its analysis.
1. For the purposes of this article, the "traditional model of law
enforcement" contemplates the enforcement of a society's criminal law by
designated entities and/or individuals who are usually agents of the state. See
infra § II(B).
2. "Cybercrime" has not been formally defined, but it essentially denotes the
use of computer technology in an effort to achieve illegal ends. See generally
Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as Virtual Crime?, 4 CAL. CRIM. L. REv.
1 (2001), http://boalt.org/CCLR/v4/v4brenner.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2003) (on
file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). Logically,
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We are therefore seeing the emergence of an alternative
approach to law enforcement,3 one that emphasizes collaboration
between the public and private sectors and the prevention of crime
rather than merely reacting to it. Section III describes how this
new, still-evolving model functions and explains why it emerged at
this particular point in time. Section IV analyzes how this evolving
approach, the operation of which is as yet limited to the
commercial sector, can be extrapolated so that it encompasses
individuals as well as businesses. Sections III and IV also examine
the extent to which reliance upon this new model will require
incorporating new doctrines into the criminal law and consider the
permissibility of devising what is, in part, at least, a "criminal law
for cyberspace." Finally, Section IV provides a brief conclusion.
cybercrime encompasses three categories of crime. In one, the computer is the
target of the offense where there may be attacks on network confidentiality,
integrity and/or availability. Hacking, denial of service attacks, and virus
dissemination all fit into this category. See Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police
Don't Care About Computer Crime, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465, 468-69 (1997),
available at http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/I0hjolt465.html (last visited Sept.
3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). See
generally How the FBI Investigates Computer Crime, CERT COORDINATION
CENTER, at http://www.cert.org/tech-tips/FBI investigatescrime.html (last
visited Sept. 17, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal).
The second category of cybercrime consists of traditional crimes (e.g., theft,
fraud, and forgery) that are committed with the assistance of or by means of
computers, computer networks and related information and communications
technology. Here, the computer is a tool used to commit a conventional crime.
See generally Brenner, supra; Goodman, supra.
The third category of cybercrime encompasses instances in which computers
play an incidental role in the commission of a traditional offense, as when a
blackmailer uses a computer to generate blackmail letters (or e-mails) or a drug
dealer uses Quicken to track his drug purchases and sales. See generally
Goodman, supra. Though scenarios such as these do not represent a "true"
category of cybercrime, they do pose challenges for law enforcement. If nothing
else they, like the "true" categories of cybercrime noted above, contribute to the
enormous amount of investigative and cyberforensic work that will eventually
become part of all criminal cases. Section II describes the effect this burden has
upon law enforcement as it operates under the current model.
3. For the purposes of this article, "law enforcement" represents the agencies
and individuals who are charged with enforcing the substantive criminal law
within a given society. The enforcement of criminal law has historically been a
state function. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. V, § 13; Ga. Const. art. V, § 2, 1I; La.
Const. art. V, § 27.
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II. CYBERCRIME AND THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT
The Hobbesian principle of sovereignt.. is rooted to the
existence of physical territory and is contingent on the ability of
the state to protect its citizens, maintain order and uphold the
law within confined geographical boundaries ....
[T]echnological advances.., have created 'cyberspace': a
spontaneous ethereal realm, separate from the physical
jurisdiction of the state, where mankind's growing wealth and
military power are being stored and channeled.
4
The traditional model of law enforcement, which is the model
still in use today, evolved to deal with real-world crime; the
essential components of the model were, for all intents and
purposes, in place by the nineteenth century. Real-world crime is
crime perpetrated in and via the real, physical world, that is,
without the use of technology.5
A. Real- World Crime
Primarily because it is situated in a corporeal, physical
environment, real-world crime has several defining characteristics.
The sections below identify and examine the four characteristics
that are the most significant for this discussion.
1. Proximity
Perhaps the most fundamental characteristic of real-world.
crime is that the perpetrator and the victim are physically proximate
to each other at the time the offense is committed or attempted. 6 It
4. Cybercrime: The Challenge to Leviathan, London School of Economics:
The Hayek Society, at http://www.lse.ac.uk/clubs/hayek/Essays/cybercrime.htm
(last visited Sept. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology
Law Journal).
5. "Technology" here refers to any technology, not simply computer
technology. The model of real-world crime articulated above is based upon the
repertoire of "harms" a perpetrator could inflict before, say, the nineteenth
century, which saw great advances in firearms and other technology.
6. One can avoid the need for physical proximity, among other things, by
engaging someone to carry out the offense on their behalf, as when a person hires
another to kill their unfaithful spouse or ungenerous wealthy relative. This does
not undermine the validity of the point being made above because, in a non-
technological world, the actual perpetrator will have to occupy some degree of
2004]
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is, for example, simply not possible to rape or realistically attempt
to rape someone if the rapist and the victim are fifty miles apart.
By the same token, in a non-technological world it is physically
impossible to pick someone's pocket or take their property by force
if the thief and victim are in different countries.
2. Scale
A second characteristic of real-world crime is that it tends to
be one-to-one crime; that is, it consists of an event involving one
perpetrator and one victim. This event - the "crime" - commences
when the victimization of the target is begun and ends when it has
been concluded; during the event the perpetrator focuses all of his
or her attention on the consummation of that "crime.",7 When the
"crime" is complete, the perpetrator is free to move onto another
victim and another "crime." The one-to-one character of real-
world crime derives from the constraints physical reality imposes
upon human activity:8 A thief cannot pick more than one pocket at
a time; an arsonist cannot set fire to more than one building at a
time; and prior to the development of firearms and similar
physical proximity to the victim at the time the crime is committed.
7. The characterization of real-world crime presented above assumes
substantive crimes such as murder, rape, theft, arson, burglary and the like. The
one-to-one character of these substantive offenses may not hold for inchoate
crimes and clearly does not apply to compound crimes such as felony-murder,
CCE or RICO offenses.
As to inchoate crimes, one can presumably be part of a conspiracy to commit
bank robbery while one commits that robbery; and one might argue that it is
possible to simultaneously conspire and attempt or conspire and solicit the
commission or a crime. See Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 1, 54-58, 89-91 (1989). The one-to-one nature of real-world substantive
crime is deliberately abrogated by compound offenses such as felony-murder and
RICO, which are predicated on the concept that one course of conduct constitutes
the simultaneous commission of various offenses. See generally, Susan W.
Brenner, RICO, CCE, and Other Complex Crimes: The Transformation of
American Criminal Law?, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 239 (1993).
Finally, the characterization presented above does not encompass the rare
occasions when a single course of conduct results in the coincident commission of
two different substantive crimes. A father, for example, who rapes his daughter
simultaneously commits the crimes of rape and incest. See, e.g., State v.
Rosenbalm, 2002 WL 31746708 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).
8. For the additional role physical constraints play in structuring the nature
of real-world crime, see infra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
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armament, it was exceedingly difficult for one bent upon homicide
to cause the simultaneous deaths of more than one person. 9
The one-to-one nature of real-world crime is, however, more a
default than an absolute; exceptions occur, especially with regard to
the number of perpetrators. Rape, murder, theft, arson, forgery and
many other crimes can involve multiple perpetrators; indeed, the
aggregation of offenders and the rise of gangs and other types of
"organized crime" is a tendency that has accelerated over the last
several centuries.'0 But while many-to-one deviations from the
one-to-one model have occurred for centuries, one-to-many
deviations were rare prior to the use of technology. For example,
in a world without computers, copiers, and similar devices, the
forging of a document must be done by hand, which takes time and
means that only a limited number of forgeries can be produced.
Consequently, prior to the 18'b century, forgery was almost
inevitably a one-to-one crime; the forger falsified a document, used
it to victimize his target and then moved onto another document
and another victim. The same is true of fraud today; the perpetrator
necessarily focuses his or her efforts on a single target, succeeds,
and, having done so, moves on to another target.
9. This has never been true of murderers who employ poison; they can cause
the more or less simultaneous deaths of many victims by, say, poisoning the food
served at a banquet. And those who use poison also deviate from the model being
articulated above in another way: They do not have to be in physical proximity
with their victim(s) at the time the homicide occurs, though they do require
physical proximity either to the victim or to some substance the victim will
consume in order to cause the victim's death. In a non-technological world,
"remote" poisoning is not a viable possibility.
In a technological world, on the other hand, "remote" poisoning is a very real
possibility. The murderer might, for example, hack into a hospital's computer
system and alter the medication prescribed for patients, either by changing the
medication entirely or by increasing the prescribed dose. Such an alteration could
cause the death of at least some of the patients, depending on the nature of the
alteration and the likelihood that the medical staff would become aware of it and
decline to administer the modified prescriptions.
10. See generally, Susan W. Brenner, Organized Cybererime? How
Cyberspace May Affect the Structure of Criminal Relationships, 4 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. 1 (2002), available at http://www.jolt.unc.edu/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2003)
(on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
11. There were, no doubt, one-to-many deviations in the pre-nineteenth
century world. A forger might, for example, falsify a document and use it to
victimize a company, perhaps a bank; if one construes the bank as constituting
2004]
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3. Physical Constraints
A third characteristic of real-world crime is that its
commission is subject to the physical constraints that govern all
activities in the "real," physical world. 12  Because we are
accustomed to living our lives according to the dictates of these
constraints, we do not appreciate how they enhance the complexity
of criminal endeavors. 13 Every "crime," even routinized offenses
"many" victims, then this would be an instance of simultaneous one-to-many
victimization. Or a robber might intercept a stagecoach and use a weapon,
probably a firearm, to take property from several travelers at essentially the same
time; this could be brought within the one-to-one premise if the occupants of the
stagecoach are construed as "one," but it is more logical to construe this as an
instance of simultaneous one-to-many victimization.
12. See generally Hans Geser, Toward a (Meta-)Sociology of the Digital
Sphere, § 3, Sociology in Switzerland (Dec. 2002), at
http://socio.ch/intcom/t hgeserl3.htm#3 (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with
the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal):
In the Real World, physical space constitutes a homogeneous, isotropic
three-dimensional universe where all objects (including human bodies)
have their definite place and thus are interrelated in at least one aspect -
even when no other interrelations exist: their objectively measurable
spatial distance.
On the societal level, physical space thus generates the basis for a
common collective environment all human beings share without any
possibility of individual modification or escape.
This pervasive coherence makes us all the inhabitants of the same world,
but at the considerable cost of reducing our freedoms of action by
subjecting it to two basic constraints: the constraint that more time and
energy has usually to be spent for reaching more distant locations than
for reaching more proximate points; the constraint that more remote sites
can only be reached by "traveling," which means: following a course of
geographical points in a strict sequential order.
Id.
13. The operation of physical constraints, of course, accounts for the one-to-
one nature of real-world crime. The proposition that real-world crime is one-to-
one crime reflects the limitations human beings operate under in the physical
world; it is, for example, physically impossible for a real-world pickpocket to pick
more than one pocket at a time. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. The
concept that real-world crime is one-to-one crime is a statement about the scope of
real-world crime. It is an articulation of the premise that in the physical world a
"crime" is a zero-sum endeavor in which a perpetrator can devote his attention to
the consummation of Crime A or of Crime B, but cannot simultaneously carry out
the consummation of both Crime A and Crime B. The physical constraints
discussed above as constituting a third characteristic of real-world crime speak to a
different aspect of real-world crime. That is, they represent the physical context
within which an offender operates; at the text above explains, this physical
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such as prostitution and street-level drug dealing, requires some
level of preparation, planning and considered implementation if it
is to succeed. For real-world crime, these activities must be
conducted in physical space, actual space.
So, someone who decides to rob a bank must visit that bank
corporeally to familiarize herself with its physical layout (e.g.,
entrances, teller windows, vault location), security (e.g., guards,
surveillance cameras, visible alarm systems) and general routine
(e.g., when employees arrive and leave, times when the bank is
likely to have the fewest customers, currency pickup and
delivery).' 4  This process exposes the robber to public scrutiny
which can lead to her being apprehended after she commits the
crime. 15 The same is true of the robbery itself; while physically
inside the bank, the robber can leave evidence or give rise to
observations that can result in her being apprehended. 16  It is
equally true of the perpetrator's flight once the robbery has been
committed; here, again, the perpetrator is exposed to public view
and therefore runs the risk of being noticed and identified.' 7 In
environment can present an offender with circumstances which can make the
accomplishment of a criminal endeavor more difficult and/or increase the chances
that the perpetrator will be identified and apprehended.
14. See generally, John W. Kennish, Developing a Comprehensive Bank
Robbery Prevention Program (2000), at http://www.kennish.com/robberythreat/
(last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal); Associated Press, Suspects in Deadly Bank Robbery Denied Bond, USA
TODAY (Sept. 27, 2002) available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002-
09-27-robbery-suspects x.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers
Computer and Technology Law Journal).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 254 F.3d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 2001):
Morrison and his companion had the bad luck in casing the bank to
choose to park in apartment parking lots where the residents were
apparently believers in Neighborhood Watch. The residents recognized
alien cars as well as people who seemed to not live in the complex.
When their suspicions were aroused, they noted their suspicions and,
when questioned, passed them along to the police.
Id. The information led to Morrison's arrest and prosecution for robbing the bank.
See id at 680-81.
16. See, e.g., id. at 681 (Morrison, who robbed a bank, left a shoe print on the
teller's counter which was later used to link him to the robbery). See also People
v. Ihrig, 2002 WL 31501922, at *1-*2 (Cal. App. 2002); Smith v. State, 571
S.E.2d 817, 819 (Ga. App. 2002).
17. See, e.g., Morrison, 254 F.3d at 681 (officers noticed the remnants of the
2004]
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addition to the risks of exposure that arise from planning and
committing the "crime" itself, the robber will presumably need to
secure a weapon and some type of disguise, 18 and may need to find
some way to launder the funds she takes from the bank.19 Like the
processes involved in the robbery itself, each of these steps takes
time and effort and incrementally augments the total exertion
required for the commission of this "crime;" and like the robbery
itself, each increases the likelihood that she will be identified and
apprehended.2 °
4. Patterns
A fourth characteristic of real-world crime is that over time it
becomes possible to identify the general contours and incidence of
the "crimes" committed within a society. 1  Real-world
victimization tends to fall into demographic and geographic
patterns for two reasons. One is that, as is explained below, 22 only
a small segment of a functioning society's total populace will be
persistently engaged in criminal activity. 23 Those who fall into this
bank's dye pack in a car used by Morrison who robbed the bank). See generally
People v. Barnes, 2002 WL 1999737, at *1 (Cal. App. 2002).
18. See, e.g., Davis v. Commonwealth, 2002 WL 31163645, at *2 (Va. App.
2002); Barnes, 2002 WL 1999737, at * 1.
19. See, e.g., State v. Mullins, 517 N.E.2d 945, 948-49 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
20. See, e.g., State v. Aleman, 809 So. 2d 1056, 1065-66 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
21. See, e.g., CALLIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE- BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 2001: CHANGES 2000-01 WITH TRENDS
1993-2001 15, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv01.pdf (last visited Oct.
5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); JAMES
ALLEN Fox & MARIANNE ZAWITZ, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE - BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE U.S., at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/htius.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2003) (on
file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). See also ROBERT
JOCHELSON, NEW SOUTH WALES BUREAU OF CRIME STATISTICS AND RESEARCH
CRIME & PLACE: AN ANALYSIS OF ASSAULTS AND ROBBERIES IN INNER SYDNEY
(Aug. 1997), at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/bocsarl.nsf/pages/r43textsection4
(last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal).
22. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Leslie W. Kennedy, Erika Poulsen & John Hodgson, Problem
Solving Using Crime Mapping: Concentration and Context, Crime Mapping
Research Center, 2001 Conference Papers, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/njij/maps/conferences/Olconf/kennedy.doc (last visited
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category are apt to be from economically-deprived backgrounds
and are likely to reside in areas that share certain geographic and
demographic characteristics, primarily those in which the less
affluent members of that society reside.24 They will be inclined to
Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal)
(stating that "about 60 percent of crime occurs in 10 percent of the places, 10
percent of offenders account for about 50 percent of offenses, and 10 percent of
victimized people are involved in about 40 percent of the crimes") (citing William
Spelman & John E. Eck, Sitting Ducks, Ravenous Wolves and Helping Hands:
New Approaches to Urban Policing, 35 PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMENT 1-9 (1989)).
See also FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: ARRESTS
BY STATE, Table 69 (2001), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ciusO1/xl/Oltbl69.xls (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: INDEX OF CRIME - UNITED STATES,
1982-2001, available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr.cius_01/xl/OltblOI.xls (last visited
Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
A "functioning society" is one in which the rule of law prevails and the
assumption that "crime" represents extraordinary behavior consequently holds.
See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text. See, e.g., William M. Cohen,
Principles for Establishment of a Rule of Law Criminal Justice System, 23 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 269, 272 (1993) ("The rule of law is not simply a formal legality
which assures regularity and consistency in the achievement and enforcement
of... order, but is... 'justice based on the recognition and full acceptance of the
supreme value of the human personality and guaranteed by institutions providing a
framework for its fullest expression."') (quoting Conference on Security and Co-
Operation in Europe: Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on
the Human Dimension, June 29, 1990, § 2, 29 I.L.M. 1307). When the rule of law
is not respected, a society descends into chaos, and lawbreaking is neither unusual
nor controlled. See, e.g., Laura Rozen, Chaos in Kosovo, Salon, at
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/1999/08/03/crime/index.html (Aug. 3, 1999)
(last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal) (stating that "Itihere is an almost complete lack of civil authority
here.... Have your apartment broken into, car stolen, neighbor murdered, and
there is no one to call"). See also Nehat Islami, Kosovo Crime Wave, IWPR (Jan.
18, 2001), available at http://www.balkanpeace.org/rs/archive/janO1/rs116.shtml
(last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal); R. Jeffrey Smith, Rule of Law Is Elusive in Kosovo, WASHINGTON POST
(July 29, 2001), available at
http://www.balkanpeace.org/hed/archive/julyOl/hed3809.shtml (last visited Oct. 5,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
24. See supra note 23. See generally Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman &
Norman Loayza, Crime and Victimization: An Economic Perspective, 1.1
ECONOMIA 219 (2000), at
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/economia/v00l/1.1fajnzylber.pdf (last visited Oct. 5,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal);
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2000, Table 4.6 (2001), at
2004]
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focus their efforts on those with whom they share a degree of
physical proximity because these are their most convenient
victims. 25 This means that much of the "crime" in a society will be
concentrated in specific areas, such as on the "West Side of
Notown" or "South of 3 1st Street in Megalopolis." 26
The other reason why "crime" falls into certain patterns is that
each society has a repertoire of "crimes"-of legal rules that
proscribe a set of behaviors ranging from more to less serious in
terms of the respective "harms" each inflicts.27 The "harm" caused
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t46.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2003) (on
file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
25. See, e.g., Fajnzylber, supra note 24, at 266-73 (analyzing characteristics
of community in Brazil with high level of crime), at
http://muse.jhu.edu/demo/eco/l. lfajnzylber.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). See also Ken Pease &
Gloria Laycock, Revictimization: Reducing the Heat on Hot Victims, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE - NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, Research in Action, at
http://www/ncjrs.org/pdffiles/revictim.pdf (Nov. 1996) (last visited Nov. 5, 2003)
(on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). See generally
RENNISON, supra note 21, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv01.pdf (last
visited Sept. 25, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal).
26. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 23; Gary LaFree, et al., The Changing
Nature of Crime in America, 1 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000 221-24, available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/criminaljustice2000/vol 1/02a.pdf (last visited Oct. 3,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); Luc
Anselin, et al., Spatial Analyses of Crime, 4 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000, available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/criminaljustice2000/vol_4/04e.pdf (last visited Oct. 3,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); Paul
Brantingham & Patricia Brantingham, A Theoretical Model of Crime Hot Spot
Generation, 8 STUDIES ON CRIME AND CRIME PREvENTION 7-26 (1999); Paul
Brantingham & Patricia Brantingham, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY (Waveland
Press, Inc. 1991) (1981). See also Lawrence W. Sherman, et. al., Communities
and Crime Prevention in Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's
Promising -A Report to the United States at http://www.ncjrs.org/works/ (1999)
(on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); Keith Harris,
MAPPING CRIME: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 67-90 (U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE - OFFICE
OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS 1999) available at http://www.ncjrs.org/html/nij/mapping/
(last visited Oct. 19, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology
Law Journal); Don Weatherburn & Bronwyn Lind, Poverty, Parenting, Peers &
Crime-Prone Neighborhoods, AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY: TRENDS
AND ISSUES IN CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, available at
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/ti85.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on
file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
27. See Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on
TOWARD A CRIMINAL LAW FOR CYBERSPACE
Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace, 2002 UCLA BULL. L. & TECH. 3, 55-65 (2002),
at http://www.lawtechjoumal.com/articles/2002/03_020625_goodmanbrenner.pdf
(last visited Oct. 19, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology
Law Journal). See, e.g., CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELR., at
http://www.belarus.net/softinfo/lowcFatal.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); BULG. PENAL CODE, at
http://www.umt.edu/lawinsider/library/lawbyjurIbulgarpc.htm (last visited Oct. 19,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal);
CRIMINAL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Mar. 14, 1997), at
http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw60.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); EST. CRIMINAL CODE,
at http://www.legaltext.ee/en/andmebaas/ava.asp?m=022 (last visited Oct. 3,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); Fiji
ISLANDS PENAL CODE, at
http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/paclawmat/Fijilegislation/Consolidation_1978/Fiji_
PenalCode.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer
and Technology Law Journal); GERMAN PENAL CODE, at
http://www.bmj.bund.de/publik/estgb.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with
the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, at
http://www.indianlawinfo.com/bareacts/ipc.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on
file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); NIGERIA, CRIMINAL
CODE ACT, CHAPTER 77 (1990), http://www.nigeria-
law.org/Criminal%20Code%2OAct-Tables.htm. (last visited Oct. 19, 2003) (on
file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); REVISED PENAL
CODE OF THE PHIL., at
http://www.chanrobles.com/revisedpenalcodeofthephilippinesbook2.htm (last
visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal); CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
(1934), at http://www.cyberussr.comlrus/uk-toc-e.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2003)
(on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); SWEDEN,
PENAL CODE (1999), at
http://www.justitie.regeringen.se/propositionermm/ds/pdf/Penalcode.pdf (last
visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal); PENAL CODE OF THE U.A.E. (Jan. 2000) (last visited Oct. 19, 2003) (on
file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); ZAMFARA STATE OF
NIGERIA, SHARI'AH PENAL CODE LAW (Jan. 2000), at
www.zaamfaraonline.com/sharia/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2003) (on file with the
Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). See also American Law
Institute, MODEL PENAL CODE (1962); Paul H. Robinson, A DRAFT CODE OF
CONDUCT, at
http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/rbnsncon.htmhttp://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/r
bnsncon.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and
Technology Law Journal). See generally Anglo-Saxon Law - Extracts from the
Early Laws of the English, at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/saxlaw.htm (last visited Aug. 27,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); THE
CODE OF HAMMURABI, at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/hamfirame.htm (last
visited Aug. 27, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
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by a specific "crime" is encompassed by, and limited to, the
definition of the offense: a rape produces the "harm" targeted by
the "crime" of rape; 28 a theft causes the "harm" inflicted by the
"crime" of theft;29 a forgery yields the "harm" subsumed by the
"crime" of forgery, and so on.30 In a functioning society,3' the
more egregious "crimes" will occur much less often and may occur
less predictably than the minor "crimes. 3 2 Murder, for instance, is
Journal); THE SALIC LAW, at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/salic.htm (last visited Aug. 27,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); THE
VISIGOTHIC CODE, at http://libro.uca.edu/vcode/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2003) (on
file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
For the proposition that a "crime" inflicts "harm" upon the victim, see, e.g.,
Brenner, supra note 2, 7, 41-94.
28. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1).
29. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.2.
30. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 224.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
See also Goodman & Brenner, supra note 27.
31. See supra note 23.
32. See, e.g., FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS:
INDEX OF CRIME - U.S., 1982-2001, at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ciusO1/xl/OltblOl.xls (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). The unpredictability of
some of the more serious crimes, such as rape and murder, lies in the motivations
for their commission. Crimes of passion, which often drives murder, are often
committed spontaneously, in a burst of emotion or, in the case of serial killers, as
the result of irrational psychological impulse. See, e.g., Mike Hagan, Special
Issues in Serial Murder, AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY (1992), at
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/proceedings/17/halloran-et-al.pdf (last visited
Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal);
Jim Litster, Homicide in South Australia, AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY
(1992), at http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/proceedings/17/halloranetal.pdf
(last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal). While some types of murder - such as familial homicide - might have
been predicted by those who knew the family members, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to generalize as to the frequency with which this type of crime will
occur. See generally Lawrence W. Sherman, Preventing Homicide Through Trial
and Error, AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY (1992), at
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/proceedings/17/sherman.pdf (last visited Oct.
3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). On
the other hand, it is possible to predict that certain types of offenses, such as
various levels of drug-dealing, assaults, robberies, trafficking in stolen goods and
prostitution, will occur in "hot spots," i.e., urban geographies in which crime is
highly concentrated. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE - NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, Policing Drug Hot Spots, NIJ Research Preview (Jan. 1996), at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/hotspot.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with
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an extraordinary event in any society that is successfully
maintaining social order and resisting chaos.33 Theft in its various
forms34 is a far less extraordinary event;35 and, depending on the
cultural mores of the society, drunkenness and/or prostitution may
be quite common.36 Also, various "crimes" fall into localized
patterns reflecting geography *and particular types of
victimization.37
the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); Crime: Strategies for
Nevada's Growing Urban Centers, NEVADA POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (Nov.
1996), at http://www.npri.org/issues/issues96/urbancrime.htm (last visited Nov. 5
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); Anne
Dryden Witte, Urban Crime: Issues and Policies, 7 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 731
(1996), at
http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_0704_witte.pdf (last
visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal). See also Waverly Crime and Disorder Audit 2000-2001, WAVERLY
BOROUGH COUNCIL, at
http://www.waverley.gov.uk/communitysafety/Crime%20and%20Disorder/ 2OAu
dit%202000-2001.doc (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers
Computer and Technology Law Journal).
33. See, e.g., FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS:
INDEX OF CRIME - U.S., 1982-2001, at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ciusOl/xl/OltblOl.xls (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
34. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
35. See, e.g., FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS:
INDEX OF CRIME - U.S., 1982-2001, at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/xl/OltblOI.xls (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
36. See generally Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Tables 4.1
& 4.6 (2001), at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t4l.pdf (last visited
Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal);
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t46.pdf (2001) (last visited Oct. 19,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
37. See, e.g., Security Alert, KANSAS CITY POLICE DEP'T - PROPERTY CRIMES
DIVISION, at http://www.kcpd.org/propertycrimes.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2003)
(on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal) ("[W]e have
identified a pattern involving check forgeries. These offenses usually occur in
areas where there is a strip mall or several businesses very close together.");
Monica Alexander & Wei-Ning Xiang, Crime Pattern Analysis Using GIS (1994),
at http://216.239.51.104/search?q=cache:Hec-
blwMvucJ:wwwsgi.ursus.maine.edu/gisweb/spatdb/gis-lis/gi94001 .html (last
visited Sept. 17, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal) ("spatial pattern of murder" in the Charlotte, North Carolina urban area);
See also Rank of Districts Based on Percentage Changed in Index Crimes (2002)
CHICAGO POLICE DEP'T, at
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Because these characteristics are inevitable aspects of "crime"
in the real-world, they shaped the traditional model of law
enforcement which evolved to deal with this type of "crime." The
next section explains how each characteristic contributed to the
model.
B. Traditional Model of Law Enforcement
As explained above, real-world crime has four empirical
characteristics: physical proximity of victim and victimizer; default
one-to-one "crime"; the influence of physical constraints; and
offender and "crime" patterns. 38 As policing evolved over the
centuries, these characteristics of real-world crime became
embedded assumptions that shaped the traditional model of law
enforcement and defined the way it approaches "crime" in general.
The first characteristic contributed a presumed dynamic to the
model: 39  victim-offender presence in the same general locale;
victim-offender proximity and resulting victimization; offender's
efforts to leave the locale or otherwise avoid apprehension and
prosecution; investigation; identification, apprehension and
prosecution of the offender. The dynamic reflects a time when life
and crime were both parochial, when victims and offenders
generally lived in the same village or in the same city
neighborhood. If a victim and offender did not actually know each
other, they were likely to share community ties; this facilitated the
process of apprehending offenders because there was a good
chance they could be identified by the victim, by witnesses and/or
by reputation. If the perpetrator and the victim did not share
community ties, that is, if the perpetrator was a stranger, his
alienness was likely to contribute to his being apprehended because
the local citizenry paid particular attention to those who "did not
http://www.cityofchicago.org/cp/statistics/DistrictRank.html (last visited Sept. 17,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); Property
Crime Trends, CHICAGO POLICE DEP'T (2000), at
http://egov.cityofchicago.org/webportal/COCWebPortal/COCEDITORIAL/9900
CrimeTrends.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer
and Technology Law Journal).
38. See supra Part II. A.
39. See supra Part II. A.1.
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belong" in their portion of the physical world.40 Law enforcement
dealt effectively with this type of crime because its parochial
character meant investigations were limited in scope.41 The model
therefore assumed that the investigation of a "crime" can focus
upon a specific geographical area surrounding the site where the
"crime" occurred.
The second characteristic contributed another element: The
traditional model of law enforcement assumes one-to-one
victimization,42 and that assumption, in conjunction with an
unrelated assumption, structures the model's conceptualization of
the scale of "crime." The unrelated assumption is that incidents of
criminal activity are, to a greater or lesser extent, extraordinary
events in a society; the model assumes, in other words, that "crime"
is a deviation from the law-abiding conduct that constitutes the
prevailing pattern of behavior in a society. This assumption
derives not from the physical characteristics of real-world crime
but from the nature of criminal law: the function of criminal law is
to maintain an acceptable level of social order within a society.43 It
40. Indeed, the presence of a stranger might offer a ready, simple solution to
criminal investigation. Since the stranger had no local ties, prosecuting and
punishing him was unlikely to cause unrest in the local community; and punishing
an outsider avoided any controversy or ill-will that might attend the apprehension
and prosecution of a local citizen.
41. The premise that victim and victimizer were necessarily physically
proximate during the commission of the offense also contributed another element
to the traditional model of law enforcement: the concept of jurisdiction over an
offense and an offender. Criminal jurisdiction has traditionally been based on a
territorial theory. Under this theory, if a crime occurs within the territorial
boundaries of a state, then it has jurisdiction to prosecute the offender. See, e.g.,
Terrence Berg, www.wildwest.gov: The Impact of the Internet on State Power to
Enforce the Law, 00 BYU. L. REv. 1305 (2000); See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 2.9(a) (2d ed. 1986).
42. See supra Part II. A.2.
43. See, e.g., ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 5 (3d
ed. 1982) ("The purpose of the criminal law is to define socially intolerable
conduct, and to hold conduct within the limits which are reasonably acceptable
from the social point of view."); H.L.A. HART, Law as the Union of Primary and
Secondary Rules, in THE NATURE OF LAW 144, 145 (M. P. Golding ed., 1966) (a
society must enact "in some form restrictions on the free use of violence, theft, and
deception to which human beings are tempted but which they must, in general,
repress if they are to coexist in close proximity to each other.") ; See also Marc D.
Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in
Cyberspace, UCLA BULL. L. & TECH 3 (2000), at
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does this in several ways - by defining what is and is not
acceptable behavior; by specifying the consequences of engaging in
unacceptable behavior; and by socializing the members of a society
in such a way as to ensure that the prevailing pattern of conduct
eschews unacceptable behavior. The presumptive result is that
"crime" becomes a subset, generally a small subset, of the total
behaviors in a societal population; consequently, law
enforcement-which is charged with apprehending those who
engage in unacceptable behavior-can focus its efforts on a limited
segment of the conduct within a given society.
The assumption that "crime" is committed by a small percent
of the population is one element - the "offender element"-
structuring the model's conceptualization of the scale of "crime."
The other element - the "offense element" - is the default
assumption of one-to-one victimization. 44 "Crimes" are defined in
terms of the seriousness of the "harm" each inflicts.45 If one-to-one
victimization is the norm, a completed "crime" inflicts a "harm"
upon one victim; additive "harms" must be inflicted sequentially.4 6
http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2002/03_020625_goodmanbrenner.pdf
(last visited Sept. 17, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology
Law Journal). See, e.g., The Code of Hammurabi, at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/hamcode.htm (last visited Sept. 17,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
To do that, countries must establish prohibitions that are designed to maintain
the integrity of certain vital interests: the safety of persons; the security of
property; the stability of the government; and the sanctity of particular moral
principles. No society can survive if its constituents are free to harm each other at
will, to appropriate each other's property, to undermine the political order and/or
to flout the moral principles the citizenry hold dear. Every society will therefore
formulate penal prohibitions defining (i) crimes against persons (e.g., murder,
assault, rape); (ii) crimes against property (e.g., theft, arson, fraud); (iii) crimes
against the state (e.g., treason, rioting, obstruction of justice); and (iv) crimes
against morality (e.g., obscene materials, defiling a place of worship). See
Goodman & Brenner, infra, at 56.
44. See supra Part II. A.2.
45. See supra Part II. A.
46. As is explained earlier, there are deviations from the one-to-one character
of real-world crime. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. These
deviations do not, however, undermine the validity of the proposition enunciated
in the text, above. The most common deviation, the many-to-one deviation, may
increase the effectiveness with which the delivery of a particular "harm" is
accomplished, but it does not increase the magnitude of that "harm." See id. If,
for instance, six people combine to affect the death of another, the resulting
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So, while a serial killer can cause many deaths, each a distinct
"harm," he necessarily does so consecutively, with each death
representing a discrete "crime.'
' 7
The conceptualization of scale derived from these assumptions
posits that the incidence of victimization in a society will be
relatively small both (a) in relationship to the size of the population
and (b) in terms of the absolute level of "harm" inflicted. The
source of the first proposition is obvious-the assumption that a
small percentage of a society's population will persistently engage
in criminal activity. The derivation of the second proposition is
more complex. The level of "harm" inflicted by the incidence of
victimization in a society is a function of three variables: (1) the
number of individuals engaged in committing "crimes"; (2) the
number of discrete "crimes" these individuals commit during a
given time period; and (3) the types of "harm" caused by the
"crimes" these individuals commit. The operation of these
variables is best illustrated by means of a hypothetical. Assume,
therefore, that a society consists of 10,000,000 people, of whom
"harm" is the same as that achieved by a solo murderer. But see infra note 48.
47. Explosives have, of course, made it possible to cause the simultaneous
deaths of many people. See, e.g., United States v. bin Laden, (S.D.N.Y.) (98 Cr.
1923), Count Seven, at
http://www.terrorismcentral.com/Library/Incidents/USEmbassyKenyaBombing/In
dictment/FrontPage (last visited Sept. 17, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers
Computer and Technology Law Journal) (charging Osama bin Laden and his
associates with bombing the United States Embassy in Nairobi and thereby
causing the death of 213 persons); United States v. McVeigh, (W.D. Okla.) (Cr.
95-110), Count Two, at
http://www.courttv.com/news/mcveighspeciaI/bombingindex.html (last visited
Sept. 17, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal)
(charging McVeigh and Nichols with causing the deaths of the 168 persons who
died in the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building). One can, however,
argue that events of this type represent a "crime" distinct from homicide because
homicide - defined as causing the death of a person - simply does not encompass
the extraordinary "harm" such an incident causes. Since "crimes" are defined and
arrayed according to the seriousness of the "harms" they inflict, conduct that
produces "harm" in the form of massive loss of life is perhaps more properly
characterized as something other than homicide, such as terrorism or the use of a
weapon of mass destruction. See generally supra note 27 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., bin Laden, supra, Count Four, (charging bin Laden and his associates
with conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction against United States
nationals); McVeigh, supra, Count Two, (charging McVeigh and Nichols with
using a weapon of mass destruction to kill 168 persons).
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500,000 engage in criminal activity on a more or less regular
basis. 48 Assume that 200,000 of these 500,000 miscreants are
incarcerated or are for other reasons not actively engaged in
criminal activity during the time period at issue. This defines the
first variable by giving us the basic pool of individuals who will
commit "crimes" during this time period.49 Defining the remaining
two variables is more problematic because they tend to interact.
That is, it is difficult to set a generic number of "crimes" our
300,000 persistent offenders are likely to commit because the
number of "crimes" an individual commits tends to be a function of
the seriousness of the "crimes" at issue. A low-level drug dealer or
a street prostitute may commit fifty or more "crimes" a week, but
this will most certainly not be true of an arsonist or a career bank
robber.50 As the seriousness of a "crime" increases, the frequency
48. See generally Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online (2001),
Table 4.5, at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t45.pdf (last visited
Sept. 17, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal)
(total arrests per state in 2000 averaged roughly 4%-6% of the state population).
49. Some "crimes" will be committed by individuals who have no history of
criminal activity; this is often true of domestic violence offenses, for example.
These non-career offenders are not included in the analysis above for two reasons:
One is that there is no accurate way to predict the number of situational offenders
who will emerge in a population during a given time period. The other is that
persistent offenders are primarily responsible for the rate of victimization in a
society. See, e.g., Don Weatherburn & Joanne Baker, Preventing Crime and
Violence Among the Transient and Persistent Offenders, Presented at the 3rd
National Outlook Symposium on Crime in Australia (Mar. 22-23, 1999), at
http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/outlook99/program.html (last visited Oct. 19,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
50. Most offenders will perpetrate "crimes" only sporadically. The sporadic
nature of real world crime is a product both of the motives for committing real-
world "crime" and the logistics involved in doing so.
People commit real-world "crimes" for various reasons, including a desire for
economic gain (e.g., theft, fraud), passion (e.g., spousal homicide, harassment) or
compulsion (e.g., serial murder). Since the consummation of a "crime" tends to
extinguish one's motivation, at least for a while, the commission of real-world
offenses is sporadic, even as to "career" offenders.
The intermittent nature of real-world criminality is also a function of the
logistical issues offenders must address if they are to commit their "crimes"
successfully and avoid prosecution. Since these activities necessarily take place in
the real, physical world, they consume time and effort, thereby reducing the
number of "crimes" an offender can commit. And, as was explained earlier, the
obligation to act in the real, physical world also increases the risk that an offender
will be identified and apprehended. See supra Part II. A.3. The influence of these
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with which it is committed tends to decrease; most murderers, for
example, kill only once.51 Crime statistics therefore indicate, and
the traditional model of law enforcement assumes, that most of the
"crimes" committed by a society's persistent offenders - the
300,000 miscreants in our hypothetical - will be less serious
"crimes," i.e., "crimes" that do not involve the infliction of death,
physical injury or massive property damage/loss.
52
Finally, the traditional model's conceptualization of scale
incorporates the fourth characteristic of real-world crime,53 i.e., the
factors means that the ratio of completed real-world "crimes" to persistent
offenders will be quite low; in the real-world, the average persistent offender may
not commit more than, say, five "crimes" per week. See, e.g., CANADIAN CENTRE
ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE, Proportions of Crimes Associated with Alcohol and Other
Drugs in Canada (Apr. 2002), at http://www.ccsa.ca/docs/crimehighlights.htm
(last visited Oct. 19, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology
Law Journal). See also Amy Klobuchar & Martha Holton Dimick, Connecting
with Neighborhoods to Stop Crimes, Hennepin County Attorney (May 7, 2002), at
http://www.hennepinattorney.org/news 2.asp?NRecno=l10 (last visited Oct. 5,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal)
(estimating that the arrest and conviction of a career property offender would
"account for a decrease of 5 to 10 crimes a week"); Press Release, San Jose
Mayor's Office, State of the City 1999 (Apr. 28, 1999), at
http://www.sjmayor.org/event library/jan_2002/socspeechl999.html (last visited
Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal)
(estimating that habitual offenders "commit an average of four crimes a week").
5 1. This is not true of serial killers, but even they tend to offend sporadically.
See, e.g., Shirley Lynn Scott, Monsters or Victims?, The Crime Library at
http://www.crimelibrary.com/serials/what/whatmain.htm (last visited Sept. 17,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal) (serial
murder characterized by a "'cooling off' period" between crimes).
52. See supra Part II. A. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform
Crime Reports establish that the overwhelming majority of indexed crimes
committed in the United States for the period 1982-2001 were non-violent
offenses. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS,
supra note 32. For example, for 2001, the FBI reports that there were 15,980
incidents of murder and manslaughter in a total population of 284,796,887; most
of the crimes reported for the year were property offenses. See id. And the
Uniform Crime Reports only document the incidence of more serious offenses,
such as the indexed crimes. They do not, for example, include minor offenses
such as prostitution, alcohol-related offenses, minor drug offenses and the like.
See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE U.S., § II (2002), at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ciusO1/Olcrime2.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
53. The third characteristic also contributes to the conceptualization of scale.
See supra note 50.
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premise that offenses and offenders fall into identifiable patterns,
for reasons that are explained above.54 What this premise adds to
the conceptualization of scale is the notion of localization. As the
previous paragraphs demonstrated, the traditional model of law
enforcement's conceptualization of the scale of real-world "crime"
postulates that it will be limited in incidence and in the relative type
of "harms" it inflicts on a society's populace.55 This final premise
contributes the notion that an identifiable percentage of these real-
world "crimes" will occur in geographically and demographically
demarcated areas.56
As must be apparent by now, the traditional model of law
enforcement assumes real-world "crime." It relies upon the
empirical characteristics of real-world "crime" and certain
extrapolations from these characteristics to structure its approach to
"crime." The model assumes that societal "crime:" (a) consists of
discrete events, "crimes," each of which is physically situated; (b)
is subject to the constraints associated with activity in the physical
world; (c) is qualitatively and quantitatively limited; and (d) falls
into identifiable geographical and demographic patterns.5 7  These
assumptions combine to generate the principle upon which the
model's approach to "crime" is based, that it is a manageable
54. See supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text. This premise is similar to
the others that influence the conceptualization, but it differs in an important
respect. The propositions and assumptions discussed above focus on the
quantitative and qualitative incidence and distribution of "crime" in a society.
That is, they concentrate on the number of offenders and the amount and types of
"harms" inflicted by criminal activity. This final premise is concerned not with the
amount of "crime" but with how criminal activity and its consequences are
distributed geographically and demographically in a society. It is true that the
amount of "crime" in a society can affect the development of patterns, especially
at the extremes; if a society were so crime-riddled as to have become
dysfunctional, it is doubtful that the "crime" in that society would fall into
identifiable patterns. The same would be true of a society in which the incidence
of "crime" was essentially infinitesimal. But for most functional societies, the
incidence of real-world "crime" falls into what might be termed the "normal
range." That is, it constitutes a relatively small percentage of the total behavior in
a society and falls into patterns, again, for the reasons given earlier.
55. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
57. In other words, it assumes real-world "crime" because that is the only type
of "crime" that existed until very recently.
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phenomenon for law enforcement.
The first two assumptions contribute the premise that discrete
"crimes" necessarily leave information, evidence, in the real-world
locale where they were committed. Extrapolating from this
premise yields the conclusion that law enforcement personnel
reacting to the report of a "crime" can locate this information and
this evidence, and use it to apprehend the perpetrator of the offense.
The model postulates that perpetrators remain in or near the area
where the "crime" was committed, which will facilitate their
apprehension by the authorities. These two assumptions
inferentially establish law enforcement's ability to deal with
specific "crimes," which is necessary if "crime" is to be a
manageable phenomenon. The last two assumptions add the
premise that because real-world "crime" occurs on a modest scale
and assumes certain patterns, law enforcement can mobilize its
modest resources so as to deal with it effectively.58
Each of these components of the model is based upon our
historical experience with "crime": we believe perpetrators will
remain in the area where they commit their "crimes" because they
have tended to do so on the past (more so, of course, prior to the
proliferation of the automobile and other forms of motorized
transportation). We believe the commission of a "crime" leaves
information, such as weapons or trace evidence at the crime scene
and witness observations of the perpetrator or victim, which the
police can collect, analyze and use to apprehend and convict the
perpetrator. We believe all this because it has been established
practice at least for the last century, since the development of
58. See, e.g., SURREY POLICE, U.K., INCREASED EMPHASIS ON INTELLIGENCE
BY SURREY POLICE (Dec. 14, 2001), at
http://www.surrey.police.uk/news_item.asp?artid=1088 (last visited Oct. 19, 2003)
(on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal) (reporting that
the department is increasing the resources devoted to intelligence gathering and
dissemination so that it can "more effectively target the active criminals in Surrey.
There are a comparatively small number of these who are responsible for a
surprisingly large proportion of crime. By dealing effectively with those
individuals we will reduce crime"). See also NEW SOUTH WALES BUREAU OF
CRIME STATISTICS AND RESEARCH, CRIME & PLACE: AN ANALYSIS OF ASSAULTS
AND ROBBERIES IN INNER SYDNEY, at
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/bocsarl.nsf/pages/r43textsection4 (last visited
Sept. 17, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
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forensic science.
These beliefs are micro-components of the model; that is, they
structure how it approaches discrete events, specific "crimes." The
model does have an over-arching conception of how law
enforcement should deal with "crime" as a general phenomenon.
This conception is historically derived. Like the common law, the
traditional model of law enforcement is a compilation of past
practices that have been deemed to be effective in dealing with the
phenomena it confronts. The model's general strategy, the reactive
approach, is one that has been in use since antiquity. It remains the
same as it was centuries ago, when law enforcement consisted of a
constable or night watchman: A "crime" is committed and reported
to the appropriate law enforcement personnel, who investigate the
offense and, if the investigation is successful, apprehend the
perpetrator, who is then formally charged with the "crime,"
prosecuted, and presumably convicted.59
This reactive approach emerged millennia ago as a pragmatic
solution to what was then very atypical behavior, i.e., the
commission of a real-world "crime." "Crime" is an unusual event
in small, rural societies because the informal social control exerted
by shared religious and other philosophies is sufficient to deter
most would-be offenders. When a "crime" does occur, it is
relatively easy to address given the nature of the society in which it
is committed. Identifying the perpetrator, who may literally be
caught red-handed, is usually not difficult; the operation of the
physical constraints discussed earlier is magnified, so it may be
impossible for an offender to avoid observation and detection either
in the process of committing the "crime" or in the process of
fleeing from it. And the essential impossibility of "stranger
danger" means that it is relatively easy to deduce who might have
had the necessary motive and opportunity for the offense. The
level of organizational development in the society determines who
will actually be responsible for apprehending an identified
perpetrator: In very simple societies, this task is assigned to the
general citizenry; more developed systems allocate it to designated
59. See, e.g., Mark H. Moore & George L. Kelling, "To Serve and Protect":
Learningfrom Police History, 70 PUB. INTEREST 49, 53 (1983).
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individuals, such as the common law's sheriff or constable.6°
The reactive approach is a workable and appropriate means of
addressing "crime" in the small, rural societies in which it evolved.
It is a workable solution because societies such as this have neither
the resources nor the organizational ability to field a force of
designated law enforcement officers who might take a rather
different approach, a proactive approach, to dealing with "crime."
6'
Crime control is therefore a matter of responding to what has been
done in a way that is presumed to prevent future such occurrences.
The appropriate response take the form of retributive justice; at this
stage of social development, societies tend to regard the
commission of a "crime" and the "harm" it inflicts as a personal
affront which requires an equivalent response, i.e., an eye for an
eye.62 This type of response is regarded as appropriate for at least
two reasons: On a purely visceral level, it returns "harm" for
"harm," so that theft, for instance, may result in the thief's losing
the hand with which he committed the "crime."63 On a more
60. See, e.g., Anglo-Saxon Law - Extracts from Early Laws of the English,
THE AVALON PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL 15 (1999), at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/saxlaw.htm (last visited Sept. 16,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal):
If any be so bold.., as to go against God's law and against my royal
authority,... then I pray Thurcyl my earl, and also command him, that
he bend that unrighteous one to right if he can; if he cannot, then will I
with the strength of us both that he destroy him in the land or drive him
out of the land...; and also I command all my reeves... that they
everywhere hold my people rightly and judge right judgments ....
Id.
61. Also, as noted earlier, societies of this type have no need for a formal law
enforcement organization because "crime" is quite rare.
62. See, e.g., The Code of Hammurabi, THE AVALON PROJECT AT YALE LAW
SCHOOL 1 (1996), http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/hamframe.htm
(last visited Sept. 16, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology
Law Journal):
195. If a son strike his father, his hands shall be hewn off.
196. If a man put out the eye of another man, his eye shall be put out.
197. If he break another man's bone, his bone shall be broken....
200. If a man knock out the teeth of his equal, his teeth shall be knocked
out.
Id.
63. See, e.g., Elizabeth Semancik, Backcountry Order Ways: The Border Idea
of Order as Lex Talionis, in Albion's Seed Grows in the Cumberland Gap,
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA AMERICAN STUDIES PROGRAM, 1 (May 1, 1997),
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practical level, this type of response is regarded as an effective way
of deterring the commission of future "crimes"; it is considered to
accomplish this by ensuring that the apprehended offender does not
engage in further criminal activity and by using him as an example
to discourage other would-be offenders from doing so. The
apprehended offender is nullified either by inflicting a level of pain
that would deter a rational human being from running the risk that
it might be repeated or by taking his life; and retributive justice
assumes that either result will be sufficient to deter others from
following in his footsteps, especially if the punishment is publicly
administered.
Although it evolved centuries ago to meet the demands of
societies in which "crime" was rare and justice was retributive, the
reactive model of law enforcement has persisted. It remains the
prevailing model in countries around the world even though penal
philosophies have increased in complexity and retributive justice
has diminished in importance. Why has it endured? One reason,
no doubt, is that we are accustomed to this model and the dynamic
it incorporates; we expect law enforcement to respond when a
"crime" is committed, and we assume that the apprehension,
prosecution and eventual punishment of the offender will
satisfactorily resolve things, returning "harm" for "harm" and
deterring future "crimes." Another reason is that societies are
http://xroads.virginia.edu/-UG97/albion/alex.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2003) (on
file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal) ("[B]acksettlers
shared an idea of order as a system of retributive justice. The prevailing principle
was lex talionis, the rule of retaliation. It held that a good man must seek to do
right in the world, but when wrong was done to him he must punish the wrongdoer
himself by an act of retribution that restored order and justice in the world").
In a classic system of retributive justice, other, more serious offenses - usually
those involving the infliction of death or serious bodily injury - require capital
punishment because the sacrifice of the offender's life is deemed the only "harm"
equivalent to the injury he caused. The same will tend to be true of offenses
against the prevailing morality (i.e., adultery or sodomy) and social order (i.e.,
treason). See, e.g., Anglo-Saxon Law-Extracts from Early Laws of the English,
supra note 60, at 3 ("If any one plot against the king's life.., let him be liable in
his life and in all that he has"; "He who plots against his lord's life, let him be
liable in his life to him, and in all that he has"). See also ZAMFARA STATE OF
NIGERIA, SHART'AH PENAL CODE LAW (Jan. 2000),
http://www.zamfaronline.com/sharia (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (on file with the
Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
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unwilling or unable to allocate the increased resources that are
needed to implement a proactive model which emphasizes "crime"
prevention as well as control-by-deterrence. 64 Yet another reason is
that it is still a workable means of dealing with real-world "crime";
it may not be the most effective means, but real-world "crime" still
retains the characteristics described earlier 65 and the persistence of
those characteristics means the reactive model continues to be a
viable strategy for addressing real-world "crime." The open
question is whether it is a viable strategy for cybercrime.
C. Cybercrime
While our experience with cybercrime is still in its infancy, it
is already apparent that the traditional model of law enforcement is
not an effective strategy for dealing with cybercrime. It cannot
deal effectively with cybercrime because online crime possesses
few, if any, of the essential characteristics of real-world "crime."
1. Proximity
Perhaps the most critical difference between the two is that,
unlike real-world "crime," cybercrime does not require any degree
of physical proximity between victim and victimizer at the moment
the "crime" is committed. 66 Cybercrime is unbounded crime,
borderless crime.67 It can be committed by someone who is located
64. See, e.g., Greg O'Connor, Community Policing - A Hard Choice,
WESTERN AUSTRALIA POLICE UNION (June, 2001),
http://www.wapolun.org.au/010632.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2003) (on file with
the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). See generally OWEN
BEVAN, AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY, Changing the Face of Policing,
(1990), available at http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/proceedings/05/ (last
visited Sept. 16, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal).
65. See supra Part II. A.
66. See supra Part II. A. 1.
67. See, e.g., Goodman & Brenner, supra note 27, at 7-8. See also
PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON THE INTERNET, The
Electronic Frontier: The Challenge Of Unlawful Conduct Involving The Use Of
The Internet, § II(D)(2) (Mar. 2000),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm#CHALLENGES (last
visited Sept. 1, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal):
In the physical world, one cannot visit a place without some sense of its
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anywhere in the world against a victim who is in another city,
another state, another country.68 All the perpetrator requires is
access to a computer that is linked to the Internet; with this, he can
inflict "harm" upon someone directly, by attacking their computer,
say, indirectly, by obtaining information that lets him assume their
identity and use it to commit fraud on a grand scale.
geographic location. ... [H]uman travel is spatially based. By contrast,
because one can access a computer remotely without knowing where, in
physical space, that computer is located, ... cybercriminals are no
longer hampered by the existence of national or international
boundaries....
[A] criminal no longer needs to be at the actual scene of the crime (or
within 1,000 miles, for that matter) to prey on his or her victims. ... [A]
computer server running a webpage designed to defraud senior citizens
might be located in Thailand, and victims of the scam could be scattered
throughout numerous different countries. A child pornographer may
distribute photographs or videos via e-mail running through the
communications networks of several countries before reaching the
intended recipients ...
[A] cyberstalker in Brooklyn, New York may send a threatening e-mail
to a person in Manhattan. If the stalker routes his communication
through Argentina, France, and Norway before reaching his victim, the
New York Police Department may have to get assistance from the
Office of International Affairs at the Department of Justice in
Washington, D.C. which, in turn, may have to get assistance from law
enforcement in (say) Buenos Aires, Paris, and Oslo just to learn that the
suspect is in New York. In this example, the perpetrator needs no
passport and passes through no checkpoints as he commits his crime,
while law enforcement agencies are burdened with cumbersome
mechanisms for international cooperation, mechanisms that often derail
or slow investigations. With scores of Intemet-connected countries
around the world, the coordination challenges facing law enforcement
are tremendous. And any delay in an investigation is critical, as a
criminal's trail often ends as soon as he or she disconnects from the
Internet.
Id.
68. "Computer-related crimes are committed across cyber space and do not
stop at the conventional state-borders. They can.. . be perpetrated from anywhere
and against any computer user in the world." COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, CREATING A SAFER INFORMATION SOCIETY BY IMPROVING THE
SECURITY OF INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURES AND COMBATING COMPUrER-
RELATED CRIME 9 (2000),
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/IntemetPoliciesSite/Crime/CrimeCommEN.html (last
visited Sept. 16, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal).
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2. Scale
Cybercrime differs from real-world "crime" in another
important regard: It is not one-to-one "crime" because it is not
corporeal crime, not terrestrial crime; consequently, the one-to-one
scale of offense commission is by no means a viable default
assumption for cybercrime.69 Much of cybercrime is already, in
effect, "automated crime;" this is a trend which will only
accelerate. The phrase "automated crime" denotes an individual's
ability to use technology to multiply the number of discrete
offenses she is able to carry out in a given period of time; a single
perpetrator can commit thousands of cybercrimes in a short period
of time.70 Indeed, with automated crime, a perpetrator can put the
process of victimization into effect and turn his or her attention to
69. See supra Part II. A.2. See also supra note 67.
70. See, e.g., Cybercrimes, IPWATCHDOG.COM,
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/cybercrimes.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal) ("The Internet... is
very different from previous technologies, at least insofar as its applicability to
crime, because of one simple reality-through the use of inexpensive and widely
available computer and telecommunications systems individuals are able to
commit wrongs with unprecedented speed and on scale never before seen"). See
also CHRISTOPHER M.E. PAINTER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE - U.S. ATTORNEYS'
BULLETIN, TRACING IN INTERNET FRAUD CASES: PAIRGAIN AND NEI WEBWORLD,
2001, http://www.cybercrime.gov/usamay200l_3.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2003)
(on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal) (online stock
fraud scheme involved thousands of victims); Hearings on Cybercrime and the
Internet Integrity and Critical Infrastructure Act, Before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary (May 25, 2000) (statement of James K. Robinson, Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/robtest.htin (last visited Oct. 5, 2003)
(on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal) ("criminals use
the Internet's inexpensive and easy means of communication to commit large-
scale fraud on victims all over the globe"); JOSEPH V. DEMARCO, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE - U.S. ATTORNEYS' BULLETIN, IT'S NOT JUST FUN AND "WAR GAMES" -
JUVENILES AND COMPUTER CRIME 2001,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/usamay200l_7.htm (last visited Sept.
16, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal)
(juveniles could "release a computer virus, infecting tens of thousands of
computers, or engage in large scale securities manipulation, causing six and seven-
figure damages to investors. Indeed, given the technological sophistication of
today's youth.., it is possible for a teenager to commit computer-related property
offenses on a scale to which, prior to the 1980's, only seasoned veterans of the
criminal justice system could aspire").
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other matters, letting automated systems carry out the process. 71
This creates a problem for law enforcement operating under the
traditional model, which dictates that officers will react to reports
of "crimes," initiate an investigation, apprehend the perpetrator and
thereby ensure that justice is done. The traditional model, however,
assumes the commission of real-world crime and, in so doing,
assumes that "crimes" will be committed on a manageable scale.
This is not true of cybercrime; computer technology acts as a
force multiplier that vastly increases the number of "crimes" an
individual can commit and the speed with which she can do so.
72
71. See, e.g., Donn Parker, Automated Crime, WINDOWSECURITY.COM (Oct.
16, 2002), http://secinf.net/misc/AutomatedCrime_.html (last visited Sept. 16,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal):
[M]any security experts are concerned about malware (a type of harmful
software that includes Trojan horse and buffer overflow attacks,
malicious Java and ActiveX codes, and hacker tools along with viruses
and worms)....
Automated crimes would go far beyond the current definition of
malware.... Automated crimes will be complete, ready-to-use,
perfectly tested crimes that could select victims automatically, perform
the crimes, create gains and erase all evidence-without the
participation or knowledge of the designers, perpetrators or victims....
... [A]n automated crime is a complete, fully automated, ready-to-use
crime-from the selection of a victim to the perpetration of the misdeed
and the covering of the perpetrator's tracks and identity-that is
packaged in a single computer program .... When the program is
executed, it automatically commits the crime and removes any damning
evidence (including itself) before the victim can blink an icon.... The
perpetrators can then execute the crime to attack any number of victims'
computers without the creator's-or even the perpetrators' or victims'-
further involvement.
.... Because the crime can be designed for bi-directional, perfect
anonymity, the perpetrator need not know who the victim was, what
crime occurred, what method was used or even the results of the crime.
The victim, likewise, would not know the perpetrator, what method was
used, and where his or her losses went. And the entire crime could take
place in only a few milliseconds. An investigator would be left with no
forensic evidence and no trail to follow, with the unlikely exception of
matching the victim's loss with someone else's equal gain.
Id.
72. See, e.g., supra note 71. See also PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON
UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON THE INTERNET, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER: THE
CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT INVOLVING THE USE OF THE INTERNET, §
II(B)(2) (Mar. 2000),
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The additive scale of cybercrime overwhelms law enforcement's
ability to react because this ability is based on the assumption that
"crime" is real-world "crime." Cybercrime violates this
assumption in two ways: It is committed on a scale far surpassing
that of real-world "crime;" and it represents an entirely new class
of "crime" that is added to the real-world "crimes" with which law
enforcement has traditionally dealt and with which it must continue
to deal.73 As a result, law enforcement's ability to react to "crime"
erodes because the resources which were adequate to deal with the
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm#CHALLENGES (last
visited Sept. 16, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal) ("The potential to reach vast audiences easily means that the scale of
unlawful conduct involving the use of the Internet is often much wider than the
same conduct in the offline world. To borrow a military analogy, use of the
Internet can be a 'force multiplier').
73. In sorting out priorities between the two, law enforcement agencies may
feel that real-world "crimes" should take priority because they are, so far, more
likely to result in the infliction of death or bodily injury; to this point, most
cybercrime results in property loss or damage. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE -
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC CRIME NEEDS ASSESSMENT FOR
STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, 11 (2001),
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/186276.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal) (participants reported
that cybercrime cases are assigned "a low to medium priority within their
agency").
At this point in time, cybercrime clearly represents the addition of an
incremental level of "new" crime to the traditional, real-world crimes that continue
to be committed. Some suggest that eventually every crime will be a cybercrime.
See, e.g., BARBARA ETTER, AUSTRALASIAN CENTRE FOR POLICING RESEARCH,
CRITICAL ISSUES IN HIGH-TECH CRIME1 (2002),
http://www.acpr.gov.au/pdf/Presentations/ClinHi-tech.pdf (last visited Sept. 16,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal) ("As
technology becomes even more pervasive, aspects of hi-tech crime will feature in
all forms of criminal behaviour, even those matters currently regarded as
'traditional' offences"). Indeed, we may be well on our way to this state of affairs.
See, e.g., Zachary Tobias, Deadly Pursuit, COMPUTERWORLD (July 9, 2001),
("' [S]ince computers are now such a part of everyday life, we're finding that
almost every crime at some point touches a computer') (quoting Patrick Lim,
forensics examiner at the Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory, at
http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0, 10801,61884,00.ht
ml (last visited Sept. 16, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and
Technology Law Journal)); CALIFORNIA HIGH TECHNOLOGY CRIME ADVISORY
COMMITTEE, ANNUAL REPORT ON HIGH TECHNOLOGY CRIME IN CALIFORNIA, 2000
("[N]early every crime committed today has a high technology aspect - usually a
personal computer which may hold evidence about the crime or its perpetrators")
(quoted in Etter, supra note 73 at i.).
2004]
30 RUTGERS COMPUTER AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
incidence of real-world "crime" are inadequate to deal with real-
world "crime" plus cybercrime.7 4
3. Physical Constraints
Cybercrime differs from real-world "crime" in another
respect: The perpetrators of cybercrime are not restricted by the
constraints that govern action in the real, physical world.75
Cybercrimes can be committed instantaneously and therefore
require a rapid response; but law enforcement is accustomed to
dealing with real-world "crimes," the investigation of which can
proceed at a more deliberate pace.76 Another complication is that
all, or substantially all, of the conduct involved in the commission
of a cybercrime occurs in an electronic environment; since a
perpetrator is not physically "present" when the "crime" is
committed, one can no longer assume she will leave trace evidence
at the crime scene.7 7 The transborder nature of cybercrime further
enhances the difficulties law enforcement officers face when they
attempt to react to a reported offense because traditional
assumptions about a perpetrator's being observed preparing for,
committing or fleeing from an offense no longer hold.78
74. The inadequacy of these resources is a function both of the incremental
offenses added by cybercrime and because cybercrime cases are particularly
difficult to investigate. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE - NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC CRIME NEEDS ASSESSMENT FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT, 16, 23-25 (2001), available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/186276.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). Cybercrime cases are
time-consuming because of their inherent complexity; they must be conducted by
officers who have specialized expertise and access to sophisticated investigatory
tools. See id.
75. See supra Part II. A.3.
76. See, e.g., FBI Overwhelmed By Cybercrime, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2002),
http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1105-864453.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal) ("'Technology permits
cyber crimes to occur at the speed of light and law enforcement must become
more sophisticated in uncovering them,' FBI assistant director Ronald Eldon told a
conference on fighting organized crime in Hong Kong ..... 'Government must
respond not at government time but at Internet time,' said Eldon"). See also supra
note 67.
77. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
78. See supra Part 11. A.3.
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Also, cyberspace lets perpetrators conceal their identities;
cybercriminals can enjoy anonymity on a scale that is not possible
in the real-world. In the real-world, an offender can wear a mask
and perhaps take other efforts to conceal his identity, but certain
characteristics-such as height, weight, accent, age-will still be
apparent. In cyberspace, one can achieve perfect anonymity;
79
consequently, officers may have no way of identifying the person
who victimized someone in their jurisdiction. 80  As one report
79. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Judiciary
Comm. and the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the Senate Judiciary
Comm. 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder),
available at http://www.cdt.org/security/000229justice.shtml (last visited Sept. 16,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal):
It doesn't take a master hacker to disappear on a network.... [A]
criminal using tools and other information easily available over the
Internet can operate in almost perfect anonymity. By weaving his or her
communications through a series of anonymous remailers; by creating a
few forged e-mail headers with powerful, point-and-click tools readily
downloadable from many hacker web sites; or by using a 'free-trial'
account or two, a hacker, online pornographer, or web based fraud artist
can often effectively hide the trail of his or her communications.
Id; See also Jonathan I. Edelstein, Note, Anonymity and International Law
Enforcement in Cyberspace, 7 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 231
(1996).
80. For example, in 2000, someone who used the name "Maxus" claimed to
be a Russian hacker who stole 300,000 credit card numbers from the online
retailer CD Universe. See, e.g., Russian Hackers Arrested, CNN (May 24, 2001),
at http://www.cnn.com/2001/TECHI/internet/05/24/russia.hackers/ (last visited
Sept. 16, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal);
Jim Heintz, Notorious or Desperate?, ABC NEWS.COM (Nov. 20, 2000), at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/tech/DailyNews/russianhackers00l 120.html (last
visited Sept. 16, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal). Maxus told the company of the theft and demanded that CD Universe
pay him $100,000 for the return of the numbers. See id When CD Universe
refused to pay, he posted the numbers on web sites and managed to distribute
25,000 of them before the sites were shut down. See id He was never identified,
never caught, never prosecuted. See id See also Greg Sandoval, How Hackers
Avoid Getting Caught, CNET News.com (May 15, 2002), at
http://asia.cnet.com/newstech/specialreports/0,39001151,39044673,00.htm (last
visited Sept. 16, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal):
The nightmare for Ecount, an online gift certificate service, began last
year when a hacker broke in to the company's system and stole personal
information belonging to its customers.
Nine months later, the criminal is still at large. The thief has brazenly
taunted executives with repeated e-mails while staying ahead of
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noted, "[t]he ability for criminals to remain anonymous on the
Internet presents a huge challenge for police and policy makers.
Anonymity is assisted by a proliferation of Internet cafes and web
kiosks, the emergence of data havens, the availability of tools for
'spoofing' and the presence of anonymising services on the
Internet.
' 81
Even if police can identify a perpetrator, gathering evidence of
the crime can be difficult for various reasons. The country that
hosts the cybercriminal and his activities may not define what he
did as illegal and may therefore be unable to prosecute him or
cooperate in his being extradited for prosecution elsewhere; 82 the
host nation may not have agreements in effect with the victim
nation which obligate it to assist in gathering evidence that can be
used against the perpetrator; 83 or the evidence may have been
investigators, deftly wiping away his electronic fingerprints and
covering his tracks at every turn....
Although law enforcement agencies are quick to trumpet their
occasional victories against cybercriminals, they are rarely able to track
down hackers sophisticated enough to pull off such complicated heists.
Few hackers of this caliber are arrested, and fewer still spend time
behind bars.
Id.
81. Etter, supra note 73 at 13.
82. See, e.g., Goodman & Brenner, supra note 73 at 13; See also Love Bug
Suspect: Charges Dropped, SOPHOS, Aug. 21, 2000,
http://www.sophos.comJvirusinfo/articles/guzman.html (last visited Sept. 17,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
83. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner & Joseph Schwerha IV, Transnational
Evidence-Gathering and Local Prosecution of International Cybercrime, 20 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 347 (2002).
Evidence-gathering and presentation can be impeded by yet another factor,
namely, expense. Assume, for example, that a county prosecutor in Pennsylvania
has identified the perpetrator who hacked into a local bank from India, has charged
her with violating Pennsylvania's anti-hacking statute and is preparing the case for
trial. Further assume that to present the case the prosecutor will need to present a
witness who lives and works in India to authenticate records provided by the
Internet Service Provider which the perpetrator used in committing the offense.
Finally, assume that it will cost the Pennsylvania county $15,000 to bring the
witness in for the trial. Many counties may not be able to bear this expense; even
if they have the money available, they will have to consider whether the funds
should instead be used to prosecute more "localized" crime, e.g., crimes having a
greater and more immediate nexus to that county. See, e.g., id.
The extent of a crime's nexus to a locality might, for example, be predicated
upon the citizenship and residence of the victim and the perpetrator. If the victim
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destroyed, advertently or because it was routine transactional data
that was not retained by the Internet Service Provider which the
offender used to commit his crime.84
4. Patterns
Perhaps because cybercrime is still such a new phenomenon,
we cannot identify patterns comparable to those that exist for real-
world crime. That is, we are unable, as yet, anyway, empirically
to derive conclusions as to how various types of cybercrime will
manifest themselves geographically and demographically.
Consequently, we cannot develop the type of crime maps law
enforcement uses to allocate its resources in dealing with real-
world crime.86
One factor which may account for our inability to identify
patterns in cybercrime is that it is not accurately documented;
nations are not tracking the incidence of cybercrime in the same
way they track real-world crime. 87 There are several reasons for
this lack of accurate cybercrime statistics: One is that countries
have not defined what "cybercrime" is and how it differs from
"crime. 88  Another is that while law enforcement agencies do
record reported cybercrimes, they do not break them out into a
separate category; online fraud, for example, is recorded as "fraud."
is, as in the hypothetical presented above, a resident of the county in which the
prosecution is brought, this presumably means that the perpetrator's offense
inflicted "harm" in that county. This may be a sufficient nexus to warrant
expending scarce county resources to bring the perpetrator to justice; on the other
hand, one might argue that prosecuting a perpetrator who is not located in and not
routinely operating within the county might do little to control the incidence of
"crime" in that locality. Id
84. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME (ETS No.
185) - EXPLANATORY REPORT 28-3 1, 149-157 (Nov. 8, 2001), available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/reports/htmlI185.htm (last visited Sept. 17,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). See also
supra note 67.
85. See supra Part II.A.4.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Etter, supra note 28 at 9 ("currently no comprehensive statistics
on hi-tech crime are maintained by Australasian police").
88. See, e.g., id. ("Hi-tech crime is variable in its manifestations, so it is
difficult to discuss in terms of aggregate incidence and impact."). See also
Brenner supra note 2.
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Yet another reason for the lack of accurate cybercrime data is that it
can be difficult to parse cybercrime into discrete offenses. Was the
"Love Bug" virus which caused billions of dollars of damage in
over 20 countries one crime or thousands of crimes? 89 Clearly,
however, the most important reasons why we do not have accurate
information about cybercrime are that (a) many cybercrimes go
undetected and (b) many detected cybercrimes go unreported. 90
89. See, e.g., Goodman & Brenner, supra note 27, at 3-5.
90. See, e.g., id. at 27-28.
The lack of official statistics means that the only data we have comes from
privately-conducted surveys, each of which indicates that both the incidence and
costs of cybercrime are substantial. The oldest private survey is the CSI/FBI
Computer Crime and Security Survey, conducted by the Computer Security
Institute and the San Francisco FBI Office's Computer Intrusion Squad. The
seventh annual survey, issued in March of 2002, was based on responses from 503
United States computer security professionals employed by corporations,
government agencies, and educational and medical institutions. It found that: (1)
90% had detected computer attacks in the last year; (2) 80% sustained financial
losses from attacks; (3) the 40% who could quantify damage from the attacks
sustained US$455,848,000 in losses; (4) more (74%) cited the Internet than
internal systems (34%) as the source of attacks; and (5) 34% reported the attacks
to law enforcement (up from the 16% who reported in 1996). Computer Security
Institute, 2002 Computer Crime and Security Survey 2 (2003), available at
http://www.gosci.com/press/20020407.jhtml? requestid=763402 (last visited Sept.
3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
An Australian survey yielded similar results: The 2002 Australian Computer
Crime and Security Survey, that is based on responses from "a wide cross section"
of Australian organizations found that 67% of those responding had suffered
attacks within the last year and 35% had experienced six or more attacks. The
respondents sustained almost $6,000,000 in damage. Just as in the CSI survey,
most attacks (89%) came from the Internet and only a small percentage of the
victims (31%) reported the attacks to law enforcement. The survey reported that
pessimism as to "the apprehension of attackers" was "the primary inhibitor to
greater reporting." Australian Computer Emergency Response Team, 2003
Australian Computer Crime and Security Survey 1 (2003), available at
http://www.auscert.org,au/render.html?it=-2001 (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
In a survey released in August, 2001, the Confederation of British Industry
(CBI), reported that two-thirds of the 148 companies responding suffered a serious
cybercrime attack within the last year. Press Release, Business Leaders Warn of
Cybercrime Threat to Internet Development (Aug. 29, 2001) at
http://www.cbi.org.uk/80256716004baae5/33a87f2eee4l b54e80256803004f04e4/
eff1596523e1653f80256aaf00390135?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 19, 2003)
(on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). Both the CBI
survey and a 2002 survey conducted by Price Waterhouse Coopers found that UK
businesses seldom reported attacks to law enforcement because they were worried
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But perhaps the lack of accurate statistics is not the real reason
why we cannot identify patterns: maybe the notion of "cybercrime
patterns" is an oxymoron. After all, the existence of patterns in
real-world criminality is a function of the physical space in which
real-world criminals operate: Economic forces dictate that most
real-world "crime" is committed by individuals who suffer from
varying levels of economic deprivation and who are, therefore, apt
to reside and function in identifiable, economically-disadvantaged
neighborhoods. 91 These neighborhoods then generate offense and
offender patterns because perpetrators tend to target victims of
opportunity, i.e., those who are within some convenient zone of
physical proximity.
92
Cyberspace makes physical space irrelevant. It becomes as
easy to victimize someone who is halfway around the world as it is
your next-door neighbor.93 Does this mean cybercrime will never
assume patterns, either as to the location of the offense or the types
of offenses being committed?
It is impossible to answer that question at this stage of our
experience because all we know about this new type of crime is
what we have seen so far. The apparent absence of cybercrime
patterns may be a function either of the fact that they have not had
time to develop or that they exist but we cannot identify them
about damage to their reputation resulting from publicity about an attack. Id;
Price Waterhouse Coopers, LLP., Economic Crime Surveys & Securities
Litigation Study (Oct. 8, 2002), at
http://www.pwcglobal.com/extweb/ncsurvres.nsf/DocID/48E718CB7B26F85A85
256C4C00659267 (last visited Oct. 19, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer
and Technology Law Journal).
It is important to note that these privately-conducted surveys all focus
exclusively on the types of cybercrime that target businesses and other collective
entities. They do not compile any data as to cybercrime that targets individual
victims.
91. See supra Part II. A.4.
92. See id. See also supra Part II. A. 1. See, e.g., Christine 0. Gregoire, Att'y
Gen. of Wash. Case Management for Missing Children Homicide Investigation,
http://www.missingkids.com/en US/documents/homicidemissing.pdf (last
visited Oct. 3. 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal) (reporting that 57% of the children who were abducted and murdered,
nation-wide, were "victims of opportunity," i.e., children to whom the perpetrator
had easy access).
93. See supra Part II. A. 1.
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because they assume forms different from those we are accustomed
to seeing in real-world crime. We cannot resolve this issue, but it
may be helpful to speculate about whether patterns will evolve and,
if so, how they might be useful in combating cybercrime.
It is useful to begin by considering the patterns that emerge in
real-world crime and how law enforcement uses them to maximize
its effectiveness. Real-world patterns reflect "crime"-categories
and "crime"-locations.94 As to the former, the frequency with
which real-world "crimes" are committed is in inverse proportion
to the seriousness of the "crime"; less serious "crimes" are
committed with greater frequency than more serious "crimes," such
as murder.95 This means, among other things, that property
"crimes" are committed much more often than crimes of violence
and that the same is true of "crimes" involving the traffic of
societally-banned substances such as drugs and child
pornography. 96  "Crime"-category patterns are derived from
compilations of data on reported offenses. 97 How does law
enforcement use the patterns that appear in the commission of
offenses? For one thing, they can be used to develop profiles of
offenders; 98 they can also be used to determine the best means of
allocating limited police resources among various units.99
"Crime"-location patterns are also used to allocate resources by
94. See supra Part II. A.4.
95. See supra Part II. A.4.
96. See supra Part II. A.4.
97. See, e.g., FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Summary of the Uniform
Crime Reporting Program: Crime in the United States (2001), at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/01crimel.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
98. See, e.g., JOHN DOUGLAS ET AL., MINDHUNTER: INSIDE THE FBI's ELITE
SERIAL CRIME UNIT (Pocket Books 1997).
99. See, e.g., Rob Stering, Crime Analysis (2001), at
http://www.catea.org/newweb/newsletter/No75/crimeanalysis.htm (last visited
Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal);
BEXAR COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, WHAT Is CRIME ANALYSIS? (2002), at
http://www.co.bexar.tx.us/BCsheriff/crimeanalysisl.htm (last visited Oct. 19,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal);
MINNESOTA CHIEFS OF POLICE ASSOCIATION AND EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION,
MODEL POLICY - CRIME ANALYSIS (1993), at
http://www.safenet.org/policies/iacp/cranpo.rtf (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
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allowing law enforcement agencies to allocate officers to
geographical areas where certain types of "crimes," are committed
with the greatest frequency. 00 Location patterns are derived both
from data compilations concerning reported offenses and crime-
mapping techniques.'
01
Since "crime"-category patterns are driven by human behavior
more than by geography, it seems likely that category patterns will
manifest themselves in cybercrime. Indeed, there is some evidence
that they are already emerging. The current inadequacy of
statistical data concerning the incidence of cybercrime makes it
difficult to extrapolate as to the existence of offense patterns, but
anecdotal evidence suggests that much of the contemporary
cybercrime falls into three categories. One category is hacking,
which can be defined as gaining unauthorized access to a computer
system either for the purpose of exploration or to cause damage
once inside.10 2  Another category is online fraud, 10 3 which may
exceed hacking in the frequency with which it is committed. The
third category consists of child pornography and other crimes
targeting minors, 104 such as using the Internet to solicit children for
sexual activity. 1°5 Interestingly, the apparent frequency of these
100. See, e.g., National Law Enforcement & Corrections Technology Center,
Advanced Crime Mapping Topics 94-134 (2002), at
http://www.nlectc.org/cmap/cmapadv-topics-symposium.pdf (last visited Nov.
3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
101. See, e.g., id.
102. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as Virtual Crime?, 4
CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2001), available at http://boalt.org/CCLR/v4/v4brenner.htm




105. There are also regularly-reported incidents of cyberstalking or online
harassment, but this type of activity clearly occurs much less frequently than the
others. See, e.g., COURT TV, CYBERSTALKING: OBSESSIONAL PURSUIT AND THE
DIGITAL CRIMINAL (LEGAL CLASSIFICATIONS), at
http://www.crimelibrary.com/criminal mind/psychology/cyberstalking/2.html?sec
t=-19. (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and
Technology Law Journal); see also Mark Grossman, Cyberstalking Law Takes
Effect Oct. 1., MIAMIHERALD.COM (Sept. 15, 2003), available at
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/business/6764516.htm (last visited Oct.
19, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Compuiter and Technology Law Journal); see
generally Online Harassment Statistics, WHOA, at
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offenses is at least partially consistent with the proposition adduced
above concerning the frequency of real-world crime; that is, in the
real-world we can predict that property "crimes" (such as hacking
and fraud) and the trafficking of banned substances will be
committed more often than, for example, "crimes" that involve the
infliction of death, serious bodily injury or massive property
damage.
10 6
What, if anything, does this mean for the development of
offense patterns in the commission of cybercrimes? It could mean
that the behaviors which shape the contours of real-world offense
categories are constants in illicit human activities. That is, crime is
finite: Because people commit "crimes" for specific, identifiable
reasons, such as to enrich themselves, to take revenge, or to
discharge psycho-sexual or other impulses,'0 7 there is a fixed class
of "crimes." If crime is finite, then we should see the same types of
"crime" being committed in and via cyberspace, and online "crime"
will manifest itself in essentially the same ways as real-world
"crime." All of this assumes, however, that we have seen
humanity's entire repertoire of antisocial activity, an assumption
which may very well be invalid. While it is reasonable to assume
that our experience over the last several millennia has treated us to
the gamut of motivations which prompt individuals to engage in
antisocial activity, we need to remember that the way these
motivations have manifested so far has been the product of the
physical constraints imposed by the real-world. We may well see
traditional motivations generating antisocial activity that takes new
and different forms in cyberspace, 108 which would mean that real-
world offense patterns will not recapitulate themselves in this new
environment.
http://www.haltabuse.org/resources/stats/index.shtml, (last visited Oct. 5, 2003)
(on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
106. See supra Part II. A.4.
107. See, e.g., Peter B. Wood, Walter R. Gove & John K. Cochran, Motivations
for Violent Crime Among Incarcerated Adults: A Consideration of Reinforcement
Processes, J. OKLA. CRIM. JUST. RES. CONSORTIUM (1994), at
http://www.doc.state.ok.us/DOCS/OCJRC/OCJRC94/940650g.htm (last visited
Oct. 19, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
108. See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 102 (noting that one new type of "crime"
has already emerged - the denial of service attack).
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There is another possible explanation for the apparent
recapitulation of real-world "crime" trends in cybercrime: it may be
that we are so far only seeing the migration of real-world offense
categories to cyberspace; that is, those who are currently using the
Internet to commit "crimes" grew up with and were socialized by a
climate in which the predominating mode of unlawful activity was
real-world "crime," in its traditional guises. It would not be
surprising, therefore, if they recapitulated the patterns they had
observed with regard to real-world criminality online; they are, in
other words, committing "crimes" and have not begun to imagine
"cybercrime." Cyberspace, after all, not only erases the importance
of geography; it also lets people do things they cannot do in real-
space. So, we may see the emergence of new and as yet
unexperienced varieties of "crime" (which will, of course, have to
be defined as such). It is probably reasonable to anticipate that
much of "crime" will continue to take the form of attempts at illicit
self-enrichment; it is also probably reasonable to anticipate that the
incidence of non-violent offenses will continue to exceed that of
violent offenses. But beyond that, it is difficult to speculate; we
will, for example, no doubt see the emergence of "collective
crime," i.e., of automated mass victimization. If that occurs, we
shall have to decide how to factor that into the way we categorize
the "crimes" that were committed in a given time period: Is the
automated victimization of 5,000 victims by one human offender
using technology the commission of one "crime" or 5,000
"crimes"? And law enforcement will have to decide how to react
to phenomena such as this. Should the allocation of resources
continue to reflect the frequency with which certain types of
"crime" are committed in an era when this process is automated, so
that a few offenders can account for thousands and thousands of
discrete "crimes"? Or should the allocation of resources be based
on other criteria?
And what about the potential for mapping the location of
cybercrimes? Is there any purpose in doing so? One difficulty that
arises in this context is determining what is meant by the "location"
of the "crime." As was explained earlier, the traditional model of
law enforcement assumes real-world "crime"; one characteristic of
real-world "crime" is that the victim and victimizer must be in
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relatively close physical proximity at the time the "crime" is
committed.109 Geography consequently assumes a great deal of
importance in dealing with real-world "crime;" aside from anything
else, focusing an investigation on the physical location of a "crime"
offers police their best opportunity for identifying and
apprehending the offender(s).1" ° But in cyberspace there is no
"crime" scene, at least not in the traditional sense; for most
cybercrimes, evidence is scattered over several locations, including
the computer the perpetrator used, the victim's computer and the
intervening computers and computer servers the perpetrator used to
accomplish the offense. So, if a woman in the Ukraine uses the
Internet to defraud a man in Texas, where did the "crime" occur?
If one assumes that the victim is the locus of a "crime," then it
occurred in Texas; but, of course, little evidence of the "crime" will
be found in Texas, and the perpetrator will most certainly not be
found there. Does this mean that "crime"-location patterns will be
irrelevant in dealing with cybercrime? It is impossible to answer
that question with any certainty. It might be useful to know where
offenders are geographically located, assuming that can be
ascertained; knowing the location of the offender is a primary goal
of the traditional, reactive model of law enforcement.
But that raises the critical issue: While the apparent difficulty
of identifying patterns in cybercrime does not itself sound the death
knell for the traditional model of law enforcement, it demonstrates
the difficulties that are involved in extrapolating this model to the
world of online activity. It seems that we must come up with a
better approach, which could involve either devising an entirely
new model of law enforcement, one that is more suited for online
crime, or modifying the traditional model so it becomes an
effective means of addressing cybercrime. The next sections take
up these issues.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL (COMMERCIAL)
"It could be argued that the monopolization of policing by
109. See supra Part I1. A.1.
110. See supra Part 11. A. 1.
TOWARD A CRIMINAL LAW FOR CYBERSPACE
government is an aberration.".... The migration of human activity
into cyberspace is already producing antisocial activity that does
not exhibit the characteristics which shaped the traditional model of
law enforcement. 12 This trend will only accelerate, which means
that the deficiencies in the traditional model will become ever more
apparent and ever more problematic. We must, therefore, consider
how we can improve law enforcement's ability to address
cybercrime without sacrificing the traditional model's proven
utility in dealing with real-world crime.
It is useful to begin this exercise by considering why the
traditional model is not an effective means of addressing
cybercrime. As Part II explained, the traditional model is a reactive
model; its fundamental premise is that officers react to completed
"crimes" by apprehending the perpetrators, who are prosecuted and
punished; this renders them incapable of re-offending and ensures
that their experience deters others from offending. This is a
territorial approach to law enforcement; it assumes that
perpetrators, victims and officers are all physically situated in a
reasonable degree of proximity within a single territorially-defined
state. When these assumptions are valid, the model works; police
officers who know the area stand a good chance of being able to
identify and apprehend perpetrators, and the local legal system
stands a good chance of being able to convict and punish them. As
Part II explained, these assumptions do not hold for cybercrime; the
use of cyberspace to commit "crimes" makes territory, and
assumptions predicated on territory, irrelevant.
Does that mean we should abandon the traditional model for a
new approach? The answer is "yes" and "no." We do need a new
approach, particularly for cybercrime, because the traditional
model is not a wholly workable solution for online crime. But this
does not mean we should abandon the strategy responsible for the
traditional model, i.e., that when a "crime" has been committed the
law enforcement system reacts in an effort to bring the perpetrator
111. DAVID H. BAYLEY & CLIFFORD D. SHEARING, DEP'T OF JUSTICE - NAT'L
INST. OF JUSTICE, THE NEW STRUCTURE OF POLICING, 1 (2001), available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/187083.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
112. See supra Part II. C.
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to justice. However we decide to deal with cybercrime, we will
always want law enforcement to react to some "crimes," certainly
the more egregious "crimes," because of the benefits that derive
from a society's reacting to and inflicting certain consequences
upon offenders. 1 3  The problem with applying the traditional
model to cybercrime is not that there is anything wrong with this
strategy; it is that the peculiar characteristics of crime in cyberspace
make the application of this strategy sufficiently problematic that
we can no longer rely upon it as our sole approach to dealing with
criminal activity. We need to retain the traditional model but
modify it to incorporate an additional strategy, one that is optimally
focused upon dealing with criminal activity in cyberspace (and that
can also be extrapolated to address some quantum of real-world
crime).
Logically, there are two ways we can deal with crime: (1)
React after a "crime" has been committed in order to incapacitate
and punish the perpetrator(s); (2) prevent "crimes" from occurring.
The two are not inconsistent; indeed, there has for the last century
been an evolving emphasis upon preventing "crimes," though this
still plays a small role in our overall approach to dealing with real-
world crime. One reason why prevention is a small part of our
current strategy is that it is resource-intensive; as long as we rely on
law enforcement officers for crime prevention, increasing our
efforts to prevent crime means we have to increase the number of
officers who are available to patrol the streets of our communities,
work with community members and otherwise create a climate in
which the commission of "crime" is seen as a high-risk and
therefore unattractive proposition." 4  Since hiring, training and
113. One presumptive benefit, as was pointed out earlier, is that apprehension,
conviction and punishment deter both the offender and others who aspire to
similar conduct. See supra Part I1. B. Other societal benefits are rehabilitation,
retribution and denunciation. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT,
JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5(a) (2d ed. 1986).
114. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENT CLINTON ANNOUNCES NEW
CRIME BILL GRANTS TO PUT POLICE OFFICERS ON THE BEAT (Oct. 12, 1994),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/Pre 96/Oct.94/590.txt.html (last visited
Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
See also Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, H.R. CoNF.
REP. No. 711, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1839.
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employing officers is costly, and since state and local governments
have limited resources, crime prevention has been a minor part of
our official law enforcement strategy.' 15
But because prevention is an effective strategy, citizens turned
to private sources to help prevent them from being victimized by
real-world criminals. 1 6 This trend, which began in the latter part
of the nineteenth century with the rise of private security services
such as the Pinkerton Agency, 1 7 accelerated toward the end of the
twentieth century as corporate and other commercial entities sought
protection for their business endeavors and, often, for their officers
and employees. 18 In a sense, it is a return to an older model, one
115. For a different perspective on why crime prevention has failed, see DAVID
H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 55-101 (Oxford University Press 1994)
(Crime prevention has failed because police spend most of their time dealing with
minor offenses, because the resources they have are used irrationally, because
there is an organizational culture that does not value initiative and "hands-on
servicing of the public" and because efforts to evaluate crime prevention programs
have been flawed). As to real-world crime, a cycle may develop in which the
affluent are unwilling to fund increased police protection for entire communities
when they can hire private security forces to protect their own neighborhoods. See
David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1284 (1999).
One result of this process is a heightened reliance on the reactive model of
policing. See id.
116. See, e.g., Brian Forst, The Privatization and Civilianization of Policing, 2
CRIM, JUST. 2000 at 21, at
http://www.ncjrs.org/criminaljustice2000/vol_2/02c2.pdf (last visited Oct. 3,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
117. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 115, at 1212. Pinkertons, founded in 1850,
became the primary protector of trains and their passengers; this agency also
maintained the only national crime record system for the 75 years prior to the
creation of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports system. A host of other private
property protection and investigative agencies emerged afterward, including
Brink's in 1859, Wells Fargo, and Bums. When a criminal investigation was
needed, the police department hired private detectives, as did private citizens and
other institutions. See generally id.
118. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 115, at 1220-21 ("By the early 1980s...
the private security industry was growing much faster than public law
enforcement.... [I]n the 1960s or 1970s,... the industry entered a period of rapid
expansion from which it has yet to emerge."). See also WILLIAM C. CUNNINGHAM
& TODD H. TAYLOR, HALLCREST SYSTEMS, INC., PRIVATE SECURITY AND POLICE IN
AMERICA 108-09 (Butterworth- Heinemann 1985); Forst, supra note 116, at 34-
36. The use of private security is not confined to corporate and other artificial
entities; individuals have begun to rely extensively on private security
arrangements, such as those associated with gated communities. See, e.g.,
BAYLEY & SHEARING, supra note 11, at 7.
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that antedates Sir Robert Peel's creation of the modem police force
in nineteenth century London;" 9 until that time, security had been
something of an ad hoc affair, often consigned to private
individuals and private arrangements. 120 Sir Robert's creation of a
modem, state-sponsored law enforcement organization led to the
decline and ultimate disappearance of the prior model;
consequently, for over a century, states have enjoyed a monopoly
on the arrangements that govern internal security within their
territories. 12'
119. It is generally agreed that the development of the first professional,
"public" police force began:
[I]n 1829, when Home Secretary Robert Peel maneuvered the
Metropolitan Police Act through Parliament. The act called for the
creation of a tax-supported police force for the London metropolitan
area, under the centralized control of the Home Office. In several
respects, the Metropolitan Police created by this legislation provided the
model for modem policing.... First, the officers were independent
from the courts.... Second, the force was uniformed, and quasi-
military in organization. Patrols were assigned to constables, who were
supervised by sergeants, who in turn reported to inspectors, who were
under the command of superintendents, who reported to the
commissioner. Third, policing was a full-time occupation, and officers
were not allowed to demand or to accept supplemental private payments
for their work.
Sklansky, supra note 115, at 1202-03 (footnotes omitted).
120. See, e.g., Forst, supra note 116, at 26:
Policing... was once exclusively in the domain of private
enterprise .... [T]he policing of homicides in ancient Athens was
primarily a family matter, with entry into the security market restricted;
individuals without families were not well protected. Families continued
to be the primary source of protection for centuries afterward. Prior to
the Norman Conquest in 1066, villages protected themselves against
criminals and nomads by organizing family men who raised a hue and
cry when attacked. Captured offenders were typically subjected to
tribunals that determined the applicable sanction: public humiliation,
torture, banishment, or death.
Id. The Normans introduced what would evolve into a public policing system.
See id In the thirteenth century, the Norman system was "replaced by a 'watch"'
system that was built "around a justice of the peace who supervised and
adjudicated, a constable, his assistants, and night watchmen." Id. See also
Sklansky, supra note 115, at 1197-98 (noting that by the Eighteenth century the
"watch" system had become a "shambles," so that "[t]hose with sufficient funds
hired deputies to serve" in their place as constables or watchmen).
121. See, e.g., BAYLEY & SHEARING, supra note 111, at 5 ("Until recently,
governments assumed primary responsibility for providing security....
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Cyberspace does not have "territories," which is one reason
why the traditional model of law enforcement is not an effective
means of dealing with cybercrime. 22 The solution is to move from
a model in which law enforcement is the exclusive province of the
state to one in which it becomes the shared responsibility of the
state and the private sector. The notion of allocating some
responsibility for crime prevention, detection and response to the
private sector is, as noted above, far from new.1 23 For decades,
private security companies have protected corporate funds,
facilities and employees. More recently, companies have
Governments determined what sort of security was needed and provided the
means to achieve it. Governments were the organizational auspices for
formulating demand for policing, and they were the providers who supplied it.").
122. See supra Part II. B. Another reason derives from the structure of law
enforcement agencies. Law enforcement agencies still use the hierarchical
organizational structure Sir Robert Peel introduced in the early nineteenth
century. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 115, at 1202-03. See also supra note 119.
Peel's model incorporated a military rank structure, in which "[p]atrols were
assigned to constables, who were supervised by sergeants, who in turn reported to
inspectors, who were under the command of superintendents, who reported to the
commissioner." Id. Law enforcement agencies still use this model and still assign
their lowest-ranking officers, who have the least training and the least experience,
to frontline duty. One consequence of this is that agencies have minimal
capability to respond to new types of threats, such as those derived from the use of
technology. See, e.g., Greg Sandoval, Law Enforcement Losing the War on
Cybercrime, ZDNet UK (May 14, 2002), at
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/0,39020369,2110168,00.htm (last visited Oct. 5,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); see also
Michael Pastore, Cybercrime Worries Americans, With Good Reason, Cyberatlas,
http://cyberatlas.internet.com/big_picture/hardware/article/0, 1323,5921_744811,0
0.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and
Technology Law Journal) (citing Gartner Group study which found that "law
enforcement funding will likely remain inadequate to police cyberspace through
2004, noting that the annual U.S. budget for funding cybercrime-related training,
investigation and enforcement is unlikely to exceed one percent of the overall
Federal law enforcement budget"); Press Release, Gartner Group, Gartner Predicts
"Mass Victimization" Internet Crime by Year-End 2002, As Web Remains
Largely Unprotected from Major Cybercrime Attacks, at
http://www.gartner.com/5 _about/press-room/pr20010330a.html (describing same
study) (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and
Technology Law Journal); see generally Interpol "Overwhelmed" by Cybercrime,
Silicon.com (Oct. 12, 2000),
http://www.silicon.com/news/500013/1/1020195.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2003)
(on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
123. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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supplemented these efforts by relying on private security agencies
to help them discourage and - when that proves unsuccessful -
investigate corporate espionage and other "business-related"
crime. 
124
These efforts, which primarily target real-world crime, tend to
be substitutionary; that is, they generally involve the use of private
security resources as an alternative to seeking assistance from law
enforcement. 125 Not surprisingly, this approach is being applied to
cybercrime; companies are engaging the services of consultants and
security firms in an effort to prevent their becoming victims of
online crime. 126 The private sector's use of commercial services to
124. See, e.g., Anthony C. Crescenzi, NATIONAL INFORMATION ASSURANCE
TRAINING AND EDUCATION CENTER, Protecting American Assets - Who Is
Responsible?, at http://csrc.net.gov/nissc/1997/proceedings/290.pdf (last visited
Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal)
("We are the Federal Bureau of Investigation, not the Federal Bureau of
Prevention." This comment was made at a recent Counterintelligence presentation
to US Government contractors by a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.... This observation sums up a dilemma currently confronting the
Federal Government .... Does the government have a role in protecting those
assets that ensure US military superiority and commercial success?").
See, e.g., Interglobe Investigation Services, Inc., at
http://www.interglobeinvestigate.com/corporateservices/securityconsulting.htm
(last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal); Internal Intelligence International, at http://www.tripleigroup.net/ (last
visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal); Select Security Solutions, Inc., at
http://www.selectsecuritysolutions.com/corporate-security-solutions.htm (last
visited Sept. 18, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal). According to one source, governments have promoted this development.
See Bayley & Shearing, supra note 111, at 9 (governments have created
"permissive environments" and "actively encourage[ed] nonstate police
activity.").
125. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 115, at 1177-81. See also Canadian
Foundation For The Americas, The Privatization of Security in Latin America
(1999), at http://www.focal.ca/images/pdf/privati.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2003)
(on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
126. Another part of this cybercrime-prevention effort is for businesses to hire
former law enforcement officers with expertise in this area and put them in charge
of securing their operations from cyber-miscreants. See, e.g., Microsoft Hires
Security Czar, USA TODAY, Feb. 1, 2002, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2002/02/01/microsoft-security.htm (last
visited Oct. 19, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal) (Microsoft hired the former chief of the United States Department of
Justice's Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section to develop security
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help secure their operations in cyberspace is novel only insofar as it
involves cyberspace; as noted above, businesses have long relied
upon private entities to protect them from real-world crime.
127
Another approach is evolving with regard to cybercrime,
though, one that utilizes a very different strategy for dealing with
criminal activity. This approach is predicated on the collaboration
of members of the public and private sectors both in preventing and
in reacting to cybercrime.128 Under the traditional model described
above, 129  law enforcement was exclusively responsible for
responding to completed crimes - the victim's role was limited to
reporting a crime to the appropriate officials and then, if requested,
strategies for the company).
127. See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Daintry Duffy, The Secret Service's Bob Weaver on Preparing
for the New World Disorder, DARWIN MAGAZINE (Mar. 2002), at
http://www.darwinmag.com/read/030102/secret.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2003)
(on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal):
In testimony before Congress... you mentioned the Secret Service
recognizes that information sharing between law enforcement and the
private sector must shift. What kind of relationship do you hope to build
between the two groups?
The way that we conduct business is the shift I'm referring to where
relationships and partnerships are the watchwords and the high
watermarks that we need to be at. Firemen do it right. They don't really
want to be at your house to put out a fire. Instead they go to great
lengths to educate with regard to fire prevention. But if you need them,
call, and they'll be there. I think that's a good lesson for all of us. We
believe in crime prevention; we believe in cybercrime prevention-and
the best way to do that is to share information.
Id The quoted passage is a statement by Robert Weaver, Special Agent in Charge,
United States Secret Service, and the head of the New York Electronic Crime Task
Force. Robert N. Weaver, New York Electronic Crimes Task Force: A Different
Law Enforcement Model for the Information Age (Oct. 1, 2002), at
http://www.4law.co.il229.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers
Computer and Technology Law Journal). Interestingly, Sir Robert Peel also
included police-public collaboration as one of his nine principles governing
policing. See, e.g., Sir Robert Peel, The Founder of Modern Policing, New
Westminster Police, http://www.newwestpolice.org/peel.html (last visited Sept. 3,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal)
("Police ... should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the
historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police; the
police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to
duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare
and existence.").
129. See supra § II.A.
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assisting with their investigation. This aspect of the traditional
model has not changed; the onus is still placed on victims to report
their victimization to law enforcement and cooperate, to the best of
their abilities, with an investigation conducted by law enforcement.
What has changed are two aspects of how this model is
implemented with regard to cybercrime.
One aspect that has changed is the way in which commercial
victims report their victimization. The rise of cybercrime has
aggravated a tendency that existed before, in at least certain areas
of the private sector. It has long been common knowledge among
those in the banking industry that financial institutions tend to fire
embezzlers instead of reporting them to the police and having
them prosecuted for their crimes. 130 Historically, banks eschewed
prosecution in all but the most egregious cases for fear that
publicizing embezzlements would lead to a loss of confidence
among the members of the banking public. Similar tendencies
have existed, no doubt, in other areas of the private sector, 3 ' but
the disinclination to report being victimized seems to be much
more pronounced when cybercrime, rather than real-world crime, is
involved.13 2  The annual cybercrime survey which the Computer
130. See, e.g., RICHARD FORNO & RONALD BAKLARZ, THE ART OF
INFORMATION WARFARE 4 (2d. Paperback ed., Universal Publishers 1999),
available at http://www.bookpump.coml/upb/pdf-b/I 128576b.pdf (last visited
Sept. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
See also Security in Electronic Funds Transfer, in Selected Electronic Funds
Transfer Issues: Privacy, Security and Equity (1982), available at
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-
bin/byteserv.prl/-ota/disk3/1982/8223/822307.PDF (last visited Sept. 3, 2003) (on
file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
131. See generally EDWARD H. OSBORNE & MARIEFTA COLLEGE, SMALL
BUSINESS INSTITUTE DIRECTOR'S ASSOCIATION, PREVENTING EMPLOYEE
EMBEZZLEMENT IN THE SMALL BUSINESs: A CONSULTING APPROACH (1995), at
http://www.sbaer.uca.edu/Research/1995/SBIDA/, (last visited Sept. 3, 2003) (on
file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
132. See, e.g., Michelle Delio, Brit Cops Tackle E-Thievery, WIRED NEWS
(Apr. 19, 2001), at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,43171,00.html
(last visited Sept. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology
Law Journal) (head of Fraud Investigation at KPMG Forensic Accounting is
quoted as saying that "[m]any companies are reluctant to report security breaches
for fear of damaging their reputation"); see also, Press Release, Integralis, UK
Companies Are Failing to Cope with the Increasing Threats of Cybercrime,
Survey Finds (July 17, 2001), at http://www.abax.fr/presse/cyber-survey.php (last
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Security Institute conducts in conjunction with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation has consistently shown, for example, that only a
very small percentage of cyber-attacks on businesses are reported
to law enforcement.
33
The private sector's reluctance to report cybercrimes causes
concern in the law enforcement community for various reasons.
One is that if businesses do not report cybercrime, the perpetrator
of an offense may return to re-victimize that business and/or use
the same tactics to victimize other businesses. 34 The net effect is
visited Sept. 17, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal) (stating that 70% of United Kingdom companies surveyed said they did
not report cybercrime to the police).
One reason why businesses seem more reluctant to report cybercrime may be
that they have a choice with cybercrime, one they do not have for real-world
crime. A bank, for example, has no choice but to report a real-world bank robbery
because it is a "public" event, witnessed by bank employees, customers and
members of the random public. A cyber-theft, on the other hand, occurs covertly;
information about such an event can be controlled, limited to those who have "a
need to know," which may be deemed not to I nclude law enforcement, at least,
not when law enforcement is operating under the traditional model.
133. See, e.g., COMPUTER SECURITY INSTITUTE, CYBERCRiME BLEEDS UNITED
STATES CORPORATIONS, SURVEY SHOWS; FINANCIAL LOSSES FROM ATTACKS CLIMB
FOR THIRD YEAR IN A Row (Apr. 7, 2002), at
http://www.gocsi.com/press/20020407.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal) (34% of the businesses,
agencies and institutions responding to the annual survey said they had reported
attacks to law enforcement, which was an increase; in 1996, only 16% said they
had reported attacks to law enforcement). See also supra note 90 and
accompanying text. See also Firms Failing to Report Cyber Crimes, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 25, 2003), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2690659.stm (last visited
Sept. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal)
(survey conducted in the United Kingdom revealed that "[f]ear about the damage
to corporate image has prevented more than two-thirds of organisations from
reporting attacks on their computer systems.").
134. See, e.g., RICHARD P. SALGADO, DEP'T OF JUSTICE - U.S. AT'Y BULLETIN
WORKING WITH VICTIMS OF COMPUTER NETWORK HACKS (Mar. 2001), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/usamarch200l _6.htm (last visited Sept.
3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal):
Although, upon finding a hacker in his or her system, a system
administrator may be content to close the intruder's account and fix the
vulnerability (essentially kicking the hacker out and locking the door),
this provides little true security. Not only is the hacker free to try the
exploit on another company's network, the hacker may have left behind
back doors through which he or she can return to the computer
undetected. In addition, through the hacker community, others may learn
2004]
50 RUTGERS COMPUTER AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
similar to that which results when a bank discharges an embezzler
instead of having her arrested and prosecuted; by letting her go, the
victim bank gives her the opportunity to victimize other financial
institutions. An article written by an attorney with the Department
of Justice's Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section
outlines two other reasons why it is important that victims report
cybercrime:
Specific deterrence is perhaps one of the most compelling
reasons for a company to report an intrusion. When law
enforcement catches and successfully prosecutes an intruder,
that intruder is deterred from future assaults on the victim. This
is a result that no technical fix to the network can duplicate with
the same effectiveness.... [A] victim could initiate its own
investigation to find the intruder. If successful, the victim may
be able to initiate a civil suit for damages. In many. .. cases,
however, the victim is at a substantial disadvantage relative to
law enforcement in this effort. Law enforcement is able to
obtain wiretap, pen/trap and trace orders, enforceable data
preservation requests and other criminal process unavailable to a
private party. Further, a monetary award is unlikely to serve as
the same deterrent as a jail sentence or even probation. The
general deterrence that criminal law enforcement provides also
benefits victims and potential victims in the long run.135
This reluctance to report on the part of cybercrime victims
creates something of a quandary for the traditional model, as it
assumes that victims will report "crimes" to law enforcement;
indeed, reporting by victims is a primary driver of the model's
approach to real-world crime. Since real-world victims do tend to
of the exploit and, emboldened by the lack of any law enforcement
response, join in compromising computer systems.... Without
reporting by victims, law enforcement cannot provide an effective and
appropriate response.
Id. See also Alex Salkever, Computer Break-Ins: Your Right to Know, BUsrNEss
WEEK ONLINE, Nov. 14, 2002 at 1, available at 2002 WL 5147614 ('Because
businesses currently fear sharing information about cyberattacks, they're holding
information back. Because of that, we're less equipped at the government level
and the industry level to figure out where our vulnerabilities are great and how to
address them,' says Mario Correa, director of Internet and security policy for the
Business Software Alliance, a high-tech trade group.").
135. Salgado, supra note 134. The reasons given above reflect the emphasis on
deterrence which is a significant aspect of the traditional model of law
enforcement.
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report their victimization, neither the traditional model of law
enforcement nor the criminal law has really had to consider how to
deal with situations in which "crimes" are consistently not reported.
Given the continuing reluctance of corporate victims to report their
victimization, it is clear that some solution needs to be devised,
either by law enforcement or by the criminal law.
Law enforcement is in the process of devising such a
solution.' 36 It is part of a larger change in the working relationship
136. As to the criminal law, the most logical alternative would be to impose a
duty to report upon victims, so that the target of a cybercrime would be obliged to
report the offense to the authorities. The victim's failure to do so would, if
discovered, result in the imposition of criminal liability; that is, victims would be
prosecuted for not reporting their victimization.
Although the criminal law historically did not require the reporting of crimes,
some states have enacted statutes that create such a duty. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 242.5 cmt. at 251 (1962) (no duty to report at common law). See also Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 794.027 (West 2002) (duty to report sexual battery); Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 38, § 3 (West 1993) (duty to report death); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.34(2)(a)
(West 1996) (duty to report crime in which victim may suffer bodily harm). See
also Jennifer Bagby, Note, Justifications For State Bystander Intervention
Statutes: Why Crime Witnesses Should Be Required To Call For Help, 33 IND. L.
REv. 571, 575 (2000) (noting that eight states have adopted statutes creating a
duty to report crime), Some of these statutes are directed at specific crimes, but
others apply to any crime. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-8-115 (West 1999)
("It is the duty of every corporation or person who has reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime has been committed to report promptly the suspected crime to
law enforcement authorities"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.22 (West 1996)
(reporting felony). There are also federal statutes-notably money laundering
provisions-that impose an obligation to report crime or "suspicious activity."
See generally Matthew R. Hall, An Emerging Duty To Report Criminal Conduct:
Banks, Money Laundering, and the Suspicious Activity Report, 84 KY. L.J. 643,
649-51 (1995-1996).
In 2002, California took a small step toward statutorily requiring the reporting
of cybercrimes by enacting Senate Bill 1386. Senate Bill 1386 added § 1798.29 to
the California Civil Code. See Cal. Stat. 2002, c. 915 (S.B.1386), § 2 (effective
July 1, 2003), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/O I-02/bill/sen/sb_1351-
1400/sb_1386 bill_20020926_chaptered.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). The new statute
requires agencies that own, license or maintain computerized data which includes
personal information to "disclose any breach of the security of the system
following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the data to any
resident of California whose unencrypted personal information was, or is
reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person." Id. The
disclosure is to "be made in the most expedient time possible and without
unreasonable delay, consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement."
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.29(a) (West 2003). As to the latter, the statute provides
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between law enforcement and the citizens it is dedicated to serving,
a change that holds out the promise of evolving into a new model
of law enforcement. Since this approach is emerging from the
relationship between law enforcement and the commercial sector,
the remainder of this section deals with how it functions with
regard to corporate victimization and corporate crime prevention.
Section IV section considers how this approach might be applied to
the relationship between law enforcement and individual citizens.
A collaborative relationship is evolving, in the context of
combating cybercrime, anyway, between law enforcement and
commercial entities in the private sector.137  This collaborative
that the disclosure "may be delayed if a law enforcement agency determines that
the notification will impede a criminal investigation." Id. at § 1798.29(c). If
notification is delayed for this reason, it must be "made after the law enforcement
agency determines that it will not compromise the investigation." Id. A customer
"injured" by an agency's failure to provide notification in accordance with the
statute can bring a civil action to recover damages. See id. at § 1798.82(a). Not
surprisingly, the statute was met with opposition from businesses and other
entities. See, e.g., Comment Letter: Investment Company Institute (Re: Senate
Bill 1386) (June 14, 2002), at
http://www.ici.org.statements/cmltr/02 cal sb1386_com.html (last visited Oct. 5,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); see also
Salkever, supra note 134.
137. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 128.
The New York Electronic Crimes Task Force... represents a
confederation of law enforcement agencies .... academia, and private
industry institutions in a strategic alliance to pool their core
competencies to address electronic crimes ....
[S]imilar to how industry has learned to organize itself to address fast-
changing market conditions in global and borderless markets, the
NYECTF is using the same principles of organization to respond
more ... effectively to crimes, taking advantage of expertise wherever it
can be found.... Its effectiveness comes from established relationships
between law enforcement agencies ... and industry....
What is even more effective is the extension of the activities of the Task
Force beyond the more traditional law enforcement investigative
activities addressing the systemic issues underlying the crimes ....
Useful information can be quickly shared with parties who can then
effectively act rapidly because of the close nature of the institutional
relationships built within the Task Force. Consequently, electronic
crime can be addressed systemically using lessons learned from task
force experience and leveraging the impressive array of resources,
capabilities and authorities of the institutions that participate in the Task
Force....
Id. For an excellent example of this approach, see, e.g., CITY OF AUSTIN, HIGH-
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relationship has several aspects: It emphasizes cybercrime-
prevention by facilitating the sharing of information among
members of the public and private sectors; and by providing
educational opportunities for both.13 8  These aspects of this new
approach emphasize training and preparation as tactics businesses
can use to frustrate the efforts of would-be criminals; 139 aside from
TECH CRIME UNIT, available at http://www.geocities.com/amhtf/htcu.htm (last
visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal):
The High-Tech Crime Unit was created as a joint partnership between
the Austin Police Department and local high-tech industries....
The High-Tech Unit was formed to take a pro-active approach in
tackling high-tech crimes before they become a problem in the Austin
area's growing high-tech industry. Currently, more than 400 high-tech
companies are in the region.
Law enforcement focuses on issues such as computer chip theft,
computer hacking, fraud, theft of intellectual property, robbery and
burglaries of high tech companies....
Law enforcement agencies ... involved in the high-tech unit are the
Austin Police Department, IRS Criminal Investigations Division, Secret
Service, FBI, U.S. Customs Service and the Travis, Williamson and
Hays County sheriff's offices.
High-tech industries provide financial support, materials, equipment and
technical information. Money provided to the unit is given to a non-
profit foundation to administer funds.
Id. The Austin High-Tech Crime Unit is supported by a non-profit foundation,
which receives funds from interested entities in the private sector. See, e.g.,
INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, OPERATION COOPERATION: PARTNERSHIP
PROFILES 3 (1999), at http://www.ilj.org/securitypartners/Partshp.Profiles.PDF
(last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal) (describing the creation of the Austin Metro High Tech Foundation).
138. See supra note 137. See also Infragard, About Infragard: Guarding the
Nation's Infrastructure, at http://www.infragard.net/about.htm (last visited Sep. 3,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). See, e.g.,
AMD Helps Austin, Texas, Cops Solve High-Tech Crimes, CPU PLANET (Oct. 9,
2002), http://www.cpuplanet.com/knowledge/casestudies/article.php/1479431 (last
visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and technology Law
Journal) (describing the meetings of the Austin Metro High Tech Foundation,
which is discussed supra, note 138: "The top security guys from each company
come together once a month, and the environment within that group, even among
competitive companies, is not secrecy and security but openness and problem-
solving."). See also P.J. Hufstetter, Tech Firms Pay Police Agencies to Fight
Cybercrime, L.A. TIMES, (July 26, 1999), at Al ("Tired of being ripped off by
high-tech criminals, some of America's most powerful computer companies are
fighting back with a relatively simple approach: Subsidize the local police.").
139. See, e.g., Robert N. Weaver, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, New
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the fact that they focus on cybercrime, they are novel only with
regard to the intensity and sophistication of the efforts involved.
The novel aspects of this approach lie not in its efforts to prevent
cybercrime, but in how it structures the reaction to a completed
cybercrime.
Like the traditional model, this approach assumes that law
enforcement reaction to a completed cybercrime is an essential
requirement for maintaining social order. Both assume that law
enforcement's investigating, identifying, apprehending and
prosecuting perpetrators promotes the goal of maintaining order by
incapacitating them, discouraging other, would-be perpetrators,
satisfying society's desire for retribution and reinforcing the
societal understanding of what is, and is not, acceptable
behavior. 140 Unlike the traditional model, however, this approach
involves the private sector in the process of reacting to a completed
"'crime." 141 So far, private sector involvement is limited to two
aspects of this process, both of which are discussed below.
York Electronic Crimes Task Force, Testimony Before the House Science
Committee (Oct. 10, 2001), http://www.nymissa.org/documents/testimony.htm
(last visited Sept. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology
Law Journal) (hereinafter referred to as "Weaver science committee testimony").
See also supra note 137.
140. See supra Part I1.A.
141. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 139, testifying before the House Science
Committee:
We have successfully investigated many significant cases with the help
of our private sector partners.... In such cases, even though we have
technical expertise that is second to none, we still rely on our private
sector counterparts to collaborate with us in identifying and preserving
critical evidence to solve the case and bring the perpetrator to justice. ...
With the variety of operating platforms and proprietary operating
systems in the private sector, we could not accomplish these objectives
without the direct support of our private sector counterparts.
Id. Special Agent Weaver is referring to the activities of the New York Electronic
Crimes Task Force. See supra note 137. See also lain Thompson, First E-Crime
Congress Meets, Vnunet.com (Dec. 12, 2002), at
http://www.vnunet.com/News/1 137500 (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the
Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal) ("'The police cannot effectively
tackle high-tech crime in isolation,' said Bob Ainsworth MP, junior Home Office
minister in his opening address to the [UK's first e-crime] conference. We need
your help in reporting crime and aiding the police.").
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A. Reporting
The first aspect deals with the reporting of cybercrime. In an
effort to encourage reporting by commercial victims, the
collaborative approach gives them more options. Under the
traditional model of law enforcement, victims report their
victimization, law enforcement investigates, and the process is set
in motion; victims can, and do, decline to cooperate in a
prosecution, which can mean that no charges are brought against an
offender. This is not uncommon in domestic violence cases, for
example. 142 In the civil justice system, no case is brought except at
the behest of, and through the dedicated efforts of, the injured
party, i.e., the plaintiff.143 In the civil system we leave the decision
whether to seek redress entirely to the victim; the injury is regarded
as a private matter, one in which the state has no interest. In the
criminal justice system, on the other hand, once a victim reports a
"crime" to the authorities, his or her role essentially becomes that
of witness; 144 the "harm" inflicted by the perpetrator is considered
to be a "harm" against the state, and it is the state that chooses to
seek redress. 1
45
142. See, e.g., Machaela M. Hoctor, Comment, Domestic Violence as a Crime
Against the State: The Need for Mandatory Arrest in California, 85 CAL. L. REV.
643, 695 (1997).
143. See, e.g., FED.R.CIv. P. 3.
144. See, e.g., Karyn Ellen Polito, Note, The Rights of Crime Victims in the
Criminal Justice System: Is Justice Blind to the Victims of Crime?, 16 NEW. ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 241,242-44 (1990):
Crime victims... are.., members of the general public ... [which
entitled them] to initiate the criminal process by reporting the crime.
However, once the crime has been reported, the victims' role diminishes
to that of a mere observer. The police who received the complaint have
discretionary authority to decide whether to investigate or to make an
arrest .... Although police and prosecutors may be influenced by the
grievance, the citizen has a very informal role in the criminal process.
The victim has no right to participate in the decision whether to bring
charges; reduce, dismiss or plea-bargain them; no right to be heard
regarding sentencing or plea agreement; and no right to be informed
regarding the criminal process.
Id. (citations omitted).
145. This was not always true. For centuries, dating back to antiquity, criminal
justice was administered in a manner analogous to the processes we now use for
civil actions, that is, "wrongs done to a person or his property were generally
regarded as private matters, subject to remedial action by a victim and his family
2004]
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How is this relevant to the way the collaborative approach
deals with cybercrime? It is relevant because this approach
changes the dynamic involved in "reporting" such a crime. Under
the traditional model, a victim has two choices; report or do not
report. As noted above, commercial cybercrime victims are often
reluctant to report cybercrime for fear of the effects the publicity
attendant upon an investigation and prosecution will have on their
business operations. 146 The collaborative approach addresses this
by giving them another alternative. This alternative is predicated,
as is the approach, upon establishing close working relationships
between the law enforcement officers who are charged with
responding to cybercrime and members of the local business
against an offender and his family." Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation
in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years After the President's Task Force on
Victims of Crime, 25 NEW. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 21, 23 (1999).
[The] victim-centered system of redress continued in early Western law
until approximately the eleventh century. After this time, however,
monarchs and their governments became increasingly involved in
addressing harm inflicted by their subjects on each other. Most
individual acts committed against a person or his property became
offenses against the "king's peace". . . rather than private matters to be
resolved by the affected parties. Fines paid by the offender to the
government and capital, corporal, and other forms of offender
punishment... often replaced the previous requirements of offender
restitution to the victim ....
In colonial America, law enforcement and the administration of justice
were primarily conducted by individual victims with the assistance of
public officials who charged fees for their services. The victim was
responsible for arresting his offender--either himself or with the aid of
the local watchman ... or constable for whose assistance the victim
paid, The victim was also responsible, at his own expense, for
investigating the crime, filing the formal charges, and prosecuting the
offender ....
By the time of the American Revolution... significant changes had
begun to occur. .. [P]rofessional government-operated police forces
began to replace the previous system of volunteer or privately paid law
enforcement officers .... Imprisonment and fines replaced capital and
corporal punishments .... Restitutive damages to the victim were no
longer actively pursued .... [A] public prosecution system evolved in
which a public prosecutor.. . initiated and conducted the criminal
prosecution on behalf of the government. By the middle of the
nineteenth century, these changes had substantially transformed the
American criminal justice system from a private to a public system.
Id at 23-26 (footnotes omitted).
146. See Delio, supra note 132; see also supra text accompanying note 133.
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community. One purpose of this relationship is to facilitate the
educational processes described above. Another is to foster a
climate of trust in which commercial cybercrime victims can, in
effect, consult with law enforcement about the circumstances of
their victimization and what response is appropriate. 147  An
essential component of this relationship is that law enforcement
agrees to hold the information that results from such a consultation
in confidence, at least to some extent; 148 the understanding
147. See, e.g., Weaver science committee testimony, supra note 139:
We have successfully investigated many significant cases with the help
of our private sector partners.... In such cases, even though we have
technical expertise that is second to none, we still rely on our private
sector counterparts to collaborate with us in identifying and preserving
critical evidence to solve the case and bring the perpetrator to justice....
With the variety of operating platforms and proprietary operating
systems in the private sector, we could not accomplish these objectives
without the direct support of our private sector counterparts.
Id. Special Agent Weaver is referring to the activities of the New York Electronic
Crimes Task Force. Id. (referring to the activities of the N.Y. Electronic Crimes
Task Force).
148. See also supra note 137 (describing a new, collaborative relationship
emerging between law enforcement and private entities for the purpose of
combating cybercrime). See, e.g., Weaver science committee testimony, supra
note 139 (noting that New York Electronic Crime Task Force investigations "are
usually not publicized without the express consent of the United States Attorney
and the corporate victim because it would breach our confidential relationship and
discourage the victims of electronic crimes from reporting such incidents"). In
December of 2002, the United Kingdom's National High-tech Crime Unit
(NHTCU) unveiled a Confidentiality Charter that is intended to "increase the
reporting of electronic crime" by overcoming businesses' fears that information
they provide will wind up in the public domain. See, e.g, lain Thomson, First E-
Crime Congress Meets, vnunet.com (Dec. 12, 2002), at
http://www.vnunet.com/News/l 137500 (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the
Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). The Confidentiality Charter
contains the following pledges:
Enquiries will be carried out to minimise disruption to business.
All exchanges of information will be kept confidential.
Where information needs to be shared with others it will be sanitised.
Sources will receive absolute protection.
The NHTCU will distribute intelligence bulletins to industry on new
threats.
There will be active support for risk assessment procedures.
Id. "In some cases the police may decide not to prosecute offenders so long as no
major crime or violation of the [European Union's] human rights legislation has
taken place." Id. The NHTCU's Confidentiality Charter was "designed with input
from the Confederation of British Industry and the Crown Prosecution Service."
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between the two is that law enforcement will not initiate a "public"
investigation heading toward prosecution without discussing the
matter with the victim and perhaps, obtaining the victim's consent
to such action. 149
Id. David Roberts, chief executive of the UK "blue chip user organisation The
Infrastructure Forum", said the Charter was "a necessary thing to be able to do
because organisations are not going to freely disclose information unless they
know it is not going to be used in a way that will get into the public [domain]".
Andy McCue, Businesses to Discuss Cybercrime Charter, IT Week (Dec. 18,
2002), at http://www.itweek.co.uk/news/1137655 (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on
file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
For a rather different reporting strategy, see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2001
Computer Security Survey, at http://www.census.gov/eos/www/css/cssprimary.pdf
and U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2001 Computer Security Survey Instructions, at
http://www.census.gov/eos/www/css/cssinstructions.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2003)
(on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). Conducted by
the Census Bureau on behalf of the Bureau of Justice Statistics, this survey
"collects computer security data for nonfarm companies, organizations and
associations operating within the United States "to obtain information "about the
nature and extent of computer security incidents experienced by businesses located
in the U.S." U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2001 Computer Security Survey
Instructions, supra. See also Cybercrime Statistics from the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/sciencetech/ecrimestatsbjs.htm (last
visited Oct. 19, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal).
As to confidentiality, the survey instructions advise potential respondents that:
[Y]our participation in this survey is voluntary. We are conducting this
survey under the authority of Title 13, U.S. Code, Section 182. By
Section 9 of the same law, your report to the Census Bureau is
confidential. It may be seen only by persons sworn to uphold the
confidentiality of Census Bureau information and used only for
statistical purposes from which no firm may be identified. The law also
prohibits the sharing of your data with other agencies, exempts the
information you provide from requests made under the Freedom of
Information Act and ensures that your responses are immune from legal
process, including copies retained in your files.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2001 Computer Security Survey Instructions, supra.
149. Since this is an evolving approach, it is not clear to what extent the victim
controls the decision to prosecute. It may be that the victim has, in effect, a veto;
that is, a commercial cybercrime victim can "report" the victimization to law
enforcement on the condition that no prosecution be brought. This would add a
second option to the current consequence of reporting a crime; that is, filing a
report of a cybercrime could result in "prosecution" or "no prosecution."
There is, however, yet another alternative: The victim could be given what is, in
effect, a privilege which encompasses the information contained in the
consultative "report" described above. The effect of the privilege would be to give
the victim the power to decide whether or not the information so provided could
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How does this consultative "reporting" arrangement benefit
the parties to the relationship? The commercial victim can contact
law enforcement, obtain its assistance in ensuring that the
vulnerability which gave rise to the cybercrime has been addressed
and discuss the possibility of prosecution with knowledgeable
officers without, however, having to give up control over the
decision as to whether or not a public prosecution will be brought.
Law enforcement benefits because it obtains important information
about the occurrence of a new cybercrime, including the nature and
incidents of the offense. This information can be used in
responding to other, similar incidents and can also be used to
prevent further incidents. Law enforcement can, without
identifying the "reporting" victim, notify other potential victims of
the occurrence and details of this offense and encourage them to
take measures to protect themselves from being victimized. This in
effect achieves extra-judicial specific deterrence by preventing the
individual who was responsible for the completed cybercrime from
is cybercrime from victimizing others.
While this approach seems to resolve the reluctance
commercial victims display to report cybercrime under the
traditional model, it also raises some interesting policy issues. For
one thing, it means that members of the private sector essentially
control the decision whether or not an offender will be prosecuted
for her crimes (assuming she can be apprehended). 150 Of course,
members of the private sector do precisely that, in a defacto sense,
under the traditional mode when they decide whether or not to
report a cybercrime. And what is undesirable about giving the
victim of a cybercrime the ability to decide whether the perpetrator
be utilized to initiative a public prosecution of the offender.
Because this approach is still evolving, and because it depends so much on the
informal relationship that is established between law enforcement and members of
the private sector, it is unlikely that these issues have been formally resolved.
What ensues upon a commercial victim's approaching a cybercrime investigator
with the information that it has been the victim of a cyber-attack is probably a
matter of negotiation rather than the articulation and enforcement of set
alternatives. Indeed, the creation and application of specified alternatives (i.e.,
"prosecution," "no prosecution" and "privilege to specify prosecution") would be
inconsistent with the entire ethos of this approach. It is fundamentally a
partnership, a collaborative association for combating a specific type of crime.
150. See supra Part II. B.
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will be prosecuted? As noted above, we do precisely this in the
civil justice system; no civil case arises unless an aggrieved party
initiates it. 151
Requiring criminal prosecutions be brought by the state
instead of by victims assumes there are significant differences
between the rationales for and circumstances addressed by the civil
and criminal justice systems, respectively. If such differences
exist, they go to the nature of the "harms" each system addresses: If
someone who is injured in a traffic accident elects not to sue the
driver of the other car, we regard that as a private matter between
those individuals. But if someone uses an explosive device to
injure another, we regard that with much greater societal import,
one that is too important to be left to the individual victim's
discretion.15 2 But why do we treat the cases differently, when for
centuries they were treated the same? 153  If "harm" is the
differentiating factor, how does the deliberate use of an explosive
device to inflict injury produce a "harm" that sufficiently exceeds
that resulting from an inadvertent injury to require action by the
state? What, in other words, is the state's interest in the deliberate
infliction, or the deliberate attempt to inflict, certain types of
"harm?"
The state's interest lies neither in the magnitude of the "harm,"
as such, nor in the motivations for its infliction, but in the potential
the infliction of certain types of "harm" has for the maintenance of
public order and safety. The function of criminal law is to maintain
an acceptable level of order within a society.' 54 It does this by
151. And, as is explained above, victim control over the decision to seek
redress for the commission of a crime was an established feature of criminal
justice for centuries. See supra note 145.
152. See, e.g., IV WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 5.
The distinction of... crimes. . . from civil injuries seems principally to
consist in this: that.., civil injuries[,] are an infringement or privation
of the civil rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as
individuals .... crimes.., are a breach and violation of the public rights
and duties due to the whole community, considered as a community, in
its social aggregate capacity.
ld.
153. See supra note 145.
154. See, e.g., ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 5 (3d
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establishing prohibitions that are designed to maintain the integrity
of certain vital interests: the safety of persons; the security of
property; the stability of the government; and the sanctity of certain
moral principles. 5  No society can survive if its constituents can
harm each other, appropriate each other's property, undermine the
political order and flout moral principles the citizens hold dear
without recourse. Every society will therefore proscribe "crimes"
against persons (e.g., murder, rape); "crimes" against property
(e.g., theft, arson); "crimes" against the state (e.g., treason, rioting);
and "crimes" against morality (e.g., obscenity, defiling a place of
worship). 5 6 Every society will also seek the most effective means
of enforcing these proscriptions.
For centuries, the enforcement of these proscriptions was left
to the victim. 157 By the mid-nineteenth century, the victim had
been replaced by the state, which claimed the sole right to seek
justice from those who violated its criminal law. 158 Why did this
shift occur? And what can it tell us about the future enforcement of
criminal proscriptions?
In a thoughtful work, Philip Bobbitt traces the historical
evolution of the "state" from the princely states that emerged in the
fifteenth century through the appearance of the nation-state in the
ed. 1982) ("The purpose of the criminal law is to define socially intolerable
conduct, and to hold conduct within the limits which are reasonably acceptable
from the social point of view.") (citation omitted). See also supra notes 27-31 and
accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., CRIMINAL CODE OF ALBANIA,
http://www.pbosnia.kentlaw.edu/resources/legal/albania/crim code.htm (last
visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal); CRIMINAL CODE OF LATVIA,
http://www.ttc.lv/New/lv/tulkojumi/E0032.doc (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); CRIMINAL CODE OF THE
RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC (1934),
http://www.cyberussr.com/rus/uk-rsfsr.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with
the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). See generally WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5-7. See also ANDREW
ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 11 (Tony Honore & Joseph Raz, eds.,
Oxford University Press 1991).
156. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 145.
158. See supra note 145.
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nineteenth century.159 The evolutionary process that resulted in the
appearance of the nation-state is too complex to be summarized
here, but it is useful to note certain aspects of the process. One
important element is territory; as states evolve in power and
sophistication, territory assumes an increasing importance. Indeed,
an essential characteristic of the more evolved forms of the state is
that each claims exclusive authority over a particular geographical
territory. 60 This authority takes two forms: preserving the physical
integrity of the territory against potential intrusions by other states;
and preserving internal order within the territory.16  As to the
latter, the evolving incarnations of the state each assume varying
degrees of responsibility for maintaining internal order; the older
systems of criminal justice in which the enforcement of criminal
proscriptions was consigned to the victim reflect earlier
conceptions of the state's role with regard to this task. 62 Each
successive incarnation of the state assumes greater responsibility
for maintaining internal order, a process that culminates with the
rise of the nation-state in the nineteenth century. 163 The defining
characteristic of the nation-state is its commitment to guarantee the
security and prosperity of its citizens and by making this
commitment, the nation-state agrees to assume responsibility for
the various tasks required to implement this guarantee. 164
This explains why a process that culminated in the nineteenth
century resulted in shifting the responsibility for enforcing criminal
proscriptions from the victim to the state. In pre-state forms of
social organization, authority is relational, not institutional,
159. See PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE
COURSE OF HISTORY 75-204 (Alfred A. Knopf 2002) (explaining how and why the
concept of a "princely state" evolved from earlier forms of social organization that
were based on the private authority of an individual, such as a prince or tribal
leader). See id. at 75-89. A "state" is based on an institutionalized public
authority. See id. at 87 ("[T]he very word state underwent a transformation...
from its Latin root status meaning a 'state of affairs' to the State as an
institutionalized 'situation."').
160. For example, the territorial state, the state nation and the nation state. See
Bobbiut, supra note 159, at 120-204.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 75-204; see also supra note 145.
163. See id. at 75-204; see also supra note 145.
164. See id. at 144-204.
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whereby members of such a society derive whatever authority they
possess from the positions they occupy relative to other members
of that society. 165 Since authority is decentralized, individuals must
vindicate "harms" inflicted upon them by other members of the
society; no central authority has emerged to assume this task. As
the state evolves, authority becomes increasingly centralized; that
process eventually culminates in the rise of the nation-state which,
as part of asserting its authority over the territory it controls and
those who reside therein, assumes total responsibility for
maintaining internal order by enforcing criminal proscriptions.'
66
This accounts for the shift we have seen in the enforcement of the
criminal law, from an older system in which enforcement lay
entirely with the victim, to the current system in which the state
monopolizes the enforcement of local criminal law.
What, if anything, does all this tell us about the advisability of
giving commercial victims of cybercrime the ability to decide
whether or not an offender will be prosecuted? So far, all we have
seen is two zero-sum systems, i.e., a victim-prosecution system and
a state-prosecution system. Does this mean that the emerging
collaborative approach to commercial cybercrime must evolve into
a victim-prosecution system?
It does not, for reasons we can again derive from Professor
Bobbitt's study of the evolution of the state. He asserts that we are
seeing the decline of the nation-state due to the combined effects of
various forces, including cyberspace, which make territorial
boundaries irrelevant. 167  As territorial boundaries become
irrelevant, nation-states can no longer protect their citizens from
internal and external threats; since this is their basic reason for
existing, nation-states disappear, to be replaced by a new, more
adaptive form of the state, the market-state.' 68 The market-state
differs from the nation-state in various respects,169 one of which is
165. See id. at 75-95.
166. See id at 144-204.
167. See id. at 213-28.
168. See id at 228-42.
169. See id. According to Bobbitt, the market-state is designed to function in a
global environment where geographical territory is irrelevant and what matters is
process. Whereas the nation-state guaranteed to provide economic and physical
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particularly relevant to this discussion. According to Bobbitt, the
market-state will emphasize public-private collaboration in
discharging the various functions that have heretofore been
monopolized by the state.
1 70
This explains why the collaborative approach described above
has emerged as a strategy for combating cybercrime directed at
commercial entities. It is the result of an implicit recognition that
the traditional model of law enforcement, which is a product of the
nation-state,1 71 cannot deal effectively with cybercrime, which is a
product of the forces that are shaping the market-state, so a new
model is needed. Like the model that came before, this model will
evolve along with the new market-state. Since this evolutionary
process is still in its infancy, it is impossible to predict precisely
what form the new model will take.
It is, however, possible to outline the general strategy it will
employ, as aspects of the strategy are evident in the collaborative
approach described earlier. The primary difference between the
model that will evolve from the collaborative approach and the
traditional model of law enforcement is that, while the former will
retain the practice of reacting to completed cybercrime, it will put
primary emphasis on preventing cybercrime. Prevention assumes
paramount importance because we can no longer routinely assume
that an effective reaction to a completed cybercrime is possible.
72
But prevention is not something that can be consigned exclusively
or even primarily to law enforcement. If commercial cybercrime is
to be prevented, businesses must assume the responsibility, alone
and working in conjunction with law enforcement, to make their
computer systems and operations as secure as possible. A critical
part of this process is the sharing of information about
consummated attacks, (i.e., completed cybercrimes); once they
learn the details of how another business was victimized,
companies can take steps to prevent the same tactics from being
used against them. This is a new form of reacting to crime, one
security to its citizens, the market-state promises only to provide them with
opportunities. See id.
170. See id. at 235-38.
171. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
172. See supra Part II. B.
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that is undertaken primarily by the victim, rather than by law
enforcement. But law enforcement also plays a role in this process.
Companies are reluctant to publicize their victimization by
cybercriminals for fear of the impact this information will have
upon their respective clienteles. 173  The collaborative approach
addresses this by letting them share the information with law
enforcement on the condition that it not be made public without
their consent. 74 Only law enforcement can share this information
with other businesses in a suitably anonymous fashion, 7 5 if this is
necessary to alleviate the victim company's fears that its
competitors might utilize the information to its detriment or that it
might otherwise be used to jeopardize the company's interests.
In sum, there is no logical or doctrinal reason why victims of
cybercrime cannot be given the power to decide whether or not the
offense committed against them should result in a formal
prosecution. Victim-driven prosecution was established practice
not so long ago. Giving cybercrime victims this power does not,
however, mean a return to the days when victims were solely
responsible for investigating an offense, apprehending the
perpetrator and funding the costs of prosecution. 76 It means we
adopt a new, more flexible system that is responsive to the distinct
issues commercial cybercrime presents. Giving these victims
control over (or input into) 177 the decision to prosecute promotes
information-sharing and cooperation among businesses and
between business and law enforcement, both for the purposes of
preventing cybercrime and reacting (formally and informally) to
completed cybercrimes. Giving them this power also fosters a
relationship between the groups that can result in other forms of
collaboration in the battle against cybercrime.
B. Assisting
As noted above, the collaborative approach, which seems to
represent a new model of law enforcement, so far includes private
173. See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 148.
176. See supra note 145.
177. See supra note 145.
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sector involvement in two aspects of the process of reacting to
cybercrime. One is the reporting of cybercrimes. 7 8 The other is the
investigative process that has heretofore been conducted by law
enforcement.
Of the two, private sector involvement in the investigative
process is the least problematic, since it does not require re-
evaluating a basic assumption of the criminal justice process. 7 9
One form this involvement takes is that a commercial entity that
has been victimized by cybercriminal assists law enforcement
officers with their investigation of that offense. A victim company
might, for instance, provide law enforcement officers with the
computer hardware, software or even technical expertise they need
to execute a computer search warrant. 80 There is nothing novel in
the notion that law enforcement can seek technical expertise from
members of the private sector. Federal and state statutes
specifically authorize this, 181 and courts have approved of the
practice. 1
82
178. See supra Part III. A.
179. Seeid.
180. See, e.g., Weaver science committee testimony, supra note 147.
[1]n one recently completed complex investigation involving the
compromise of a wireless communications carrier's network, our case
agent actually specified in the affidavit of the federal search warrant that
representatives of the victim business be allowed to accompany federal
agents in the search of the target residence to provide technical
assistance. This is unprecedented in the law enforcement arena and
underscores the level of trust we enjoy with those we have built
relationships with in the private sector. It is also indicative of the
complexity of many of these investigations and serves to highlight the
fact that we in law enforcement must work with private industry to be an
effective crime fighting force. In approving this search warrant, the
court recognized that in certain cases involving extraordinarily complex
systems and networks, such additional technical expertise can be a
critical, and sometimes imperative, component of our investigative
efforts.
Id. (emphasis omitted). See also United States v. Schwimmer, 692 F. Supp. 119,
126 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); see also AMD Helps Austin, Texas, Cops Solve High-Tech
Crimes, CPU Planet (Oct. 9, 2002), at
http://wwwcpuplanet.com/knowledge/casestudies/article.php!1479431 (last
visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal).
181. See 18 U.S.C. § 3105; see also VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-56 (Michie 2000).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Clouston, 623 F.2d 485, 486 (6th Cir. 1980);
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Legal issues might, however, arise with regard to seeking such
assistance from the victim of the crime being investigated. The
statutes noted earlier, and much of the case law in this area, 183 all
antedate the rise of cybercrime and therefore contemplate private
assistance of a type unlike that described above. For the most part,
these authorities assume that the police should be allowed to call
upon those having special expertise to assist them in executing a
search warrant.' 84 A classic example is law enforcement's seeking
assistance from employees of a telephone company to install a pen
register or wiretap. 85 As this example suggests, what is common
in most of these cases is that they involve law enforcement's
obtaining assistance from a disinterested third party with particular
expertise. Depending on the facts at issue, the target of a search
warrant that was executed with assistance provided by the victim of
a cybercrime might claim that the search was invalid because the
victim's agents deliberately exceeded the scope of the warrant,
perhaps in an effort to locate proprietary information that could be
of use to the victim company or to find evidence of unlawful
activity not encompassed by the warrant. The target of such a
search might also contend that involving a victim or victim's agents
in executing a warrant against a rival company represents, in effect,
a conflict of interest and should not be allowed. 86 It remains to be
seen how a court would resolve claims such as these. It is clear,
though, that merely involving the victim in the execution of a
search warrant does not, per se, render the search unlawful.
87
Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d 1184, 1188 (Mass. 1997); Huggins v.
Oklahoma, 861 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993); People v. Boyd, 474
N.Y.S.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Miller v. Hogeboom, 76 N.W. 888, 889
(Neb. 1898). Seealso United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002).
183. Cf Bach, supra note 182.
184. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d 1184, 1188 (Mass.
1997).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Guglielmo, 245 F. Supp. 534, 535 (N.D. Ill.
1965).
186. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 598 P.2d 877, 882 (Cal. 1979) (noting
that it was not improper to bring burglary victims to scene of warrant execution to
identify stolen property given that there was no indication that (a) the warrant was
obtained pretextually to authorize a "general exploratory" search or (b) the victims
acted out of vindictiveness or "other improper motivation").
187. See, e.g., United States v. Clouston, 623 F.2d 485, 486 (6th Cir. 1980)
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Indeed, the practice of involving the victim dates back to common
law, when officers were required to bring the victim of a theft
along to identify stolen goods.' 
88
Providing assistance with the execution of search warrants
does not exhaust the private sector's involvement in investigating
cybercrimes. Businesses routinely conduct internal investigations
into suspicious activity; if these investigations are conducted for
the purpose of determining the propriety of an employee's actions
as an employee, they do not trigger the constitutional standards that
govern the actions of law enforcement officers. They do not, for
instance, trigger the application of the Miranda doctrine or the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures.' 89 These and other constitutional protections only apply
to the actions of law enforcement officers or to the actions of
private citizens who are acting as agents of law enforcement. 90
(not improper to involve employees of telephone company in executing warrant
for property stolen from that company given that the employees' role was limited
to identifying the stolen property).
188. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611-12 (1999): "Where the
police enter a home under the authority of a warrant to search for stolen property,
the presence of third parties for the purpose of identifying the stolen property has
long been approved by this Court and our common-law tradition." See id.; see also
Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1067 (K.B.1765) (in search for stolen
goods case, "'[t]he owner must swear that the goods are lodged in such a place. He
must attend at the execution of the warrant to show them to the officer, who must
see that they answer the description"') (quoted with approval in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886)). id; see also United States v. Robertson, 21 F.3d
1030 (10th Cir. 1994).
189. See, e.g., State v. Roush, 563 S.E.2d 642 (N.C. App. 2002) ("Miranda
warnings are not required in interrogations conducted by private individuals who
are unconnected to law enforcement.")
190. See, e.g., United States v. Douglas, 947 F.2d 951, (9th Cir. 1991) ("A
wrongful search or seizure conducted by a private person does not contravene the
Fourth Amendment.... [I]f a private person acts as an instrument or agent of the
state in conducting the search, however, a Fourth Amendment violation may
occur"). See also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 614
(1989). Compare United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1046 (11 th Cir. 2003)
(Turkish hacker who gave law enforcement evidence he obtained by hacking into
defendant's computer was not acting as an agent of the state in doing so) with
United States v. Jarrett, 229 F. Supp.2d 503 (E.D. Va. 2002) (Turkish hacker was
acting as agent of the state when he searched defendant's computer).
When companies provide assistance to law enforcement in, for example,
executing a search warrant, they are acting as an agent of the state and are,
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This is where the potential difficulty can arise: If a company
becomes aware that an employee may be using its computer
facilities for illegal purposes, it will investigate the employee's
actions. If, as noted above, the investigation is conducted purely as
an internal matter, i.e., to determine whether the employee should
be discharged or even civilly sued for the damage he has caused,
the constitutional principles that govern the conduct of official,
criminal investigations would not be triggered. But if the company,
at the beginning of the investigation or while it is still in progress,
decides it will gather evidence to give to the police so the employee
will be prosecuted, the company may be acting as an agent of the
state and constitutional doctrines may apply.' 9' If the company is
deemed to have been acting as an agent of the state and, while so
doing, violated the Fourth Amendment in the process of gathering
evidence, that evidence will be suppressed, which may mean that a
perpetrator goes free, to paraphrase Judge Cardozo, because the
"employer blundered."' 192
The collaborative approach is still in its infancy, even with
regard to cybercrimes directed at commercial entities. The rules
we have developed, particularly over the last century, to govern the
conduct of criminal investigations by law enforcement officers will
have to evolve as this new approach evolves. This is not to say that
this new approach will or should result in an erosion of the
protections against excessive or arbitrary state action that were so
carefully and thoughtfully crafted by courts during the twentieth
century. We will, though, have to confront many difficult issues as
we move toward what might be characterized as a "blended"
approach to cyber-security and cybercrime investigations. 193
therefore, encompassed by the constitutional standards noted above. See, e.g.,
United States v. Schwimmer, 692 F. Supp. 119, 126-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2000)
(UPS employee who opened package was acting as agent of the state so the Fourth
Amendment applied); State v. Buswell, 449 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Minn. App. 1989)
(Fourth Amendment governed propriety of private security guard's search of
person attempting to enter racetrack).
192. See People v. DeFore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) ("The criminal is to go
free because the constable has blundered.").
193. The issues we will confront in implementing this new, collaborative
approach have been very thoughtfully described by Wesley Alig, in his paper on
the issues that result from using private security in the battle against cybercrime:
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL (INDIVIDUAL)
"Doctrines such as ... assumption of risk have no place in the
criminal law.' 94  The collaborative approach to cybercrime
examined in § III is evolving in the context of a particular variety
of cybercrime: crimes that target commercial victims. While a
significant amount of cybercrime is directed at such victims,' 95 and
This reliance on private security in the battle against cybercrime creates
a number of difficult legal issues, the most important of which is the
applicability of the state action doctrine. In American law,
constitutional and other protections evolved to constrain the actions of
state agents, e.g., of police officers; they do not apply to conduct
undertaken by private parties. The increasing reliance on private
security raises difficult questions as to how - if at all - these protections
should apply to the conduct of private individuals who work
independently to gather the evidence that is needed to prosecute
cybercriminals.
The worst-case scenario in this area is when a private company basically
puts the entire case against an accused together by gathering the
appropriate evidence, even by an unreasonable search, and then handing
it all over to the police. The police do not really have to do anything and
the accused individual does not have a remedy because the exclusionary
rule does not apply since there wasn't state action. For example, in
Texas, Ken Kellar, a self-employed computer technician, picked up the
hard drive of the defendant. The owner of the hard drive thought that
there might be a virus. Kellar started opening files looking for a virus
when he found child pornography. He called the FBI and then the
police. He was a confidential informant for the FBI. After he talked to
the police he went back and searched again for more files.
The court held that even though he was a confidential informant his first
search was not state action, however, his second search was. The court
determined that his in his initial search his intent was not to find the
child pornography files but to look for the virus. In his second search
however, he was specifically looking for more illegal files. The court
also reasoned that in the first search the government did not know of the
intrusive conduct, and in the second they had constructive notice
because the FBI agent was alerted to the fact that Keller had found the
files. This case is just one of many illustrations of private companies
handing completed cases to the police. Even a confidential informant
was held to not be a state actor for part of the search.
Wesley A. Alig, Private Computer Security: The Problem of State Action in
Criminal Procedure and How It Applies to Private Computer Security,
http://www.cybercrimes.net/Private/state.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). (citations omitted)
(discussing United States. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984)).
194. Commonwealth v. Godin, 371 N.E.2d 438, 443 (Mass. 1977).
195. See Part I11.
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although there are distinct dangers associated with cyber-attacks on
the commercial sector, 196 this does not mean we can neglect the
"other" victims of cybercrime: individuals. Individuals have as
much of a right to protection from cybercriminals as do commercial
entities. 197 We must therefore consider whether the collaborative
approach can and should be extrapolated to include individual
computer users, as well as commercial entities.
This approach resulted from the realization by the business
and law enforcement communities that the traditional, reactive
model of law enforcement can no longer be the sole strategy used
to combat cybercrime. The traditional model is, as § III explained,
not particularly effective against cybercrime because it is based
upon assumptions that are derived from the empirical
characteristics of real-world crime. Since cybercrime shares few of
these characteristics, the traditional model is ill-suited to be our
primary approach to cybercrime and cybercriminals.
The traditional model's inability to deal effectively with
cybercrime transcends the nature of the victim; consequently, we
need a more effective way to protect individuals, as well as
commercial victims. The collaborative approach described above
is the most likely (indeed, currently our only) candidate for this
task. We must therefore determine if its methodology is
appropriate for individual computer users.
The collaborative approach as it has evolved so far has two
distinct aspects: One emphasizes training, education and
information-sharing between commercial entities and law
enforcement for the purpose of preventing cybercrime. 198  The
196. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE
CYBERSPACE 5-11 (Feb. 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/case for-action.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2003)
(on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal) (hereinafter
referred to as The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace).
197. Aside from the fact that the criminal justice system is obligated to protect
every citizen to the best of its capacity, there is another reason to extend the
utmost in cybercrime protection and prevention to individuals. In a borderless
world, individual computer users can become vectors that are used in cyber-
attacks against other individuals, commercial targets and even government targets.
See, e.g., The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, supra note 196.
198. See Part Il.
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other involves members of the commercial sector in the process of
reacting to a cybercrime; the result is a collaboration between law
enforcement and commercial entities that, so far, encompasses the
reporting of cybercrime and the private sector's assisting officers as
they investigate cybercrimes. 199 The issue to be considered in this
section is whether this is a viable approach for individuals, and it
raises two questions: Can this approach be implemented effectively
as to individuals? If so, will it enhance law enforcement's ability
to protect individuals from cybercrime? For reasons that should
become clear as the analysis proceeds, we will address these issues
in reverse order.
A. Enhanced Protection
The first aspect of the collaborative model - training and
educating potential victims of cybercrime so they are aware of the
risks they face and take steps to minimize them - can no doubt
enhance law enforcement's ability to protect individuals. Indeed, it
might achieve more dramatic successes as to individuals than
commercial entities, since the latter are more likely to be aware of
the risks they face and of the dangers of ignoring those risks.
Individual computer users are, for the most part, quite ignorant of
the risks they face in cyberspace; they tend to believe that
cybercrime is directed at corporate and government entities and
that "cybersecurity is someone else's problem, not the concern of
the home Internet user."200 Individuals must learn that because the
reactive model is not an effectual means of discouraging
cybercrime, they are responsible for their own safety when they
venture into cyberspace. The successful inculcation of this
message will take time; notwithstanding the popularity of personal
firearms, home and auto alarm systems, citizens still generally tend
to assume that law enforcement will provide a safe environment for
them.2 ° t Other factors that might impede the process of training
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, supra note 196.
201. See, e.g., A.H. Korthals, Netherlands Minister of Justice, Safety: The
Concern of Government and Citizens (Nov. 19, 2001), at
http://www.minjust.nl:8080/cactual/speeches/spOO30.htm (last visited Oct. 5,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal):
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individuals in online self-protection is that they have neither the
economic incentives which motivate commercial entities to secure
their computer systems nor the resources businesses can employ for
this purpose.2 02 This suggests that this aspect of the collaborative
approach should include, as to individuals, at least, advice as to
what measures to take to protect themselves online and some
guidance in obtaining the tools they need to do SO.
2 03
As to other aspects of the collaborative approach, one reason it
evolved in the commercial context was to enhance the accuracy of
cybercrime reporting; companies have been disinclined to report
their victimization by cybercriminals, for fear of the effect this
information can have upon their business endeavors.20 4 This is not
a significant issue with regard to individuals, for two reasons. One
is that individuals will suffer no economic disadvantages if they
report their victimization to the police; indeed, some may anticipate
obtaining such an advantage in the form of redress from their
victimizer. The other reason why individuals are not reluctant to
report is that they are unaware of the critical difference between
real-world crime and cybercrime. Individuals report real-world
crime because they have been socialized to believe in the
traditional, reactive model of law enforcement; the educational
system, their parents and the media have all combined to convince
them that when a real-world "crime" is committed, the police will
apprehend and bring the perpetrator to justice, i.e., prosecuted and
A recent exploration into trends in the field of justice.., refers to the
reduced acceptance of risk as a societal trend which has important
consequences for Justice. One aspect of this trend is the greatly
increased expectation citizens have that the government will protect
them from all sorts of risks. In the aftermath of the disasters in Enschede
and Volendam, some even go as far as wanting to extend the
Constitution to include a constitutional right to safety. Although one
may rightly wonder whether this is merely a paper tiger, it is a sign of
society's expectations.
Id.
202. Another difference is that commercial entities are more likely to have
experience in providing for their own security against real-world crime, and be
able to extrapolate this experience to the context of online crime.
203. See, e.g., National Cyber Security Alliance, Stay Safe Online, at
http://www.staysafeonline.info/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2003) (on file with the
Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
204. See Part Il.
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punished.20 5 They tend to assume this is true of cybercrime, as
well, so they tend to report their experience with cybercriminals. °6
The collaborative approach also features citizen involvement
in the process of investigating cybercrime; commercial entities
provide technical and other assistance to law enforcement for
207various purposes, such as executing computer search warrants.
This aspect of the collaborative approach represents a realization
by both parties that law enforcement resources are, and will
continue to be, overwhelmed by the complexity and pace with
which technology advances. Businesses have access to greater
technological resources than do individuals; they also have
significant incentives to use those resources to increase the stability
and security of the online environment in which they function. It is
unlikely that individuals can become involved in the investigative
process in this way, i.e., by providing law enforcement with
technology it needs to combat cybercrime. They might, though,
become involved in another way-by serving as sources of
information as to what takes place in cyberspace.20 8 Neighborhood
watches have been created in an effort to provide law enforcement
with information about real-world crime; perhaps some variety of
205. Police and prosecutors may know that they have little, if any, chance of
apprehending the perpetrators of many real-world "crimes," but this knowledge
has not penetrated general public awareness. Indeed, those involved in the justice
system would not want this to become general public knowledge since a system of
criminal justice cannot operate effectively if the public has little confidence in its
ability to maintain order.
206. See, e.g., Lisa Gill, United States: Identity Theft Complaints Skyrocket,
ECOMMERCE TIMES (Jan. 23, 2003), at
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/20553.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2003)
(on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); Executive
Summary, IFCC 2001 Internet Fraud Report (Jan. 1, 2001 - Dec. 31, 2001), at
http://wwwl.ifccfbi.gov/strategy/IFCC_2001_AnnualReport.pdf (last visited Oct.
5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). See
also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE - BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Prosecutors in State
Courts, 2001 at 5, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govIbjs/pub/pdf/psc0l.pdf (data on
cybercrime cases prosecuted by state prosecutors) (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on
file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
207. See supra Part 11I.
208. See, e.g., United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039 (lth Cir. 2003)
(Turkish hacker sent law enforcement evidence he obtained by hacking into
defendant's computer); United States v. Jarrett, 229 F. Supp.2d 503, 503-04, (E.D.
Va. 2002).
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neighborhood watches will emerge in cyberspace, as the
209individual's way of participating in the battle against cybercrime.
While it is difficult at this point to identify precisely how, and
to what extent, individuals may become involved in the process of
investigating cybercrime, it is clear that the collaborative approach
holds out the promise of improving the efficacy with which law
enforcement protects them from cybercrime. Whether this promise
will be realized depends upon whether the approach can be
implemented effectively in the individual, non-commercial context.
B. Implemented Effectively
The primary impediment to the successful implementation of a
collaborative approach with regard to cybercrime against
individuals is the continued persistence of the belief in the
209. See, e.g., William Jackson, Secret Service: Prevention, Not Arrests, Is Key
to Cybersecurity, NEWSBYTES, Aug. 22, 2002, 2002 WL 3451351:
In its efforts to combat cybercrime, the Secret Service is learning from
law enforcement mistakes made in the war on drugs.
'Enforcement controlled the agenda, and prevention was a small part of
it,' said Special Agent John Frazzini, who is helping to organize a
nationwide electronic crimes task force.
That approach did not work very well against drugs and will not work
against hackers, Frazzini said....
'We're not going to arrest our way to security,' he said. 'The concept of
the task force is analogous to the neighborhood watch program,' in
which members of a community look out for each other to prevent
crime....
Id. See also Tatiana Gau, Information Security in the AOL Community:
Technology, Tools, and Education, Statement Before the Federal Trade
Commission Workshop on Consumer Information Security at 3 (May 20, 2002),
at http://www.flc.gov/bcp/workshops/security/comments/tatianagau.pdf
(describing AOL Neighborhood Watch) (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the
Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); Online Child Porn Hits the
"Wall, " TECH TV (July 3, 2001), at
http://www.techtv.com/cybercrime/viceonline/story/0,23008,7763,00.html
(reporting on an individual who effectively maintains an online Neighborhood
Watch against child pornography) (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the
Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); Lori Enos, United States Makes
Bust in Online Fraud Cases Totaling $117M, Ecommerce Times (May 24, 2001),
at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/per/story/9967.html (U.S. Attorney General
John Ashcrofl quoted as saying that "'[j]ust as neighborhood watch programs keep
watch over their neighborhoods and report suspicious activity to law enforcement,
Internet users... have a 'cyber community watch' program") (last visited Oct. 5,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
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effectiveness of the traditional, reactive model of law
210enforcement. It is a rather delicate task to undermine this belief
sufficiently to convince individuals that they are responsible for
their own safety in cyberspace without jeopardizing their general
confidence in the justice system.21' Indeed, the federal
government's first effort in this regard, its draft for the National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, was criticized as being too vague
and too gentle in style and substance.
One criticism leveled at the draft for the National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace is that it does not contemplate using the law to
encourage citizens to improve the security of their computer
systems and forays into cyberspace. 212 Those who advanced this
210. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal Protection, 21 YALE L.
& POL'Y REv. 53, 81 (2003) ("the public expects.., prompt police response to,
and effective investigation of, crimes once they have been committed."). This
belief is not limited to individuals. Many commercial victims, even
technologically sophisticated victims, tend to assume that if they report a
cybercrime to law enforcement, the matter will be dealt with: the perpetrator will
be apprehended, conviction and punishment will ensue, and like-minded
individuals will be deterred from emulating his unlawful activities. See, e.g.,
Steve Gibson, The Strange Tale of the Denial of Service Attacks against
GRC.COM, at http://grc.com/dos/grcdos.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal). The discussion above
focuses primarily on individuals both to simplify the analysis and because they
will no doubt be the most intransigent when it comes to convincing citizens that
they cannot rely on law enforcement to preserve order and security in cyberspace.
Commercial entities are further advanced in this regard because they have had to
learn to take measures to protect themselves and their operations from
cybercriminals. See Part I11.
211. See, e.g., The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, supra note 196.
See also The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, Priority III § A(1)(a) (Feb.
2003) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/priority_3.pdf (last visited
Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
212. See, e.g., Dan Verton, Gilmore Commission Critical of Bush
Cybersecurity Plan, COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 17, 2002). at
http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0, 10801,76827,00.ht
ml (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology
Law Journal):
In its fourth annual report, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic
Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction, chaired by former Virginia Gov. James S. Gilmore III,
called the recently released Draft National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace 'a small step' in the right direction.'
'The draft strategy poses what we view as voluntary, tactical responses
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criticism tended to stress the need for federal legislation that would
require commercial entities and Internet Service Providers to
institute specific measures designed to improve overall security.213
The viability and utility of legislation such as this is a matter that is
quite outside the scope and ambitions of this article, but the notion
of using the law to promote a collaborative approach to combating
cybercrime is not. What follows is in no way a formal proposal; it
is more on the order of a speculation as to how the shift from one
model of law enforcement to another. Indeed, the shift from one
type of state to another 214 might affect one of the basic assumptions
of substantive criminal law.
Our criminal law does not require a blameless victim. It is a
"crime" to inflict a prohibited harm on an individual even though
he recklessly exposed himself to the risk of such harm or consented
to its infliction.215 This is contrary to the tort law principle that a
victim can be held to have "assumed the risk" of injury to herself;
if a tort victim is found to have assumed the risk from which she
216sustained injury, she cannot recover for that injury. The
to an inherently strategic problem of national importance,' the report
states. The report also faults the Bush plan because it 'relies on private
sector willingness to take certain security measures and bear their costs,
and chooses not to use government's power to legislate, regulate or
otherwise require certain actions.'
See also Robert Lemos & Declan McCullagh, Cybersecurity Plan Lacks Muscle,
C/Net News.com (Sept. 19, 2002) at http://news.com.com/2100-1023_3-
958545.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and
Technology Law Journal) ("'Cybersecurity is too tough a problem for a solely
voluntary approach to fix... ,' said James Lewis, director of the CSIS Council on
Technology and Public Policy").
213. See id.
214. See supra notes 159-170 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Atencio,189 N.E.2d 223 (Mass. 1963) (state
had an interest in seeing that the victim, who died while playing Russian roulette,
"should not be killed by the wanton or reckless conduct of himself or others").
See also Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 261 A.2d 550, 558 (Pa. 1970) ("a
killing with the victim's consent is nevertheless murder"') (quoting Case Note, 71
HARV. L. REv. 1565 (1958)).
216. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 496B, 496C (1965).
Courts have held, however, that "[b]ecause of the legitimate public policy of
deterring and punishing intentional wrong-doing," assumption of the risk is not a
defense in an action based on an intentional tort. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co. v. Hill, 775 A.2d 476, 482 (Md. App. 2001). See also McGill v.
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explanation for the difference lies in the fact that a "crime" is a
wrong against society, while a tort is a matter between
individuals.2 17 So however reckless or foolish a victim may have
been, the criminal law will not deny her justice on the premise that
she could have avoided her own victimization because it is
vindicating societal rights to peace and order, not merely her
individual rights.2 18
Should there be a different rule in cyberspace? Should
someone who ventures into cyberspace without having taken
certain basic precautions to ensure her protection against, say,
identity theft or a virus or online fraud, be deemed to have
"assumed the risk" of incurring that cybercrime? Why might we
even consider instituting such a variation from the traditional
common law rule? And could the principle of "assumption of risk"
be incorporated into the criminal law, at least, the criminal law of
cyberspace? Again, we will address the questions in reverse order.
As to whether the "assumption of risk" principle could be
incorporated into the criminal law of cyberspace, the answer is that
it could not, at least not as the principle is applied in tort law. In
tort law, as noted above, if a victim is found to have assumed the
risk of harm which resulted in her injury, she is barred from
obtaining redress for that injury. If we were to import this notion
whole into the criminal law, the consequence would be that foolish
or vulnerable victims who were found to have assumed the risk of
Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 352 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 907 (1991).
217. See supra notes 152-155 and accompanying text. See also
Commonwealth v. Atencio, 189 N.E.2d 223 (Mass. 1963).
218. See, e.g., Ius COMMUNE CASEBOOK: TORT LAW § 7.2 111.6 ("In criminal
law the victim's conscious self-exposure to harm is not accorded the same
exculpatory force where personal injuries are negligently inflicted as it has been in
private law") (discussing doctrine of assumption of risk under German law). See
also George P. Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative
Analysis, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 401,419 (1971):
There is a point in saying that intentionally interfering with the interests
of others is wrong regardless of the expectations of the victim or third
parties. It is hardly a justification for rape, robbery, arson, or homicide to
point out that because of a high crime rate the victim expected a criminal
attack. The defense of assumption of risk has no place in the law of
intentional crimes.
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their victimization would be barred from seeking justice. A
corollary consequence would be that cybercriminals who preyed
upon vulnerable members of our society would, in effect, guarantee
themselves a "Get out of jail free card., 219  Obviously, neither
result is acceptable; one of the purposes of the criminal law is to
protect all members of society, including the young, the
disadvantaged and the elderly. Importing the tort doctrine of
assumption of risk would, in effect, be declaring open season on
these individuals.
Clearly, therefore, the tort law principle of assumption of risk
219. See, e.g., How to Play Monopoly 1934 Rules, at
http://www.adena.com/adena/mo/mo26.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
Interestingly, such a concept has been incorporated into the cybercrime law of
at least one country. Article 138a of the Dutch Penal Code provides that anyone
who:
Intentionally and unlawfully accesses an automated system for the
storage or processing of data, or part of such a system, shall be liable, as
guilty of breach of computer peace, to term of imprisonment not
exceeding six months or a fine of 10.000 guilders if he:
(a) Breaks through a security system, or
(b) Obtains access by a technical intervention, with the help of false
signals or a false key or by acting in a false capacity.
Netherlands, Penal Code Article 138a, The Legal Framework: Unauthorized
Access to Computer Systems at http://www.mosstingrett.no/info/legal.html (last
visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal). See also, Wtboek van Strafrecht, Boek 2, Title V, Article 138a at
http://www.win.tue.nl/-aeb/jura/Strafrecht/Wtboek van Strafrecht/boek_2/title_5.
html (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and
Technology Law Journal). According to one computer crime expert, the
Netherlands provision was intended to incorporate assumption of risk into the
nation's hacking law, so it is not a crime to gain access to a Dutch computer
system without authorization if the computer system was not secured.
Conversation with Professor Bert-Jaap Koops, Senior Lecturer - Faculty of Law,
Tilburg University, Netherlands at
http://www.uvt.nl/webwijs.english/show.html?anr=822574&lang--en (last visited
Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
Compare N.Y. Penal Law § 156.05 (McKinnney 2002) (one is guilty of
unauthorized use of a computer when he or she knowingly and without
authorization causes a computer to be used "and the computer utilized is equipped
or programmed with any device or coding system, a function of which is to
prevent the inauthorized use of said computer") with N.Y. Penal Law § 156.10
(McKinney 2002) (one is guilty of computer trespass when he or she knowingly
and without authorization causes a computer to be used either with the intent to
commit or firther a felony or to gain access to computer material).
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cannot and should not be imported into the criminal law, not even
with regard to conduct occurring in and via cyberspace. 220  But
what about incorporating the concept, not the rule? That is, what
about incorporating a notion of assumption of risk into the criminal
law, one that does not absolve the perpetrator of liability for his or
her crimes but can be used to underscore the fact that there may
well be no official redress for "harms" inflicted in cyberspace?
There is, of course, no absolute guarantee of official redress
for real-world crime. Federal prosecutors tend to have greater
discretion than state prosecutors, but even local prosecutors "have
wide discretion in deciding who to investigate (and who not to
investigate) and who to charge (and who not to charge)." 221
Prosecutors have always declined to prosecute some segment of the
222real-world offenses that are brought to their attention.2 The
220. The significance of the conduct occurring in cyberspace is arguable. One
could point out that the principles of the criminal law evolved to establish order
and safety in the real, physical world which we necessarily inhabit. Since we are
not required to inhabit cyberspace, if it is construed as a "place," we should not
expect the same level of protection in that environment as we do in the real-world.
If one subscribes to this view, then it would be possible to develop different rules
governing actions in and mediated through cyberspace because it is a different
reality, one we make a conscious effort to visit. However, even if one accepts the
premise that cyberspace is a different "place" and therefore at least theoretically
governed by different legal principles, it is already difficult, and will become
increasingly difficult, to argue that individuals (and entities) "voluntarily" inhabit
cyberspace. As human activity increasingly moves online, it is unreasonable to
suggest that individuals participate in cyberspace out of caprice rather than
necessity.
221. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 3-3.1, cmt. at 49 (3d
ed. 1993). See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standards 3-3.4 -
3.9. See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE - U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL PROSECUTION § 9-27.110, cmt., available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia readingroom/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm
(last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal).
222. Seee.g., U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF FED. JUSTICE STATISTICS 2000, Table 2.3 ("Suspects
in matters concluded and declined, by investigating agency, Oct. 1, 1999 -
September 30, 2000") available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.govbjs/pub/pdf/cfjs0002.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on
file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal) (percentage of cases
in which prosecution was declined by the Department of Justice was 25.3%).
Police exercise similar discretion with regard to investigating crimes. See infra
note 227.
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critical difference between real-world crimes and cybercrimes lies
in the factors that result in a lack of prosecution. Declination
decisions for real-world crimes are based on specific factors, such
as a prosecutor's doubt that an accused is guilty, the accused's
cooperation in apprehending or convicting others, the extent of the
harm caused by the offense, the likelihood of prosecution in
another jurisdiction and the "possible improper motives" of a
complaining witness. 223 In these instances, prosecution is declined
because a prosecutor has determined that it would be unjust or
unnecessary; the declination decision therefore represents a
considered decision not to prosecute when prosecution is a viable
option. For cybercrimes, on the other hand, prosecution is
increasingly often not an option because of the practical difficulties
involved in identifying and apprehending cybercriminals.224 This is
the critical difference between the two instances of no-prosecution:
Declination decisions are a sign that the justice system is
functioning effectively as to real-world crime; having the ability to
prosecute, it chooses not to. The justice system's inability to
prosecute cybercrime cases is a sign that it is not functioning
effectively in this area. Since this state of affairs will continue, if
not worsen, we need to ensure citizens realize that when they
venture into cyberspace they enter an insecure environment in
which the implicit guarantees of official redress applicable to the
real-world no longer apply; they must therefore become the
guarantors of their own safety in the online world.
An attenuated assumption of risk principle could be used to
accomplish this, i.e., to make individuals-and entities-realize
that they are responsible for preventing their victimization by
cybercriminals. Such a principle would include two components:
223. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 3-3.9(b). See also
U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE - U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, PRINCIPLES OF FED.
PROSECUTION § 9-27.220(A), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia readingroom/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm
(last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal) (federal "prosecution should be declined when 1. no substantial federal
interest would be served by prosecution; 2. the person is subject to prosecution in
another jurisdiction; or 3. there exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to
prosecution.").
224. See supra §11(C)
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(1) a negative proposition the effect of which is to overcome the
current default expectation of an effective law enforcement
response to one's victimization; 225 and (2) a declaration that the
negation of such a generalized expectation in no way impedes or
prevents the investigation and prosecution of identified,
apprehended cybercriminals. It might look something like this:
One who [understanding the risk of harm to self or property]
accesses or employs cyberspace to engage in commercial or other
activity without having taken all reasonable, available measures to
protect herself and her property from being victimized by online
criminal actors during the course of and with regard to any matters
related to such activity shall be deemed to have assumed the risk of
that victimization. Such a victim should report the offense(s) to the
appropriate law enforcement agency.226 The filing of such a report
in no way obligates the agency to investigate or otherwise pursue
the matter; domestic law enforcement agencies have full discretion
to determine what, if any, action will be taken as the result of
receiving such a report. 27 Law enforcement agencies are under no
225. This expectation is characterized as a "default" expectation because it is
not shared uniformly by all citizens. Depending on the society, many of its
citizens may realize that an effective law enforcement response is unlikely, at the
very least, with regard to certain types of crime, such as petty vandalism or petty
thefts. See infra note 227. This realization may not, however, apply to activity in
the virtual world, particularly among the less sophisticated members of society.
226. The filing of reports is to be encouraged because each report provides law
enforcement with more empirical data about the types of criminal activity that are
occurring in and via cyberspace. See supra § III(A).
227. This discretion is an accepted aspect of policing the real-world. See, e.g.,
Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 443 (2000):
The police officer is forced to decide on what occasions he or she should
use [an officer's] powers for two major reasons. First,... what crimes
an officer will be in a position to act upon depend upon where the officer
is and what he or she is looking for, and this involves discretion. Second,
if the officer comes upon a minor matter that is criminal, he has to
decide whether it is worth his time, and the time of prosecutors and
judicial officials, to process the matter. In the United States, we are very
frank about such uses of judgment or discretion by individual police
officers or, sometimes, by the police department in the form of
directives to officers .... [I]t is wholly implausible to assume that the
goal in the United States is to enforce all the criminal statutes enacted by
state and federal legislatures. The larger part of violations of the law by
270 million Americans must be ignored by the fewer than one million
police, who do not have time to investigate matters they consider
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unimportant. Moreover, these officers know that prosecutors and judges
will lack the capacity to try cases if all the small matters are brought to
court....
Id
In urban areas of the United States, individuals understand and appreciate that
many minor crimes, such as theft of a bicycle, are highly unlikely to be
investigated, resolved and prosecuted. For that reason, people are likely to take
precautions to avoid becoming a victim of such crimes by using bicycle locks and
other preventative measures. Additionally, people may not bother reporting minor
offenses to the police, realizing that the law enforcement response will be pro
forma, at best.
The attenuated assumption of risk principle articulated in the text above is, to
some extent, an endeavor to extrapolate this real-world understanding of the
futility of expecting an effective law enforcement response to computer-facilitated
activities. One might ask why this is necessary; given the transparently global
nature of cyberspace, it would seem the public should realize that similar factors -
i.e., anonymous offenders, number of offenses - make expectations of effective
online policing unrealistic. See supra § II(C). Unfortunately, most Americans do
not realize that cyberspace is, in effect, a "high crime area" in which the law
enforcement presence borders on ineffectual, for reasons which were explained
above. See Id. There are no doubt various reasons for this difference. One may
be that when individuals engage in certain of the activities that result in online
victimization, they regard themselves as engaged in a virtual face-to-face
encounter with another individual. In online auction fraud, for example, the
victim engages in a transaction (which ultimately proves to be fraudulent) with
another person, the buyer or seller; interactions of this type, which feature an
identified (though presumably aliased) other, may not seem to present the
"danger" of urban, faceless victimization to which the victim may have grown
accustomed. Another likely reason for the difference is that many individuals who
venture into cyberspace have no real appreciation of how the technology works
and how it can be used to their detriment or to the detriment of their families.
They understand that leaving an unsecured bicycle on one's front porch may be an
invitation to theft; they do not understand that using an unsecured cable modem is
an invitation to other types of virtual malefaction.
This general failure to appreciate the risks that lurk online is, of course, why this
article is proposing the implementation of the attenuated assumption of risk
principle discussed in the text above. It is needed both to heighten awareness of
these risks and to encourage individuals (and entities) to assume responsibility for
their own protection. The latter is of far more consequence with regard to
cybercrime than it is to real-world crime. The real-world crimes police and
prosecutors elect not to pursue are, as the above-quoted passage indicates, minor
crimes; bicycle theft, petty vandalism, drug possession and the like are "crimes,"
but they are not offenses that pose any serious risk of "harm" either to person or
property. While this may be true of certain types of cybercrime, others inflict
serious "harm" upon individuals, entities or property; the vandalism of a web site
may seem like a "minor" offense, but if the site belongs to a commercial entity,
the company may lose thousands or even tens of thousands of dollars in lost
revenues while it is paying to have the site restored.
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obligation to take action with regard to offenses targeting those
who assumed the risk of becoming a victim online, though they
may do so.
The fact that a person or entity assumed the risk of being
victimized pursuant to paragraph (1), above, creates no enforceable
rights in the party or parties who are in any way responsible for that
victimization. The principles set forth in paragraph (1), above,
cannot be used as an affirmative defense in a prosecution for
offenses committed against one who assumed the risk of being so
victimized and they in no way restrain law enforcement's ability to
initiate the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for
such offenses.
The bracketed language in the first paragraph creates the
option of structuring the principle so that one must understand the
risk he assumes; this is a traditional component of the tort law
principle.228 If the criminal law principle is to achieve the desired
result, however, it must impose strict liability. That is, the
assumption of risk should arise from the act of accessing
cyberspace without having taken adequate precautions prior to
doing so; 229 knowledge of the risk being assumed should not be
required since the purpose is to encourage citizens to learn about
risks and take steps to avoid them. Incorporating knowledge of the
risk essentially nullifies the efficacy of the principle without
increasing the fairness of the result. The tort principle incorporates
knowledge of the risk being assumed because the consequence of
assuming a civilly-defined risk is that the injured party loses the
right to seek redress for consequent injuries; requiring notice is
therefore a matter of simple fairness.23 ° In the criminal context, the
228. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C(2) (1965) ("a plaintiff
who fully understands a risk of harm to himself or his things.., and who
nevertheless voluntarily chooses to enter or remain, or to permit his things to enter
or remain within the area of that risk, under circumstances that manifest his
willingness to accept it, is not entitled to recover for harm within that risk.").
229. In addition to taking precautions prior to going online, users must make
reasonable efforts to avoid being victimized while online. The precautions they
take prior to accessing cyberspace are likely to be of a technical nature, designed
to guarantee the security of their computer and their avenue of access. See, e.g.,
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, supra note 196, Priority III.
230. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D, cmt. b (1965) ("The
basis of assumption of risk is the plaintiffs consent to accept the risk and look out
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person loses, at most, the expectation of an immediate, effective
law enforcement response to their victimization; since this
expectation may be quite unrealistic, the victim actually "loses"
nothing. The assumption of a criminally-defined risk does not bar
the victim from seeking damages in a civil action brought against
an appropriate party,23 ' nor does it preclude the eventual
apprehension and prosecution of the victimizer. It merely negates
the supposition that one's victimization triggers an entitlement to a
law enforcement response that is instantaneous and efficacious.
We still have not addressed one of the most important
questions raised above; why would we consider importing
assumption of risk into the criminal law? We have never found it
necessary to do so with regard to conduct occurring in the real,
physical world because law enforcement has been able to assure a
level of security such that we did not find it necessary to recruit
citizens to help combat the forces of lawlessness and disorder. One
thing we can reliably predict, however, is that law enforcement
cannot be given enough resources to combat cybercrime effectively
for himself. Therefore he will not be found ... to assume any risk unless he has
knowledge of its existence.").
231. Since assumption of the risk has not been applied in the criminal context,
there is no case or statutory law that is precisely on point for this proposition. An
argument, at least, for its validity can be derived from the way in which the civil
assumption of risk doctrine and related principles are applied. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496F (1965) ("The plaintiff's assumption of
risk bars his recovery for the defendant's violation of a statute, unless such a result
would defeat a policy of the statute to place the entire responsibility for such harm
as has occurred upon the defendant."). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 892C(2) (1965) (a victim's consent to the commission of a crime does not
bar a tort action seeking damages resulting from it if the conduct at issue was
criminalized "to protect a certain class of persons irrespective of their consent").
One can certainly argue that the criminalization of conduct reflects a considered
decision to place the entire responsibility for harm resulting from such conduct on
the person responsible, i.e., the defendant in a civil case seeking damages for such
harm. This argument is consistent with the decisions which have held that
assumption of risk does not bar recovery for an intentional tort because public
policy favors sanctioning and deterring intentional conduct. See supra note 216.
See also Janelsins v. Button, 648 A.2d 1039, 1045 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
Finally, the argument is also supported by the way in which the criminal
assumption of risk principle operates: It does not, as the text above explains,
absolve the perpetrator of criminal liability for his misdeeds; it merely makes it
clear that law enforcement can legitimately assign a lower investigative priority
when the victim assumed the risk of being victimized.
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using the traditional, reactive model; the scale and complexity of
cybercrime as it is and as it will evolve means that societies simply
cannot fund such an effort. 232
The alternative is to recruit citizens into this effort, to move
from a purely reactive model of law enforcement to a blended,
collaborative-preventive-and-reactive model.233  One way to
accomplish this is to encourage individuals and commercial entities
to become responsible for their own security; 234 another is to enact
Draconian laws that require citizens to ensure their own security.
235
The former is likely to be ineffective, at least for some time;236 the
latter is unnecessarily harsh and probably unworkable.
237
232. This is already becoming apparent. See, e.g., Bob Tedeschi, Crime Is
Soaring in Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 27, 2003, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/27/technology/27ECOM.html? (last visited Oct.
3, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal):
'The vast, vast majority of virtual crimes right now never get caught or
prosecuted . .. ' said Dan Farmer, chief technology officer of Elemental
Security, a computer security firm in Silicon Valley ....
Law enforcement authorities acknowledge the difficulty of catching
electronic thieves. 'The crime is much easier because you have
anonymity,' said Tim Caddigan, deputy special agent in charge of the
Secret Service's financial crimes division ....
Adding to the difficulty of catching wired thieves is the fact that the
authorities are outnumbered and, in many cases, outsmarted by criminals
with better computing skills ....
Id.
233. See supra § Ill.
234. See, e.g., THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE, Priority III §
A(l)(a) (Feb. 2003), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/priority_3.pdf (last
visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal).
235. One wonders how such laws would be enforced. Would fines or other
sanctions be levied on those who had failed to comply with their requirements?
This could result in sanctioning victims because they had become victims. Or
perhaps these laws would utilize a traditional assumption of risk approach,
denying victims (presumably victimized because they did not ensure their own
security) access to the reactive aspects of the criminal justice system and any
possibility of ensuring that their victimizers were brought to justice.
236. This approach is likely to be ineffective until the risks of venturing into
cyberspace without having taken measures to secure oneself against cyber-
predators becomes an embedded assumption among the members of the American
public. See supra notes 205-206 and accompanying text.
237. Regardless of how one feels about the severity of such a tactic, this
approach would prove unworkable because it would only add a layer of
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"enforcing" to the effort that is already required to police cyberspace. That is, if
laws were enacted requiring citizens - individual and corporate - to ensure their
own security in cyberspace, these laws would have to be enforced, which would
mean that some group of persons, some agency, would be assigned the task of
monitoring the extent to which citizens had instituted security measures and
pursing the imposition of sanctions against those who had not. Conceptually, the
enactment of such laws and the consequent imposition of sanctions upon those
who refused to comply with their requirements could be justified on the basis that
because cyberspace is a borderless world, every citizen's portal to cyberspace is a
potential source of attack, both for cybercriminals and cyberterrorists. The
problematic aspect of this approach therefore lies not in its conceptualization but
in the pragmatic consequences of its implementation. For one thing, the
enforcement of these laws would divert resources that could more effectively be
employed in a collaborative effort to prevent cybercrime, and to react to
completed cybercrimes. For another, measures such as these would be likely to
alienate at least a large segment of the American public; as many have recognized,
it is far more effective to recruit citizens as willing participants in a campaign than
to impose demands and sanction those who do not live up to these demands. See,
e.g., ANGELO M. CODEVILLA, INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STRATEGIC & POLITICAL
STUDIES, PASSIVE SECURITY MEASURES CRIPPLE LAW-ABIDING CITIZENS AND
DON'T PREVENT TERRORIST ACTIONS (Oct. 1, 2001),
http://www.israeleconomy.org/strategic/codevillainsight.htm (last visited Oct. 5,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal):
The uselessness of security measures is not news. Niccol6 Machiavelli,
hardly a civil libertarian or a devotee of weak government, explained in
1521 that security measures give enemies initiative and fixed targets
against which to plan, but most of all they lead the government to treat
everyone as a potential enemy. By thus demonstrating impotence, fear
and lack of trust, the government magnifies resentment and isolates
itself. True security, Machiavelli wrote, lies in a citizenry both armed
and loyal.
Id. See also George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Civil Liberties,
346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1337 (2002), available at
http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/346/17/1337 (last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on
file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal):
The necessity of maintaining the public's trust ... means that the
argument that, in a public health emergency, there must be a trade-off
between effective public health measures and civil rights is simply
wrong .... Early in the course of the AIDS epidemic, public health
officials recognized that mandatory screening for human
immunodeficiency virus would simply help drive the epidemic
underground, where it would spread faster and wider. Likewise,
draconian quarantine measures would probably have the unintended
effect of encouraging people to avoid public health officials... rather
than to seek them out .... [T]he protection of civil liberties is a core
ingredient in a successful response to a bioterrorist attack. Provisions
that treat citizens as the enemy, with the use of the police for
enforcement, are much more likely to cost lives than to save them.
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The goal is to alter citizen expectations slightly, to make it
very clear to citizens that if they engage in certain activities online
and are victimized while doing so, their victimization may well be,
at most, a low priority for law enforcement. This merely reflects
what is already occurring; police and prosecutors cannot, for
example, pursue justice for every individual who foolishly sent
someone, somewhere, $35 for a Beanie Baby that was advertised
on eBay but never delivered.238 Police and prosecutors know cases
Id. at 1340.
238. Indeed, law enforcement cannot obtain redress even for those whose
victimization involves much larger sums of money. See, e.g., Bob Sullivan, A
$55,000 Net Scam Warning, MSNBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/854552.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2003) (on file with
the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal):
He's a veteran Internet user, and an accomplished dentist. He has a
friend in the FBI, and they have discussed Internet crime. Bruce Lachot
is not your typical Net scam victim. But.. . Lachot finds himself out
$55,000... a victim of one of the most successful and widespread
Internet scams to date ....
The dentist decided it was time to get a 5-seat car, and began test-driving
BMWs at dealerships .... He was smitten with the M5 series, which
can cost $70,000-$80,000. But no local dealers had one, and there was a
long waiting list.
'So I thought, 'Maybe I'll look online,' Lachot said .... Lachot ended
up at Autotrader.com .... [H]e started negotiating with a seller who
said he was in Munich ... and bargained the price down to $55,000 ....
The seller instructed Lachot to .... wire money using the electronic
currency system called E-gold.com. The funds would then be moved
into Escrow-deals.com's E-gold account; then, once the escrow
company verified the deposit, the seller would ship the car ....
Lachot sent the money to E-gold, but as he prepared to transfer it to the
six Escrow-deals.com accounts, he had misgivings .... [T]he dentist...
told the seller he wouldn't have anything to do with the escrow
company.
'He said there's another escrow company I work with,' Lachot said.
This second... company.., appeared much more convincing. 'Their
site seemed a lot more legitimate. It said they were part of the Internet
Security Alliance. It had a direct link to the Internet Fraud Complaint
Center. It was a really slick site, and I'm thinking, OK, this looks good.'
'By Thanksgiving, I'm starting to get nervous,' Lachot said .... He
called his friend at the FBI, and filed a report with the Internet Fraud
Complaint Center. The next day, the seller sent a new e-mail, claiming
that he was hung up at the NATO conference in Prague, and promised to
ship the car on Dec. 4.... That's the last Lachot heard from either the
escrow firm or the seller ....
Lachot... didn't have any protection when he sent away $55,000. Still,
TOWARD A CRIMINAL LAW FOR CYBERSPACE
such as these stand very little, if any, chance of ever being
prosecuted, but they have no acceptable way of communicating this
to the public. In a system that assumes the effectiveness of the
traditional, reactive model of law enforcement, it would not be a
wise career move for a county prosecutor to inform his constituents
that if they are victimized in certain ways while online, his office
may not pursue those cases. The attenuated assumption of risk
principle set forth above could be used to make this notion more
palatable by giving the public a realistic understanding of the
dangers they face online and of their evolving responsibility to
ensure their own safety in the online world.
If such a principle were to be implemented, how, precisely,
would it operate? Would it apply equally to all who venture into
cyberspace or would some be deemed, in effect, less capable of
assuming the risk of victimization? If distinctions were made,
upon what basis would victims be held more or less responsible for
their injuries?
We cannot predict conclusively how these issues would be
resolved, but we can gain insights into how the principle might
work in practice by considering its application to various categories
of users, i.e., to those who venture into cyberspace. The sections
below undertake this analysis.
1. "Regular" Adults
This category comprises the primary targets of the online
assumption of risk principle. It encompasses two discrete groups:
"sophisticated" adults and "regular" adults. "Adults" are those
over the age of 18.239 "Sophisticated adults" are those who, by
virtue of their profession or personal inclinations, are particularly
adept at protecting themselves with regard to their activities in and
he's luckier than many victims: thanks to his FBI agent friend, he knows
federal investigators have at least taken a look at his case. But even with
the inside help, he knows he's unlikely to see any of his money, or any
justice.
Id.
239. This seems to be a standard definition of adulthood in criminal statutes.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.66.300 (Michie 2002); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(a)
(West 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130(1) (Mitchie 1999); OR. REV. STAT. §
144.600, Art. 11(a) (2001).
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pertaining to cyberspace. "Regular adults" is a residual category
that consists of normally functioning2 40 adults who possess no
particular computer expertise but who can be deemed capable of
acquiring the expertise or the assistance needed to protect
themselves with regard to activities in and pertaining to cyberspace.
The principle is intended to ensure that "regular" adults, in
particular, are aware of the risks that lurk online and understand
that they are the primary guarantors of their own safety, that, in
other words, the criminal justice system can provide no guarantee
of redress for "harms" they suffer at the hands of a cybercriminal.
The principle would no doubt play a lesser role as to
"sophisticated" adults, since we can reasonably assume that they do
understand the risks that lurk online; as to this sub-category of
computer users, the principle would operate primarily as a reminder
of the need to take what for them are clearly understood and easily
implemented precautions.
The online assumption of risk principle would operate without
exception or qualification as to adults who fall into this general
category of computer users.
2. "Vulnerable "Adults
This category encompasses individuals 18 or older who cannot
be deemed as capable as "regular" adults of acquiring the expertise
and/or the assistance they need to protect themselves with regard to
their activities in and pertaining to cyberspace. Specifically, it
comprises those whose abilities in this regard have been impaired
by age, mental handicap, illness or other objectively identifiable
factors.24' The individuals in this class are capable of accessing
240. Cf infra § IV(B).
241. The definition of "vulnerable adult" used for this category is a lesser
variant of the definition found in many criminal statutes, i.e., "a person 18 years of
age or older who has a physical or mental condition which substantially impairs
the person from adequately providing for his or her own care or protection." D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-932 (2001). See also ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.220 (Michie 2002);
MD. ANN. CODE § 3-604(a)(10) (1957); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-507(e)(vii)
(Michie 2003). The definitions used in many extant statutes is inappropriate for
this analysis because it might functionally demarcate a class of persons whose
impairment is substantial enough to prevent their accessing cyberspace, at least in
any independent and meaningful way. The principle, however, that some adults
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cyberspace independently and in a meaningful way; they can,
without assistance, use computer technology to surf the Internet,
send and receive emails and/or otherwise engage in online
activities. They therefore have the capacity to use cyberspace but
because of their impairment we cannot assume they have the
requisite capacity to protect themselves from the dangers they may
encounter online.
How should "vulnerable" adults' impaired ability to protect
themselves be factored into the application of the assumption of
risk principle?242 One possibility would be for law enforcement
officials to factor a victim's impairment into the decision to
investigate and/or prosecute on the premise that the criminal justice
system should make every effort to try to sanction and thereby
deter those who target vulnerable victims.
243
3. Children
Should the assumption of risk principle apply to children, i.e.,
to those under the age of 1 8?244 Clearly, those below a certain age
cannot be expected to have the same levels of maturity,
sophistication and, perhaps, technical expertise and resources as
adults. Unfortunately, the same factors that make it impossible for
law enforcement officers to react effectively to completed
cybercrimes against adults make it impossible for them to do so
may not be as capable of ensuring their own protection as others is an important
one that should somehow be factored into the assumption of risk calculus.
242. One could analogize the individuals in this category to children, in the
sense that both are less able to protect themselves than are "regular" adults.
Unfortunately, the analogy, even if apt, is of little utility in resolving the question
posed above; we cannot assume that "vulnerable" adults, like children, have
parents or guardians who can be assigned responsibility for ensuring their safety
while online. See infra § IV(B)(3). Aside from anything else, the categories differ
in terms of one's amenability to direction and supervision: We can reliably
presume that children, especially those below a certain age, are subject to parental
control; we cannot make this assumption as to "vulnerable" adults both because of
the extent to which they will differ as to the nature and extent of their impairment
and because they are adults who are presumptively unfettered by the insistent
vigilance parents exercise as to children. See infra § IV(B)(3).
243. It would also be eminently reasonable to target computer users who fall
into this category for special education about and assistance with online security.
244. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
2004]
92 RUTGERS COMPUTER AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
with regard to completed cybercrimes against children. 245  At the
same time, it seems unduly harsh to impose the assumption of risk
principle upon children without lenity or moderation.
A reasonable approach might be a triage system in which (a)
parents are solely responsible for ensuring the online safety of
children who are below a certain age (12, say) and (b) parents and
children are jointly responsible for ensuring the online safety of
children above that age (12-18, say). The premises responsible for
alternative (a) are (i) that younger children are less likely to engage
in online activities that expose them to real-world danger, such as
assignations with pedophiles;246 and (ii) that it is reasonable to
make their parents the guarantors of their safety because they are
less likely to be able to bypass security measures implemented by
adults.247  Alternative (b) rests upon a single premise: that their
increasing maturity and technological sophistication makes it
reasonable for children in this category to assume at least some
responsibility for their safety with regard to online activities.
248
The assumption of online risk applies to both alternatives.
Alternative (b) however, should include an exception; assumption
245. See supra §II(C).
246. This is, in effect, saying that it is reasonable to impose the assumption of
risk principle in this context because children of this age are less likely to be the
targets of "serious" crimes than are older children. This proposition is derived
from the underlying rationale of the assumption of risk principle, i.e., to let law
enforcement to concentrate its efforts on more "serious" crimes, with the
prevention of lesser crimes being consigned to the potential victims who venture
into cyberspace. See supra notes 232-238 and accompanying text.
247. It may well be that children in this age group tend to be more
technologically sophisticated than their parents and are, therefore, able to bypass
security measures implemented by their parents. However, if parents realize they
are primarily responsible to ensuring the online safety of children in this age
group, they can reach out to external sources - friends, family, commercial entities
- to ensure the implementation of security measures that cannot be compromised
by children in this age group. Indeed, the principle of assumed risk should create
an incentive to devise such measures and implement systems for making them
generally available to parents.
248. As a matter of prudence, children in this category should be educated
about the specific types of risk they may confront while online and about the
tactics they should employ to avoid those risks. They should also be encouraged,
consistent with the assumption of risk principle, to report criminal or potentially
criminal behavior they encounter while online to law enforcement. See supra note
226 and accompanying text.
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of risk applies full force except as to crimes that create a realized or
likely risk of physical harm to a child within this category.249
4. Adults Victimized Indirectly by an Online Entity
The above analyses of the extent to which adults should be
deemed to have assumed the risk of their victimization online
assumed that these adults were victimized directly, as a result of
their own acts or omissions.250  This section is concerned with
instances in which adults are victimized indirectly as the result of
transactions with an online entity, typically a commercial entity.251
Assume, for example, that adults who patronize an online
retailer are victimized because a hacker unlawfully accesses the
retailer's databases and secures the credit card numbers of many of
its customers. The hacker sells the credit card numbers to others
who use them to buy expensive goods or to "steal" the identities of
the retailer's customers. 252 Should the assumption of risk principle
apply to the customers even though they were not directly
responsible for their victimization?
249. This proposition, again, derives from the rationale for the principle, i.e., to
let law enforcement concentrate its resources on "serious" crimes. See supra note
246.
250. See supra §§ IV(B)(1)-(2).
251. The discussion in this section assumes (a) that an "adult" is someone over
18 and (b) that the rules enunciated in § IV(B)(3) apply to those under 18. See
supra §§ IV(B)(1) & IV(B)(3). The analysis in this section could also be applied
to children who are victimized indirectly. See infra notes 255-256.
The entity that becomes the vector for victimizing individuals can, but need not
be, a commercial entity. It could, for example, be a lobbying group, a charitable
organization or a governmental agency. The discussion in the text assumes that
the vector is a commercial entity simply because so much crime is economically
driven. It follows, therefore, both from logic and from what we have so far seen
of cybercrime, that indirect victimization of the type discussed above is likely to
involve the use of a commercial entity as the vector for exploiting individuals.
The approach suggested in this section could also be applied to children who are
victimized indirectly by a commercial entity. See infra notes 255-256.
252. See, e.g., Renay San Miguel, Tackling Identity Theft, CNN.com (Jan. 29,
2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2002/TECH/I11/26/hln.wired.id.theft/ (last visited
Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal);
Renay San Miguel, Experts: Chat Rooms a Haven for Hackers, CNN.com (Apr.
10, 2002), at http://www.cnn.com/2002/TECH/intemet/04/10/hackers.chat.rooms/
(last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal).
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One could argue that the principle should apply only to the
commercial entity because its acts or omissions were the direct
cause of the theft of the credit cards which resulted in the
customers' victimization.253 The better approach, however, is to
impose assumption of risk on the customers (as well as on the
commercial entity) 254 because doing so creates an incentive for
individual customers (and artificial entity customers) to review and
assess security guarantees before patronizing an online commercial
site. This is consistent with the underlying rationale of the online
assumption of risk principle, which is to create educated users who
assume responsibility for avoiding their victimization. Applying
the principle in this context should help encourage the development
of "security consciousness" among those who patronize online
suppliers of products or services. 255 And it does not leave these
secondary victims without redress because they are deemed to have
assumed the risk of criminal victimization, and in no way prevents
them from seeking civil redress against the retailer whose possible
256negligence was the direct cause of their victimization.
5. Commercial Entities
The sections above argue that we should apply the assumption
of risk principle both to "primary victims," i.e., individuals whose
victimization is the direct result of their failure to take adequate
precautions as to their online activities, 257 and to "secondary
victims," i.e., those whose victimization derived from their
connection to an online entity attacked by a cybercriminal.258 We
must now consider whether it should apply to entities conducting
253. See infra § IV(B)(5).
254. See id.
255. If the principle is also applied to children, then this should encourage
parents to assume responsibility for monitoring the security of commercial sites
which their children patronize.
256. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. Again, if the principle were
applied to children, their parents could seek civil redress on behalf of a victimized
child.
257. See supra §§ IV(B)(1)-(3).
258. See supra § IV(B)(3). As is explained above, secondary victims can seek
redress from the entity in question because the principle does not bar the
imposition of civil liability. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. See also
supra § IV(B)(4).
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commercial activities in cyberspace; that is, we must decide
whether entities, too, assume the risk of their direct victimization
by cybercriminals.259
Is there any reason to treat "collective victims" differently?
More precisely, is there any reason why assumption of risk should
not apply to online commercial entities?
The answer may depend on how we approach these entities.
We can conceive of them in two ways: (1) as being functionally
undistinguishable from their real-world counterparts; or (2) as
being quite a different phenomenon. In the first perspective, online
commercial entities - like real-world commercial entities - are
merely an avenue by which we obtain goods or services; for both,
their function and their commitment to their clientele is limited to
providing certain deliverables. The second perspective is a
speculation; it postulates that in the online world, commercial
entities might take on responsibilities unknown to their real-world
equivalents and thereby become the basis of a new approach to
online security. Instead of relying solely on their own efforts to
evade the attentions of cybercriminals, individuals (and patron
entities 260) could conduct their activities through presumptively
secure companies. Companies could guarantee varying levels of
259. This analysis focuses on commercial entities as primary victims. This
section considers whether we should apply assumption of risk to entities that
become the targets of successful cybercrimes because they failed to protect
themselves with regard to their online activities. Its focus on commercial entities
derives from the empirical proposition that they are more likely to be the targets of
cybercriminals, but the analysis presented above should apply with equal force to
non-commercial entities. See supra note 251.
The analysis of secondary victimization presented earlier applies to commercial
entities that are victimized because of their connection to another entity. See
supra § IV(B)(4). If, for example, an online retailer suffers because a hacker
successfully penetrates the databases of a company that processes credit card
transactions, the retailer should be treated the same as any other secondary victim;
the retailer will be deemed to have assumed the risk of being criminally victimized
but can always seek civil redress from the credit card processing company. See id.
See, e.g., Paul Roberts, Hackers Get Info on Millions of Credit Cards, InfoWorld
(Feb. 18, 2003), at http://www.infoworld.com/article/03/02/18/HNbreakin_ 1 .html
(last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal).
260. Patron entities are commercial or non-commercial entities that obtain
goods and/or services from other (commercial) entities.
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online security to those with whom they do business;26 1 using
companies with higher levels of security would become another,
very legitimate way to avoid becoming a victim of a
cybercriminal.262  We must, therefore, consider whether the
assumption of online risk should be applied to traditional
commercial entities and/or to the postulated emergent commercial-
263security entities.
(a) Traditional Commercial Entities
Traditional commercial entities provide goods and/or services
to their customers. Should assumption of risk apply to these
entities? They are, after all, not in the business of providing
security for their customers; they are analogous to real-world
businesses that expect an immediate and effective law enforcement
response when they are targets of real-world crime. One can argue
that we want law enforcement to give priority to the victimization
of such entities because of the presumptive likelihood that these
crimes will be of significantly greater scale than those targeting
individuals.264 The "scale" argument for exempting these entities
261. Third-party security guarantees have already emerged. See, e.g.,
VeriSign, at http://www.verisign.com/corporate/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2003) (on
file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal); Thawte, at
http://www.thawte.com/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers
Computer and Technology Law Journal). Companies could guarantee varying
levels of security, depending upon the nature of their commercial activities, the
extent of their resources and other pertinent variables.
262. A hierarchy of security guarantees could evolve in which one could
assume that transactions mediated through a commercial entity with an AAAA
security rating were quite secure, whereas a security rating of BB would put the
customer on notice that they were assuming the risk of dealing with that company.
This postulated hierarchy is consistent with the rationale of the assumption of risk
principle, which is to encourage individuals and entities to protect themselves in
their dealings via cyberspace.
263. "Traditional commercial entities" are functionally indistinguishable from
their real-world counterparts. "Commercial-security entities" are online entities
that undertake to provide both commercial deliverables and at least some measure
of security encompassing their interactions with customers.
264. See, e.g., Martin Sargent, Twisted List: Five Most Notorious Hackers
Ever, TechTV (Apr. 9, 2001), at
http://www.techtv.com/screensavers/twistedlist/jump/0,24331,3321226,00.html
(last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal) (Russian hacker Vladimir Levin used stolen customer codes and
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from the assumption of risk has two prongs. One is that an
exemption is warranted because the greater damage a cybercriminal
inflicts upon a commercial entity has a more profound impact upon
society than does the lesser harm inflicted upon an individual
victim; the other is that since the level of "harm" a criminal inflicts
tends to be an indicator of his/her level of dangerousness, 265 there is
good reason to encourage law enforcement to assign investigative
priority to cybercrimes against entities such as these.266
This argument has some validity, but the policies that support
implementing the online assumption of risk principle would be
more effectively furthered by enforcing the principle against
commercial entities. If commercial entities know their
victimization will not necessarily receive a priority higher than that
passwords to siphon $10 million from Citibank); Alex Salkever, Cyber-Extortion:
When Data Is Held Hostage, BusinessWeek Online (Aug. 22, 2000), at
http://www.businessweek.comIbwdaily/dnflash/aug2000/nf20000822_308.htm
(last visited Oct. 5, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
Journal) ("With thousands of financial institutions and other customers trading
billions of dollars daily in stocks and bonds based on information from Bloomberg
terminals, the threat of a hacked system could have proven catastrophic for both
the media company and its Wall Street customers").
The presumption of greater scale is derived from the fact that commercial
entities generally control more assets than individual targets. It follows that a
cybercriminal can appropriate more "value" from and/or wreak more havoc on an
entity than on an individual. See, e.g., supra note 264. "Value" encompasses both
traditional assets such as cash, intellectual property, proprietary information or
trade secrets and emerging assets such as information. See, e.g., Jonathan C.
Lipson, Remote Control: Revised Article 9 and the Negotiability of Information,
63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1327 (2002).
265. Criminal law is concerned with preventing "harm to society", specifically
with preventing "injury to the health, safety, morals and welfare of the public. This
it accomplishes by punishing those who have done harm, and by threatening with
punishment those who would do harm, to others." Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W.
Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 1.2(e) (1986). See also Susan W. Brenner,
Is There Such A Thing As "Virtual Crime"?, 4 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2001),
available at http://www.boalt.org/CCLR/v4/v4brenner.htm (last visited Oct. 5,
2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
266. Aside from anything else, cybercriminals who successfully target large
commercial entities have not only proven that they are "dangerous" as the term
has traditionally been used in criminal law, i.e., that they have a propensity for
unlawful conduct, but have also demonstrated a level of technical expertise which
equips them to commit highly sophisticated offenses. It is reasonable to infer from
their established propensity for unlawful conduct that they will continue to commit
further offenses unless and until they are apprehended and prosecuted.
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given to other victims, 267 they have an incentive to take whatever
measures are reasonably necessary (and reasonably within their
capacity) to ensure that their assets and activities are secure from
the depredations of online criminals. The application of the
principle is also dictated by simple logic. An earlier section
explained why assumption of risk should apply to customers who
are victimized because they dealt with an entity whose online
security failed, resulting in the commission of a cybercrime the
effects of which caused harm to the customers. If we apply
assumption of risk to the customers but do not apply it to the
commercial entity whose ineptitude created the opportunity for the
commission of cybercrime, what seems a perverse result ensues:
the customers are held to have assumed the risk of doing business
with an insecure commercial entity, but the entity itself is not
deemed to have assumed the risk that it would become the target of
a cybercrime. Consequently, the customers' victimization would
not be a priority for law enforcement but the entity's victimization
would. While this result may seem at once illogical and
undesirable, one can argue that it is not; indeed, two arguments can
be made on its behalf.
The first argument concentrates on the effect the differential
application of the assumption of risk principle has in this scenario.
Applying the principle to the customers means their victimization
is given little or no law enforcement attention. Not applying the
principle to the entity means that its victimization will receive law
enforcement attention and may even become a priority for the
appropriate agencies. The net effect of all this is that law
enforcement will concentrate its energies on cybercrime that
directly victimized the entity and indirectly led to the victimization
of its customers. At the very least, this means both classes of
victims will know that law enforcement attempted to redress the
injury done to them; at the very most, it means that law
267. The assumption of risk principle merely negates any expectation of an
immediate, effective law enforcement response to any cybercrime. It does not bar
law enforcement from assigning priority and providing such a response to the
victimization of a particular online commercial entity. So, if a company is the
target of a distinctly egregious cybercrime, law enforcement is free to respond to
that event in whatever fashion it deems necessary.
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enforcement will apprehend the perpetrators, who will be tried and
punished for their deeds. Are these not satisfactory outcomes?
One can also re-invoke the issue of scale to defend what at
least initially seems to be a perverse result. The argument is that
the commercial entity was the target of a "collective" crime which,
for the reasons given above, warrant a higher law enforcement
priority than do the discrete, derivative crimes inflicted upon the
entity's customers.
The primary objection to these arguments is that not applying
assumption of risk to the entity would directly controvert the
policies responsible for the assumption of risk principle. Requiring
entities to assume the risk of being the direct victims of cybercrime
gives them an incentive to secure their online operations. The
measures entities institute to protect themselves, also protect their
customers, who assume the risk of dealing with these entities.268
Since customers can do relatively little to secure their interactions
with commercial entities, creating this incentive enhances the
security of online commercial transactions.
There is yet another reason why these entities should not be
exempted from assuming the risk of online crime. It goes to the
consequences, specifically the civil consequences, of assuming
such a risk. As an earlier section explained, 269 indirect victims of
cybercrime - individuals and entities alike - are deemed to have
assumed the risk of their criminal victimization but are not barred
from seeking civil redress for their losses. So, the customers of a
traditional commercial entity who become the victims of identity
theft because the entity left their personal information unsecured
can sue that entity, on the premise that its negligence was the
proximate cause of their becoming the victims of identify theft.27°
268. As explained below, customers' ability to seek civil redress from a
responsible commercial entity should further enhance the effectiveness of this
incentive.
269. See supra § IV(B)(4).
270. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. The prospect of civil suits
should enhance the incentive to secure online operations and assets that result
from applying the assumption of risk principle to traditional commercial entities.
See supra note 268 and accompanying text Of course, if the principle is not
applied to these entities, then this incentive may be eroded or never come into
existence.
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While the assumption of risk principle should play no formal role
in civil proceedings resulting from the commission of a cybercrime,
it might be used informally to support certain inferences. The
plaintiff-customers would be deemed to have assumed the risk of
their indirect victimization but the defendant-entity would not be
deemed to have assumed the risk of its own, direct victimization.
Defendant-entities might use the plaintiff-customers' assuming the
risk of cybercrime to argue, however subtly, for a cyber caveat
emptor principle; that is, they might claim that the customers are
not entitled to a civil recovery because they clearly assumed the
risk of cybercrime. Applying the assumption of risk principle to
both parties eliminates this possibility.
271
(b) Commercial-Security Entities
As noted earlier, the existence of these entities is a matter of
speculation, an extrapolation from the premise that online
commercial entities will find it in their best interests to offer
security guarantees to their customers. The validity of this premise
is already evident, as online retailers currently offer varying
27assurances of security to their patrons. 72 The proliferation of these
271. It should also eliminate any possibility that plaintiff-customers could use
the defendant-entity's own assumption of risk to sustain an inference that the
traditional commercial entity was negligent as to its online security. Such an
inference is factually inappropriate because it is quite possible that the entity
implemented all reasonable security measures and was still victimized; perhaps the
cybercriminal had inside technical information as to how to bypass its otherwise
unobjectionable security measures. As long as the assumption of risk principle
applies equally to both parties, neither should be able to use it to gain unfair
advantage in civil litigation arising from their joint victimization.
272. See, e.g., Secure Shopping Guarantee, Rogers,
http://www.shoprogers.com/about/security.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (on file
with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal):
If you are not an existing Rogers customer, rest assured that shopping at
www.rogers.com is safe. Our security systems use up-to-date technology
embodying industry standards, and secure shopping is our priority. The
Rogers.com Secure Shopping Guarantee is our commitment to you. If
your credit card is used in an unauthorized manner as a result of you
shopping on www.rogers.com - through no fault of your own - we will
cover whatever amount your credit card company doesn't - up to $50.
Id.; See also Secure Shopping Guarantee, K-Mart, at
http://www.kmart.com/helpdesk/index.jsp?display=safety&subdisplay=secure
(last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law
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assurances is interesting because they really have no counterpart in
the real-world; customers shopping at their local grocery or
department store or patronizing their favorite local restaurant
typically receive no guarantees that the processing of their credit
card or other data is protected by security measures instituted by
the vendor. This is particularly surprising when one realizes how
easy it can be for a store clerk or restaurant server to appropriate
the information needed to commit identity theft.
273
The already evident trend for online commercial entities to
offer guarantees of security (albeit in varying degrees) must be
attributable to perceived differences between online and offline
commerce, differences that are already apparent to those who
venture online in source of certain goods and services. One
difference, no doubt, is the relative anonymity of online commerce.
In the real-world, we give our credit cards to perfect strangers with
little, if any, disquiet. Perhaps because we derive an illusion of
security from the fact that we "see" this person and therefore
Journal) ("We have established a Secure Shopping Guarantee for every transaction
that you make with www.kmart.com. Should any unauthorized charges appear on
your credit card as a result of shopping with www.kmart.com, you must notify
your credit card provider in accordance with its reporting rules and procedures").
273. See, e.g., Skimming Scan, Identity Theft Protection, at
http://www.identity-theft-protection.com/articles/skimming.htm (last visited Oct.
2, 2003) (on file with the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal):
You have just finished eating dinner at your favorite restaurant. You
hand the waiter your credit card. The waiter returns in a few minutes
with your credit card and receipt for the meal. This is how a nice
evening at a restaurant normally ends but what you do not know is you
have just become a victim of Identity Theft.
This waiter used a technique called Skimming. This is a technique used
by Identity Thieves to gain access to your Credit or Debit cards. The
thief uses a small hand held electronic device known as a 'skimmer'.
This skimmer gathers the information that is embedded in the magnetic
strip of your card.
In the scenario described above a waiter takes possession of your card
and on the way to the register they swipe your card in their hand held
skimmer. This process only takes a second. The skimmer then has the
information stored that was embedded in the magnetic strip of your card.
This information may include your name, address, credit limit, and
Personal Identification number.
With this information the thief can use it to make counterfeit credit cards
or make unauthorized purchases over the phone or Internet....
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"know who they are." Our inability to see who "we are dealing
with" online, coupled with widely publicized instances of identity
theft and other online fraud, make online patrons more hesitant,
more desirous of assurances that, in fact, their transactions are
being protected by security measures instituted by the vendor.
So far, though, we are relatively undemanding consumers of
security guarantees. It is exceedingly doubtful that most patrons of
online commercial entities actually read the security policies and
guarantees provided by the entities with which they deal. It is far
more likely that they find the existence of such policies and
guarantees enough to remove the hesitance they may feel about
engaging in anonymous online commerce. If, however, the
assumption of risk principle is implemented, especially as to
indirect online victimization, it is reasonable to assume that the
typical patrons of online commercial entities will become more
demanding in their expectations of security and more selective in
choosing the entities with which they deal. This means that
security will necessarily become part of the deliverables these
entities provide, a state of affairs that will only be exacerbated by
applying the online assumption of risk principle to the direct and
indirect victimization of individuals and entities by cybercriminals.
This, then, would be the genesis of the commercial-security
entities hypothesized above. Commercial-security entities would
probably begin as variants of the traditional commercial entities
discussed in the previous section. Their primary purpose would be
purveying commercial goods and services; providing security
would be a secondary purpose, a necessary supplement to their
primary endeavor. Because these transitional entities are not far
removed from traditional online commercial entities, the
assumption of risk principle should clearly apply to their activities,
both as to the direct and indirect victimization of the entity and its
customers, for the reasons given above.274
It is likely that at some point these entities will begin to realize
that security, itself, is a marketable commodity. That is, they may
appreciate that they can market not only the goods and/or services
they have traditionally provided, but can sell their consistently
274. See supra § IV(B)(5)(a).
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reliable security measures as an independent commodity. Once this
occurs, we should see the evolution of the first, true commercial-
security entities. These entities will act as an online portal, a
trusted gateway via which individuals and other entities can
conduct commercial and other transactions online. 275 They will
market their own goods and services, perhaps the products they
provided originally, but they will also market their ability to
provide safe, secure access to other sources of goods and
services.276 Since these portal sites are a step removed from
traditional commercial entities, one could argue that the assumption
of risk principle should not apply to them because they are now
providing more than idiosyncratic deliverables. They have become
part of the fabric of online security. This is, in effect, a variation of
the "scale" argument adduced to support exempting traditional
commercial entities from the application of the principle. 277 That
is, the argument for exempting these entities from the application
on the online assumption of risk principle is premised on the extent
to which they have assumed the responsibility to protect online
transactions from the depredations of cybercriminals. And there is
an appeal to this argument; these commercial-security entities are,
after all, providing a service above and beyond purveying goods
and services to customers. They are in a sense analogous to
twentieth century proprietary telephone companies in that they
have become the medium by which much of the nation's commerce
is conducted. It would, therefore, seem eminently reasonable to
exempt them from the assumption of risk principle and thereby
encourage law enforcement to give its highest investigative priority
to attacks on these entities. Doing so would have the consequent
benefit of encouraging consumers to rely on these entities as portals
for online commerce and, in turn, should help to increase the
general level of online security. The previous section argued that it
275. We can see the beginnings of this in Amazon.com, which has rather
rapidly evolved from being purely an online bookseller into a portal site that
provides access - presumably trusted access - to other websites that provide a
variety of goods, from apparel to office products to collectibles. See
Amazon.com, at http://www.amazon.com (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (on file with
the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal).
276. See supra note 275.
277. See supra notes 264-266 and accompanying text.
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was inadvisable to exempt traditional commercial entities from the
assumption of risk principle because doing so would erode their
incentive to provide adequate security for themselves and for those
with whom they do business. That argument does not seem
compelling with regard to the entities in this category. Unlike
traditional commercial entities, they are providing not merely
goods and services but security. Since security is one of the
deliverables they are providing and, indeed, may well be the most
significant of those deliverables, it seems that exempting them from
the application of the assumption of risk principle would not
undercut their commitment to provide the highest possible level of
online security.
V. CONCLUSION
Cyberspace presents many challenges for the law, both civil
and criminal. One of the most critical challenges the law faces is
ensuring the enforcement of criminal law in cyberspace. As earlier
sections of this article explained, cybercrime differs in several
fundamental respects from real-world crime, the type of crime
which our existing model of law enforcement was developed to
address. As a result, the traditional model is not an effective means
of dealing with cybercrime.
There is good reason to believe that we are witnessing the
emergence of a new model of law enforcement, at least with regard
to cybercrime. While it is far too early to speculate with any
specificity as to the eventual form this model will take, it is
possible to note several characteristics which will most certainly
persist. Because it is the product of an evolutionary process that is
changing our basic social order, from the nation-state to the
market-state, the new model will necessarily de-emphasize the
state's guaranteeing certain rights and protections to its citizens. It
will emphasize citizen opportunities and obligations. For
cybercrime, this means that we will see the evolution of a system in
which citizens and law enforcement officers work together to
ensure our collective security from crime, particularly cybercrime.
